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FAITH AND THE VATICAN COUNCIL I: CHAPTER THREE OF THE CONSTITUTION DEI FILIUS

by

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PREFACE

One about to be baptized is questioned: "What do you ask of the Church?" The responder simply says: "Faith". And once the water flows, conjoined with the words, "Ego baptizo. . ." the splendor of grace with that faith floods the soul.

Thus for the child, at least, grace and faith come through baptism. That grace likens the child to God, that faith empowers him to possess secrets of God--all unknown to the child.

In the course of time the divine life may be lost, to be regained. Yet, in all probability, faith will not be lost. Divine love may not give it life, but remain it will, dormant, inactive, dead.

The Church, the guardian of the sacraments, labors to apprise her children of the value of grace--the divine vitality. She also guards the faith since: "The principal duty and office of the Church is to guard and preserve the deposit of faith in its pristine form. This she does against the damaging influences wrought by men and the times so that not one jot or tittle is lost from it nor truly changed."[1]

Faith, the virtue, cannot suffer directly from the onslaughts of these external influences. But man is man. And the influences of the times, of other men can be the occasion for man to reject that faith.

The intellect does not become dissatisfied with truth. It becomes, rather, unimpressed because earthly passions and the viciousness of men present error with more force and in the guise of the true.

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[1] Mansi, 51.42B.

It has been and, in time, ever will be the sacred trust of the Church to counter these influences. Possibly more than in previous centuries the forces of evil were about their devious work in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Those times saw a revolution destructive not only of government but also of religion. And Jansenism like fire sparked and spread, fanned on by the French temperament, fueled by the government. Even the Jesuits could not dampen its ardor for they were no more. The same government suppressed all religious vows, attached the lands of the Church, made the work of the clergy dependent on the state.

None of this augured well for theology. It was in a weak state. For the great libraries of religious were destroyed. Seminaries were closed. The state tightened its control of the Church by professing its dominance as a mission, as a doctrine.[2]

These times had to pass. Yet even though political regimes may topple and fall the thought of man lingers on. It affects the ideas of a new era. The thought of man so threatening, so damaging to the life of grace and faith during these centuries was called rationalism.

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[2] It would be useful to consult the following for the political and religious questions of these centuries: Fernand Mourret, *A History of the Catholic Church*, trans. Newton Thompson(St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1954) 7; Edgar Hocedez, *Histoire de la théologie au XIXe siècle* (Brussels: L'Edition Universelle, S.A., 1949) 1; an article by J. Pohle, "Theology", *Catholic Encyclopedia*(New York: Encyclopedia Press, Inc., 1913) 14; three works by E. E. Y. Hales *Pio Nono*(New York: Image Books ed., 1962), *Revolution and Papacy*(New York: Hanover House, 1960) and *The Catholic Church in the Modern World*(New York: Hanover House, 1958); Adrien Dansette, *Histoire religieuse de la France contemporaine*(Paris: Flammarion et Cie, éditeurs, 1948) 1; in English *Religious History of Modern France*, trans. John Dingle(New York: Herder and Herder, 1961); Augustin Fliche and Victor Martin, eds. *Histoire de l'église*(Paris: Bloud and Gay) vol. 20, Jean Leflon, *La crise revolutionnaire*, 1949; vol. 21, Roger Aubert, *Le pontificat de Pie IX*, 1952.

Rationalism spawned errors. Some were direct descendents. Others were generated in opposition to it. Yet all, though not attacking, did sap the strength of faith in some way.

The Church had reacted to protect her borders as the need arose. But so dangerous were the errors that she felt the time was opportune to solemnly proclaim and define the truth. Thus in 1869 the Vatican Council was opened--to protect faith.

The intention here is to present the errors and how the Church combatted them at the first Vatican Council.

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THE LIBERAL ARTS PRESS, New York
Discourse on Method by Rene Descartes, trans. Laurence J. Lafleur, 1960.
Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics by Immanuel Kant, trans. Mahaffy-Carus, Rev. L.W. Beck, 1951.
The Vocation of Man by Johann Gottlieb Fichte, ed. Roderick M. Chisholm 1956.

YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS, New Haven
Voltaire and the English Deists by Norman Lewis Torrey, 1930.

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CHAPTER ONE

THE INTELLECTUAL CLIME

This study begins with a consideration of Rationalism. Rationalism cannot be precisely defined. It is not a school of thought, nor a system of tenets but is, rather, an intellectual tendency to give reason supremacy in determining certitude. This does not stop with metaphysical truths but carries over into the realm of morality. And in the quest for truth no authority may be invoked except the authority of reason. Philosophy far from being the handmaid of theology, is actually, contrary to it.[1]

The rationalist insists that the proper domain of reason is nature or the natural order. To him reason signifies that which is in opposition to supernatural faith and revelation, all those natural means by which man arrives at the knowledge of truth. Nature here is opposed to grace and the supernatural. Thus the rationalist contends: only those conclusions are valid which are arrived at through sense perception, by induction or deduction.[2]

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[1] See C. Constantin, "Rationalisme", Dictionnaire de théologie catholique(Paris: Libraire Letouzey et Ané, 1937) 13.2, 1689 (Hereafter referred to as DTC). See Frederick Copleston, S.J. for a discussion of the meaning of rationalist. He contends, and rightly, that the common acceptation of the word as put forward here is not really adequate. It would see, though, that what is presented is the logical conclusion of the rationalist positions no matter how they be individually defined. A History of Philosophy (Westminster: Newman Press, 1959) 4.16-24.

[2] J.M.A. Vacant, Études théologiques sur les constitutions du vatican(Paris: Delhommet Briguet, Editors, 1895) 1.113.

There is, of course, an order of nature. Reason comprehends this. But reason, according to its nature, seeks truth in a limited way. And rationalism is on safe ground as long as its capabilities and limitations are recognized and adhered to. This position is termed intellectualism to distinguish it from rationalism in the strict sense.[3]

Rationalism is dangerous enough on the speculative level where it could only effect a few. But it is also a practical doctrine for it teaches a purely natural morality. It endeavors to subvert the teachings of Christianity and purports to govern private and public morality, to establish, in fine, the rule of reason and nature.[4]

But man must have religion. Rationalism grasping this need proposes a natural religion for man.[5] Religion, however, is separated from the supernatural since the human intellect has knowledge of religion without the intervention of revelation. This is a necessary tenet because revelation as supernatural must not be admitted and cannot be a source of truth. God's existence is proved by reason. And all truths of God and His relationship to man acquired by the use of the gifts natural to reason may be admitted. God, as the author of nature, is recognized. But God, as the author of grace, is ignored since this certain knowledge of God comes through revelation alone. Rationalism expresses this rule, "I will not accept as true any religious doctrine which is not evident to me in itself and of which I cannot have an entire knowledge."[6]

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[3] Saint Thomas Aquinas and others of the Scholastic era characterize this kind of intellectual endeavor. See Pietro Parente, Dictionary of Dogmatic Theology(Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1951) 237.

[4] See Vacant, op.cit., 1.114-5.

[5] This is particularly true of the English deists. See Copleston, op.cit., 4.36.

The foregoing might suggest a great congruity of thought among rationalists. This is not true. Even the rationalists themselves would not have made such a claim. All rationalists admit one thing however: the supernatural is an anomaly.[7] Because of this, oddly enough, unanimity ceases. The agnostic although not a true rationalist cannot solve the problem of God's existence. The deist will concede the existence of God but in a natural sense only. The pantheistic rationalist furnishes a doctrine filled with nuances totalling the single concept: all things are God.[8] This in broad summary is Rationalism.

Rationalistic thought might be traceable to early Christian times. But this is beyond our purpose. Some have pointed to Erigena (d.ca.870) and to Abelard (d. 1141) as fathers of modern rationalism. Now, although these men may have contributed to a spirit leading to modern rationalism[9] it seems the beginnings are more certainly found in Spain in the thirteenth century. It was the position of Averroes, a purely philosophical rationalism, which was the origin of the seventeenth century libertins and eighteenth century deists.[10]

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[6] "Je n'accepterai pour vrai aucune doctrine religieuse qui ne me soit évidente par elle-même et dont je ne puisse avoir l'intelligence entière." Contantin, art.cit., 1689.

[7] It is, indeed, an over simplification to assert this. For a rationalist like Descartes, for example, was a sincere Catholic philosopher who believed in a supernatural, spiritual reality. In the common acceptation of the word, "rationalist", however, this statement stands, See Copleston, op.cit., 6-7 for a discussion of the emancipation of philosophy from theology.

[8] See Constantin, art.cit., 1690.

[9] See Ibid., 1691-2.

A key figure, the father of modern philosophy in France,[11] arises during the seventeenth century--Descartes (1596-1650). Of him Bossuet remarks: "I see. . .a great combat being arraigned against the Church under the name of Cartesian philosophy: I see springing from his heart and from his principles (in my opinion badly understood) more than one heresey."[12]

Descartes aimed at truth. "I desired to devote myself wholly to the search for truth."[13] To attain this he entered on a way of doubt in which the positions he had previously taken were discarded so that what he reached by reason would fit into a complete unit.

> Nevertheless, as far as the opinions which I had been receiving since my birth were concerned, I could not do better than to reject them completely for once in my lifetime, and to resume them afterwards, or perhaps accept better ones in their place, when I had determined how they fitted into a rational scheme.[14]

While he was in the process of reconstructing his position he attested to the veracity of God. An important consideration since for him knowledge comes through a kind of natural revelation.[15]

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[10] See Etienne Gilson, Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1938) 66. Constantin, art.cit., 1692-1721, gives a good account of the philosophers from the thirteenth to seventeenth centuries.

[11] See Copleston, op.cit., 4.1.

[12] "Je vois. . .un grand combat se préparer contra l'Église sous le nom de la philosophie cartésienne; je vois naître de son sein et de ses principes, à mon avis mal entendu, plus d'un heresie." From Eugene Lenoble, "Descarte", Dictionnaire pratique des connaissances religieuses 2 (1925) 785; hereafter referred to as DPCR.

[13] René Descartes, Discourse on Method and Meditations, trans. Laurence J. Lafleur(New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1960) 25.

[14] Ibid., 12.

Descartes was daring but he was fearful of entering the vague field of faith. His judgments, therefore, on faith and the motive of credibility are sober enough. He granted the truths of faith were not rationally explainable and less clearly understood then those of reason. Yet they were certain. Their certainty depended on the authority of God and consequently were more sure than the truths of reason.[16]

After Descartes, Bayle assumes importance since his greatest work, Dictionnaire historique et critique (1697) indicated the slant rationalism was to take. Since Bayle's first principle was: reason is best suited for criticism not for synthesism, one cannot look to him for a developed philosophy but one can point to him as the most important presage of the Enlightenment.[17]

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[15] See Jacques Maritain, Three Reformers (London: Sheed and Ward, 1928) 68.

[16] See Lenoble, art.cit., 785. At the end of the seventeenth century there are many errors opposed in themselves claiming to be cartesian. Lenoble tries to vindicate Descartes, since he disavowed many of the very errors taught later. Yet this doesn't seem correct for it was his philosophy that contained the seeds, which grew by the extension of his philosophy to other areas, into magnificent errors.

[17] See Constantin, art.cit., 1733; see also Copleston, op.cit., 6.6-7. Sir Harold Nicolson writes this of Bayle: "Pierre Bayle (1647-1706) was the true originator of scepticism. Sainte-Beuve describes him as the 'great precursor' of Voltaire, and Voltaire himself hailed him as 'one of the greatest men that France has produced', as 'more learned than Plato or Epicurus.' 'He was', he wrote, 'the greatest dialectician that has ever written: he taught doubt.' Gibbon praised him: Hume followed him: Leibnitz, although he did not agree with his conclusions, admired the force of 'the marvellous Dictionary': Frederick the Great considered the Dictionary as 'the breviary of good sense': Bayle influenced Lessing, and through Lessing the whole German Aufklarung: his impact on Shaftesbury was sharp and lasting: Lecky considered that he 'did more than any previous writer to break the spell which Saint Augustine had so long cast over theology' and asserted that Bayle's Historical and Critical Dictionary was the true foundation

In England the empiricist Locke prefigures the Enlightenment. Though not a metaphysician, at times he shows a flair for the ontological. Knowledge was for him experimental, whether purely external through sense perception or internal through reflection.[18] But "the assent to any proposition; not thus made out by the deductions of reason; but upon the credit of the proposer, as coming from God, in some extraordinary way of communication" is faith.[19] This is proper enough but in a conflict the experimental remains supreme.

Thus Locke and Bayle prepared the way for that period during which reason gained absolute supremacy--the Enlightenment. Previously reason and faith shared the body of truth. Now, reason formerly opposed to prejudice, ignorance, superstition, and authority becomes the open foe of the supernatural and thus the foe of revelation and faith. Reason decides all. And a truth clearly and evidently offered by reason brooks no intervention from faith. It is not to be rejected because of some false notion that it is contrary to faith.[20]

The Enlightenment does not attempt to set up a system with the principles of the past as its foundation. Rather, it constructs its ideal according to the rationale of science. Thus it purports to forego the entailed and detailed deductions and proofs of former ages and

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of rationalism." Age of Reason(London: Constable & Co. Ltd., 1960) 24-25.

[18] See Lenoble, "Locke", DPCR, 4 (1926) 482; see also A.D. Sertillanges, Le christianisme et les philosophies(Paris: Aubier, Editions Montaigne, 1941) 2.153-6.

[19] John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding(Philadelphia: Troutman & Hayes, 1853) ch. 18, sect. 2.

[20] See Constantin, art.cit., 1737.

promises to extend the boundaries of truth and philosophy making them elastic, vital and concrete according to this new pattern.[21]

Succintly the mind of the Enlightenment may be summed up:

> Reason is now looked upon rather as an acquisition than as a heritage. It is not the treasury of the mind in which the truth like a minted coin lies stored; it is rather the original intellectual force which guides the discovery and determination of truth. This determination is the seed and the indispensable supposition of all real certainty.[22]

In England this period is the age of the deists. And probably most influential among them was David Hume. It was not that he was a profound thinker (though by far the most profound of the deists) but his scepticism marks a notable departure from previous methods. Hume was not so important in himself; he did not propose a doctrine full of insight and vitality. His importance derives, rather, from the response of his readers--in particular Kant.[23] It was Hume's Essay on Human Understanding to which Kant referred when he said: "I openly confess my recollection of David Hume was the very thing which many years ago first interrupted my dogmatic slumber and gave my investigations in the field of speculative philosophy a quite new direction."[24]

In general, though, the effect the English deists had on the continent was marked. And this through the writings of Voltaire.

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[21] See Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, trans. Koelln and Pettegrove(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951) 5-7.

[22] Ibid., 13; for the philosophers of the Enlightenment in England, see Constantin, art.cit., 1741-44.

[23] See Sertillanges, op.cit., 2.162; also Etienne Gilson, The Unity of Philosophical Experience(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1937) 216-20.

[24] Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics, trans. Mahaffy-Carus, rev. L.W. Beck(New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1951) 8. Kant had probably read Hume's work twelve years before. See loc.cit.

Highly educated in literary culture he used winning satire and forceful yet blithe criticism to continue in France what Bolingbroke had begun in England--an unceasing foray against all that the Church meant.[25]

Voltaire produced a great amount of work, all reflecting the philosophical deism of Locke and his disciples. His methods were their methods. His failures reflected their failures. His triumphs matched their triumphs. Though it would seem that the French precursors of this period should have had direct influence on Voltaire, such was not the case. Their influence was felt. But first it had to cross the channel to England, be digested, return to the mainland and then it was augumented by Voltaire.[26] Torrey nicely enunciates the influence of the English deists:

> The English deistic controversy was a primary factor both in Voltaire's philosophical deism and in his attacks on the established religion. It renewed and fortified his convictions that the Christian religion, like all other revealed religions, was founded on fraud and imposture and that the history of the Church was fundamentally unreliable. It convinced him that no comfort could be found for the orthodox in the arguments drawn from the miracles and prophecies. It furnished him with many facts, but above all, it gave him methods, the atmosphere, and the authorities for his own attack. The so-called moral argument of the English deists, represented by Woolston, Tindal, and Annet, had the most important direct influence upon Voltaire's work. While the more scholarly works of Middleton against the latter-day miracles, and of Collins against the prophecies, were by no means neglected, it was especially the tracts of their more facile and witty successors that found strength and increase in their continental transplantation.[27]

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[25] See Vacant, op.cit., 1.117; also Constantin, "Voltaire", DTC, (1930) 15.3387; also Copleston, op.cit., 6.18-24.

[26] See Norman Lewis Torrey, Voltaire and the English Deists (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930) 199,202-3.

[27] Ibid., 206.

One would think two men with the same destructive purpose would have joined forces and attacked in concert. Not so with Voltaire and Rousseau. Rousseau was intent on destruction but could not entertain the same violent criticisms of Voltaire. He was a religious idealist with more than his share of sentiment. And because of this his works greatly minimized the slashing attacks of Voltaire.[28]

Rousseau, ruled by sentiment, fashioned a subjective religion and held a positive distaste for the cruel doctrine which accused man of sin at his birth.[29] Maritain gives a poignant description of this man of passionate extremes:

> He is no mere theorist of the philosophy of feeling, like the English moralists, of his time, who are rather intellectuals and analysts discoursing on feeling. It has often been noticed that he himself--and how intensely--is all feeling. He lives in every fibre of his being, with a kind of heroism, the primacy of feeling. Does that mean that reason plays no part in him? By no means. Reason in such a man plays a two-fold part: Sometimes it serves passion, and then it displays a prodigious talent for sophistry. That is the moralizing stoical, plutarchian Jean-Jacques, pompous with virtue, censor of the vices of his age, the Rousseau of the Discours, of the Letter to d'Alembert, and the Contrat Social. Sometimes reason, like an ineffectual light, watches the intoxications of evil desire and sees clearly the harm of them. But it takes care not to interfere, and watches always, and so really only increases the attraction by giving it a certain flavour of intelligent and artistic perversity, since, as Aristotle says, it is a mark of the artist to remain an artist when he sins deliberately.[30]

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[28] See E. Vacandard, "Rationalisme", DPCR, 5 (1927) 1021.

[29] See Charles Poulet, Histoire de l'Église de France(Paris: Beauchesne, 1948) 2.228-30.

[30] Maritain, op.cit., 96; Christian Bartholmess summarizes the articles of Rousseau's religious work Profession de foi du vicaire savoyard: God's existence is a certainty made known to us through some kind of spiritual sentiment, but his essence because of its vastness is inaccessible to us; man is free and therefore responsible for all his

But as might be expected a man of changing feelings does not fix his terminology, nor analyse his work. He is the subject of impulse and by impulse he writes. Religion at one time is founded on reason, then on some kind of instinct, now on feeling, then on conscience. Even so a final judgment is reached: conscience is the true source of religion.[31]

Rousseau was profoundly aware of the moral worth of man. And through his writings especially *Emile* and *Heloise* he passed this on to Immanuel Kant.[32]

Kant was awakened from his "dogmatic slumbers" by Hume. And once loosed he found himself faced with a problem akin to that which Descartes attempted to solve. How was one to protect God, freedom and

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actions; immortality is factual, but its condition is unknown. *Histoire critique des doctrines religieuses de la philosophie moderne*(Paris: Ch. Meyrueis et Companie, Editors, 1855) 1.241-3.

[31] See Ernst Cassirer, *Rousseau, Kant, Goethe*, trans. Gutmann, Kristeller, and Randall(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1945) 45. On conscience Rousseau rapturizes: "Conscience! Conscience! Divine instinct: immortal and heavenly voice; sure guide of a being ignorant and limited, but intelligent and free; infallible judge of good and evil, which makes man like unto God, it is thou who formest the excellence of his nature and the mortality of his actions; without thee I feel nothing in myself to raise me above the beasts, save the sad privilege of wandering from error to error with the aid of an understanding without rule and a reason without principle." "Conscience! conscience! instinct divine; immortelle et céleste voix; guide assuré d'un être ignorant et borné, mais intelligent et libre; juge infaillible du bien et du mal, qui rends l'homme semblable à Dieu; c'est toi qui fais l'excellence de sa nature et la moralité de ses actions; sans toi je ne sense rien en moi qui m'élève au-dessus des bêtes, que le triste privilége de m'égarer d'erreurs en erreurs à l'aide d'un entendement sans régle, et d'une raison sans principe." *La profession de foi du vicaire savoyard* (Edition critique par Pierre Mausue Masson, Fribourg et Paris, 1914) 273.

[32] See Thomas P. Neill, *Makers of the Modern Mind*(Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Co., 1949) 206-207.

immortality from the corrosiveness of scepticism?[33]

The way, he said, up to his day was through metaphysics. But "its procedure is at first dogmatic, that is, it confidently sets itself to this task without any previous examination of the capacity or incapacity of reason for so great an undertaking."[34] Such a procedure, however, "lands us in dogmatic assertions to which other assertions, equally specious, can always be opposed--that is, in scepticism."[35] Thus attempting to establish a metaphysics dogmatically must be regarded as "abortive."[36]

This is, indeed, a rebellion against the metaphysics of the era, a rebellion which prompted him to subject rationalism and empiricism to scrutiny.[37] What was exempt? Certainly not religion!

> Our age is, in especial degree, the age of criticism and to criticism everything must submit. Religion through its sanctity, and law-giving through its majesty, may seek to exempt themselves from it. But they then awaken just suspicions, and cannot claim the sincere respect which reason accords only to that which has been able to sustain the test of free and open examination.[38]

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[33] See Ibid., 207.

[34] Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith(London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1929) 46.

[35] Ibid., 57.

[36] Loc. cit.

[37] See Friedrich Ueberweg, History of Philosophy(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1903) 2.137; also Copleston, op.cit., 6.428-29; Lenoble, "Kant" DPCR, 4 (1926) 194-5; P. Charles, "Kant et Kantisme", DTC, 3.2 (1925) 2305; Charles is a little severe in his judgment of Kant. He remarks that not only did Kant ignore all Catholic tradition but also every bit of human thought. And speaking of theology Charles says that every time Kant touched a point of doctrine his ignorance becomes clear. See also Gilson, Unity, 227-8.

[38] Kant, op. cit., 9, a.

That might sound as if reason would be the downfall of God. But no. Kant insisted on the existence of God, though this is not a philosophically demonstrable fact. Thus he cast away the proofs of the existence of God. For pure reason, speculative reason "extend(s) only to objects of possible experience, and which, if also applied to what cannot be an object of experience, always really changes this into an appearance, . . ." That this might not happen in relation to God, "I have therefore found it necessary to deny knowledge, in order to make room for faith."[39] For faith was the way to God.

The knowledge he denied meant that "the holding of a thing to be true is sufficient both subjectively and objectively,"[40] Belief on the other hand is "objectively insufficient".[41] And "faith as _habitus_, not as _actus_, is the moral attitude of reason in its assurance of the truth of what is beyond the reach of theoretical knowledge."[42] This has the ring of truth, but this "assurance in matters of faith is an assurance from a purely practical point of view. It is a moral faith that proves nothing for pure rational knowledge as theoretical, but only for it as practical and directed to the fulfillment of its obligations."[43] Further this faith is:

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[39] _Ibid._, 29. See James Collins, "Kant's Opus Postumum", _New Scholasticism_, 17 (1943) 251-285 for Kant's later idea of God. It seems in this work Kant reduces God's existence to an "as if" (_als ob_) proposition, one which is postualted practically, 280.

[40] Kant, _Critique Pure_, 646.

[41] _Loc. cit._

[42] Kant, _Critique of Teleological Judgment_, trans. James Creed Meredith(Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1928) 145.

[43] _Ibid._, 143-44

> The steadfast principle of the mind, therefore, according to which the truth of what must necessarily be presupposed as the condition of the supreme final end being possible is assumed as true in consideration of the fact that we are under an obligation to pursue that end--and assumed notwithstanding that we have no insight into its possibility, though likewise none into its impossibility. Faith, in the plain acceptation of the term, is a confidence of attaining a purpose the furthering of which is a duty, but whose achievement is a thing of which we are unable to perceive the possibility--or, consequently, the possibility of what we can alone conceive to be its conditions. Thus the faith that has reference to particular objects is entirely a matter of morality, ...[44]

One might think this faith is hardly rational. But, "on the contrary, it is something that has a foundation in reason (though only in relation to its practical employment), and a foundation that satisfies the purpose of reason."[45] Still it does not have an objective basis, for it is a "moral maxim[46] governing the attitude of the mind."[47]

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[44] *Ibid.*, 145-46. The basis for this morality is duty: "Duty! Thou sublime and mighty name that dost embrace nothing charming or insinuating, but requirest submission, and yet seekest not to move the will by threatening aught that would arouse natural aversion or terror, but merely holdest forth a law which of itself finds entrance into the mind, and yet gains reluctant reverence (though not always obedience), a law before which all inclinations are dumb, even though they secretly counterwork it; what origin is there worthy of thee, and where is to be found the root of thy noble descent which proudly rejects all kindred with the inclinations; a root to be derived from which is the indispensible condition of the only worth which men can give themselves?

"It can be nothing less than. . .personality, that is freedom and independence on the mechanism of nature, yet, regarded also as a faculty of a being which is subject to special laws, namely, pure practical laws given by its own reason; so that the person as belonging to the sensible world is subject to his own personality as belonging to the intelligible world." *Critique of Practical Reason*, trans. Thomas Kingsmill Abbott (5th. ed., rev., London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1898) 180.

[45] Kant, *Critique Judgment*, 146-47.

[46] A maxim is a "subjective principle of volition". *Critique Practical, op.cit.*, 17. It is a "proposition which contains a general determination of the will. . .(and) is regarded by the subject as valid only for his own will." *Ibid.*, 105. See also *Critique Pure*, *op.cit.*, 547,640.

[47] *Critique Judgment*, 147.

It can be concluded from the above that faith is then, a conviction which has practical value, but not theoretical. It is an ethical certainty founded on practical reason which obliges to the course of action but does not add to scientific information.[48]

Prior to Vatican Council I there are no other rationalists who influence thought as did Kant. This study of rationalism, then, closes with Bossuet's words which well reflect this spirit:

> Under the pretext that we must not accept anything but what we understand clearly--which, within certain limits, is true--everyone gives himself liberty to say "I understand this, and I do not understand that," and on this sole basis they admit and reject whatever they like.[49]

In an extremely simplified way let us state that this spirit did not go unchallenged. In France, principally, the attacks of rationalism spurred greater activity in the realm of fundamental dogmatic theology. And in the process Traditionalism was born.[50] In Germany there is a different approach. Kant and his followers had had great influence. And it was thought to be necessary to use the same ideas in the defense of Christianity. Thus Semi-rationalism had its beginning.[51] These two errors command our attention.

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[48] See Ibid., 143-47; also Pierre Lanfrey, L'église et les philosophes au dix huitième siècle(Paris: G. Charpentier, éditor, 1879) 339; Charles, art.cit., 2325; Cassirer, op.cit., 48-49; Edgar Hocedez, Histoire de théologie au XIX^{e} siècle(Brussels: L'Édition Universelle, S.A. 1949) 1.18.

[49] Letter to the marquis de'Allemans, 21st. May, 1687(Urbain et Levesque, III, 372-3), cited from Maritain, Reformers 74-5. It is interesting to note that as Rousseau had lauded the conscience and Kant idealized duty; Fichte saluted the Will: "Sublime and Living Will! named by no name, compassed by no thought! I may well raise my soul to Thee, for Thou and I are not divided. Thy voice sounds within me, mine resounds in Thee; and all my thoughts, if they be but good and true, live in Thee also. In Thee, the Incomprehensible, I myself and the world in which I live become clearly comprehensible to me; all the secrets of my existence are laid open, and perfect harmony arises in my soul." Johann Gottlieb Fichte, The Vocation of Man, ed. Roderick M. Chisholm(New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1956) 139.

[50] See Hocedez, op.cit., 1.23, 104.

Traditionalism charges: reason cannot obtain certitude of moral and religious truths. Thus tradition and radically revelation become the pivot of truth, truths not only in the realm of morals and religion but also in the purely natural sphere. The timbre of traditionalism is felt in these words of Ventura: "Everything that is new in religion is heretical. Everything new in philosophy is absurd. Everything new in politics is revolutionary."[52]

Several factors coalesce to produce such a reaction. Hocedez lists four.[53] First, there is the excessive individualism rampant in the eighteenth century. The second rests in a "paradoxe étrange":[54] the teaching of philosophy in Catholic schools is at an all time low; metaphysical principles are explained by revelation and tradition because the traditional philosophies are ignored. Third, Kantianism, with its consequent scepticism and doubt, spurs a countering action. And last, traditionalism reacted against mystical and rational abuses caused by the growing influence of Jansenism.

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[51] See Ibid., 131-2; also J. Bellamy, La théologie catholique au XIX^e siècle(3rd ed., Paris: Beauchesne & Cie Éditeurs, 1904) 18-19.

[52] Tout ce que est nouveau en religion est hérétique. Tout qui est nouveau en philosophie est absurde. Toute ce qui est nouveau en politique est révolutionnaire." F. Ventura de Raulieu, La philosophie chretienne, tome I, 1861; from Sertillanges, op.cit., 238.

[53] See Hocedez, op.cit., 1. 104-5.

[54] Ibid., 104. The treatment of traditionalism and semi-rationalism depends greatly on Hocedez. About traditionalism he states: "Une histoire critique du traditionalisme et de ses origines reste encore à faire."

In its most extreme form traditionalism is termed Fideism.[55] The Abbé Bautain is usually indicted on this count. And although he never claimed to be a theologian,[56] his philosophy necessarily had theological implications. That philosophy was not simply a reaction to rationalism. For he also formulated it in admiration of the Kantian Critique of Pure Reason. It was his purpose, too, to supplement this work on the psychological level.[57]

When Bautain speaks of faith, Horton says,[58] he does so in one of three ways. First faith assumes. It is the work of faith to assume those first principles which reason cannot demonstrate. And in this way faith logically precedes reason. Second faith receives. For in the process of knowing the truth must enter the mind. It may, then be rejected immediately whereupon all cognition stops. Or it may be accepted initially. The mind now can mull it over and knowledge is born. This first acceptance is caused by faith. And in this sense faith psychologically precedes reason. Third (a necessary step from the second) faith begins to see truth. Truth draws faith. This must be so for faith discerns truth and starts the knowing process. Thus it must be a knowing faculty, at least, in the primary stage of cognition. This, like the second, evidences a psychological precedence of faith.

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[55] Bellamy, op.cit., 27, calls, fideism "Un systeme plus radical . . . Encore qu'il différât notablement du système menaisien, il avait cependant avec lui les affinités les plus étroites." Aubert would seem to concur. He calls Bautain more than a traditionalist: an intuitionist and ontologist; Roger Aubert, Le problème de l'acte de foi (2nd ed., Louvain: E. Warny, Ed., 1950) 114-5. Vacant also calls it traditionalism in its extreme: "Le fideisme ainsi entendu embrace le traditionalisme. . ." op.cit. 1.139.

[56] See Aubert, op.cit., 114.

[57] See Marin Ferraz, Histoire de la philosophie en France au XIX^{e} siècle: Traditionalisme et Ultramontanisme (Paris: Didier et Cie, 1880) 341.

[58] See Walter Marshall Horton, The Philosophy of the Abbé Bautain (New York: The New York University Press, 1926) 168-70.

Evidently faith comes before reason. Moreover it is also superior to reason in the degree of the resulting certitude. For Bautain held that reason never actually comes in direct contact with an object (always by means of faith). But even more convincing, faith is directly applied to Absolute Truth, God, thus demanding for faith God's infallibility.[59]

Bautain's errors as he himself saw them were:

> We have curtailed the power of reason too much, and confused two things theologically different, to know miracles and prophecies as motives and as objects of faith. . . that reason alone could not establish the motives of credibility of the Christian religion which rests on supernatural facts.[60]

But his profession of faith, signed April 26, 1844 presents even a better idea of his errors:

> We promise today and in the future:
>
> Never to teach that with only the light of reason, setting aside divine revelation, one cannot give a real demonstration of the existence of God;
>
> That with reason alone one cannot demonstrate the spirituality and immortality of the soul, or any other purely natural, rational or moral truth;
>
> That with reason alone one cannot have knowledge of principles or of metaphysics, and also of truths which depend on them, as

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[59] See Hocedez, op.cit., 2.78-9.

[60] "Nous avons trop restreint la puissance de la raison et confondu deux choses théologiques différentes, savoir les miracles et les prophéties comme motifs et comme objet de foi." ". . .que la raison seule ne peut établir les motifs de crédibilité de la religion chrétienne, qui repose sur des faits surnaturels." Philosophie morale, Paris 1842, 1. VIII-IX; from Aubert, op.cit., 121.

> knowledge entirely distinct from supernatural theology which is founded on divine revelation;
>
> That reason cannot attain a true and full certitude of the motives of credibility, that is to say, of the motives which render divine revelation evidently credible, as are especially miracles and prophecies, and particularly the resurrection of Jesus Christ.[61]

Anything contrary to these articles which could be found in his works, he retracted.

Now, traditionalism as such is pioneered by de Maistre. He decried the ruin wrought by the natural sciences, a ruin which negated the supernatural, which denied all religious life--the refuge of man.[62]

But he did not wish to downgrade reason. In his Examen de la doctrine de Bacon he noted:

> It is essential to observe that sacred Scripture does not reveal any part of the existence of God, it supposes it as a truth known beforehand. . .How can man receive a new truth, if he does not have already within himself a truth by which he may judge the other?. . .As soon as you separate reason

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[61] L'abbé de Regny, L'abbé Bautain sa vie et ses oeuvres(Paris: Bray et Retaux, Libraires-éditerus, 1884) 337. "De ne jamais enseigner que, avec les seules lumières de la droite raison, abstraction faite de la révélation divine, on ne puisse donner une véritable démonstration de l'existence de Dieu;

"Qu'avec la raison seule on ne puisse démontrer la spiritualité et l'immortalité de l'âme, ou toute autre vérité purement naturelle, rationnelle ou morale;

"Qu'avec la raison seule on ne puisse avoir la science des principes ou de la metaphysique, ainsi que des vérités qui en dépendent, comme science tout à fait distincte de la théologie surnaturelle que se fonde sur la révélation divine;

"Que la raison ne puisse acquérir une vraie et pleine certitude des motifs de crédibilité, c'est-à-dire de ces motifs qui rendent la révélation divine évidemment croyable, tels que sont spécialement les miracles et les prophéties, et particulièrement la resurrection de Jésus-Christ." There is a fifth statement but it does not concern us.

[62] J. de Maistre, "Soirees de Saint-Petersbourg" (1821), Oeuvre posthumes, 1, 310; cited by Emile Brehier, Histoire de la philosophie (Paris: F. Alcan, 1926-32, 2 vols.) 2.3, 581.

> and faith, revelation can no longer be proved, can no longer prove anything.[63]

Even though that might seem to be a strong witness to his trust of reason, he undercut the power of reason and bolstered the role of faith and tradition. Many of his statements show his affinity to the traditionalism of Bonald (of which there is no doubt). For he defended the theory of innate ideas against Locke. And further contended that these ideas obscured by the fall still enlighten mankind. Against Bacon (with whom he was severe) he frequently used authority which for him was a most telling argument. Also he held for the divine origin of language and closely united thought and word, twice making them synonymous.[64] And if this is not enough note his words written to Bonald after the latter's publication of Recherches philosophiques: "Is it possible that Nature could have played such a trick as to stretch two strings as perfectly in tune as your mind and mine? . . .I have thought nothing you have not written; I have written nothing you have not thought."[65]

Still it is de Bonald who is called the father of Traditionalism. All philosophies, he recognized, searched for truth. But because the rationalistic brand had nurtured too many evils he substituted universal reason and authority, tradition, for individual reason. And at the base of this authority or tradition was primitive language. Though he maintained some word, at least interior, was needed to give rise to thought, he did not equate thought and words as did de Maistre. Where did this word originate? It could not come from man or society so evidently it was God-given.[66]

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[63] 2e partie, Chap. I.; from Hocedez, op.cit., 1.106. "Il est essentiel d'observer que l'Écriture sainte ne révèle nulle par l'existence de Dieu, elle la suppose comme une vérité connue antérieurement. . . Comment l'homme recevra-t-il une vérité nouvelle, s'il ne porte en lui-même une vérité antérieure par laquelle il jugera l'autre?. . .Dès que vous séparez la raison de la foi, la révélation, ne pouvant plus être prouvée, ne prouve plus rien."

[64] See Hocedez, op.cit., 1. 105-107.

[65] From Ferraz, op.cit., 86; no reference to de Maistre given. "Est-il possible, écrit de Maistre, que la nature se soit amusée à tendre deux cordes aussi parfaitement d'accord que votre esprit et le mien? . . .Je n'ai rien pense que vous ne l'ayez écrit; je n'ai rien écrit que vous ne l'ayez pensé."

There are many such truths which God must give to society for its benefit. And society conserves these as a social good. This tradition is transmitted by word from generation to generation. And society not only has the duty to relay these truths (because a tradition lost is lost forever); but absolutely needs to do so (because it constitutes its self-preservation). Infallibility is then predicated to this society. For it is a normal consequence, says de Bonald, since only a superior can find one fallible. And society knows no superior. Only an inane individual reason would challenge these truths since a divine guarantee is implicit in this infallibility. Besides such opposition to universal reason is criminal since successively one would be acting contrary to tradition, society, and nature--an unnatural act, therefore, criminal.[67]

Following de Bonald is Lamennais, the greatest in the line of traditionalists. He believed his own personal experience, political and social entanglements, compelled him to adopt this system.[68]

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[66] See Hocedez, op.cit. 1.108.

[67] See Ibid., 109.

[68] See A. Fonck, "Lamennais", DTC. 8.2 (1925) 2513.

While de Maistre and de Bonald anchored their theories in language, Lamennais founded his on God known through the testimony of mankind. This witness, testimony, or common sense of mankind is all-important. We shall try to see how basic it is.

For Lamennais man (the individual) is powerless in the face of truth, either to accept or deny it. For intelligence has been fooled too often in its search for truth to be certain. In this condition man can only be an absolute sceptic. But scepticism spells death. Then how is man going to find that certitude, that infallible reason? Lamennais gives another alternative--the witness of mankind, common sense, tradition. Listen to Lamennais:

> Instead of drawing into oneself and losing oneself in endless quests, it is enough to open ones eyes to recognize that, in estimating the true and false, all men are naturally determined by common consent. Do they wish to make certain that some sensation, some sentiment, some reasoning conforms to the truth, they look to see if other men feel as they do, and reason as they do. Their judgment, which, according to the remark of Nicole, is always weak and timid when it is all alone, is reassured when it sees itself supported by those of others. The more the agreement is general, the more confidence or greater is the certitude; and this certitude is as complete as it can be when the agreement is universal. As a matter of fact if the reason of all men or human reason could make a mistake when it attests that a thing is true, there will be no greater certitude possible since evidently men come to certitude only by the aid of human reason. The common consent or authority, this, then, is the natural rule of our judgments. And irrationality consists in rejecting this rule, in listening to ones own reason in preference to the reason of all. So the most general principle of philosophy and incredulity is the strict definition of irrationality and this is why the sens commun which never falls into the abuse of sophisms declares one irrational who opposes his particular reason to general reason.[69]

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[69] . . .au lieu de se renfermer en soi-même et de se perdre dans des recherches sans fin, il suffit d'ouvrir les yeux pour reconnoître que, dans l'appréciation du vrai et du faux, tous les hommes se déterminent naturellement par le consentement commun. Veulent-ils s'assurer

This for him is valid because faith in God affords this certitude to the reason of mankind. And this happens through the word which God grants to mankind, and which man holds and transmits as tradition. These truths or facts are given at birth and man cannot alter the process. To try would be fatal.[70] In Lamennais' *Défense d'Essai sur l'indifference en matière religion* we read: "It is as impossible for one not to admit or not to believe these first truths, which once received constitute one's life, as not to have been created; if one could conquer this vital faith, one would have the power of self-annihilation."[71]

A good summary of Lamennais' teachings is presented in the prohibition issued by Di Fortis, the General of the Jesuits. It was not

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que telle sensation, tel sentiment, tel raisonnement est conforme à la vérité, ils regardent si les autres hommes sentent comme eux et raisonnent comme eux. *Leur jugement, qui*, selon la remarque de Nicole, *est toujours foible et timide quand il est tout seul, se rassure quand il se voit appuyé de celui d'autrui*. Plus l'accord est general, plus la confiance ou la certitude est grande; et la certitude est aussi complète qu'elle puisse l'être quand l'accord est universel. En effet, si la raison de tous les hommes ou la raison humaine pouvoit se tromper quand elle atteste qu'une chose est vraie, il n'y auroit plus de certitude possible, puisque évidement les hommes ne peuvent parvenir à la certitude qu'à l'aide de la raison humaine. Le consentement commun ou l'autorité, voilà donc la règle naturelle de nos jugemens; et la folie consiste à rejeter cette règle, en ecoutant sa propre raison de préférence à la raison de tous. Ainsi le principe le plus général de la philosophie et de l'incrédulité est la définition rigoureuse de la folie; et voilà pourquoi le sens sommun, qui jamais ne se laisse abuser par des sophismes, déclare fou quiconque oppose sa raison particulière à la raison générale." F. de La Mennais, *Oeurvres Completes*(Paris: Paul Daubrée et Cailleux, éditeurs, 1836-1837) 5. 104-105.

[70] See Hocedez, *op.cit*., 1.112-3.

[71] F. de LaMennais, *op.cit*., 5.106; "Les vérités premières qu'elle a recues constituant sa vie, il lui est aussi impossible de ne les pas admettre ou de ne pas les croire, que de ne pas être crées; et si elle pouvoit vaincre cette foi vitale, elle pourroit s'anéantir."

meant for publication outside the Order so as not to appropriate a power or right of the Pope or bishops. Seven condemned propositions were listed:

1. There is no other criterion of truth but common sense.
2. Faith alone engenders certitude.
3. The existence of God is the first truth we know.
4. From the existence of a contingent being one cannot deduce the existence of a necessary being; in other words, it is vicious reasoning to say: I exist, therefore God exists.
5. Finite intelligence by that very fact is always and in all things subject to error
6. In Catholic schools false systems which lead to atheism and the overthrow of religions has prevailed.
7. Man could not be certain of his existence or of this thought except for the common sense.[72]

The strength of this prohibition is gathered from the fact that not even the name of Lamennais was to be pronounced.

At the opposite pole to traditionalism stands semi-rationalism. And it proposed the same general methods of rationalism in opposition to it. For by philosophy an attempt was made to show that faith was not opposed to progress in science; that the dogmas proposed for belief were not contrary to the principles of modern culture; that the only efficient way, the better method, was to prove or demonstrate the validity of the Catholic religion through reason.[73]

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[72] Joseph Burnichon, Histoire d'un siècle (Paris: Bariel Beauchesne, Éditeur, 1914-1922) 2.22.
1. "Il n'y a pas d'autre criterium de la vérité que le sens commun.
2. "La foi seule engendre la certitude.
3. "L'existence de Dieu est la première vérité que nous connaissons.
4. "De l'existence d'un être contingent, on ne saurait déduire l'existence d'un être nécessaire; en d'autres termes c'est faire un raisonement vicieux que de dire: J'existe, donc Dieu existe.
5. "L'intelligence finie, par cela même qu'elle est finie, est toujours et en tout sujette à l'erreur.
6. "Dans les écoles catholiques ont prevalu de faux systèmes qui conduisent à l'athéisme et au renversement de la religion.
7. "L'homme ne saurait être certain, si ce n'est par le sens commun, ni de son existence ne de sa pensée."

The partisans of this school of thought adhere firmly to the existence of supernatural revelation but profess it in such a way that these truths are beyond the reach of reason in its present state. Reason is aware of the truth but cannot penetrate its essence.[74]

The semi-rationalists wanted to preserve supernatural realities yet in their approach they gave an exaggerated worth to human reason. For by their explanations the intrinsic truth of the mysteries of revelation became intelligible thus rendering faith a necessary consequence of natural demonstration.[75]

From this we can gather that a semi-rationalist is one "who grants to natural reason a power and an effectiveness in the matter of faith or in the preambles of faith which it does not have."[76]

Foremost among semi-rationalists is George Hermes. Hermes, not unlike other students at Munster came under the pall of the common infatuation--the doctrines of Kant and Fichte. These teachings subjected his faith to severe and numerous crises which remained unsolved while there. Yet he did not descend to the extreme of total incredulity. He, rather, compromised his faith by attaching a provision to it. Until by study and the demands of reason he resolved his difficulties, he would hold this faith of the Church. And even though he had been convinced of Kant's and Fichte's inanity, he used their methods to rid himself of doubts.[77]

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[73] See Hocedez, op.cit., 1.167.

[74] See Fritz, "Semi-rationalisme", DTC, 14.2 (1941) 1850-1.

[75] See Hocedez, op.cit., 1.167.

[76] ". . .semi-rationaliste c'est accorder à la raison naturelle une puissance et une éfficacité en matière de foi ou dans le préambules de la foi qu'elle n'a pas." Ibid., 143.

With untiring energy he performed this task while professor at Munster. Here he wrote his main work, Philosophische Einleitung in die Christakatholische Theologie, (1819) for which he was awarded a doctorate in theology. As a teacher his method, audacity and sincerity gained a great reputation for him. But, Hocedez remarks, before and after his death in 1831, theologians were right in seeing in Hermes only an adventurous philosophy; a builder of a fated system, weak and vulnerable; the foremost semi-rationalist; a propounder of a number of errors.[78]

Here, indeed, was a sensitive, sincere man. Witness!

> And I have now reached the firm belief--God be praised for I have found it--I have arrived at the conviction that I wished for and searched for so eagerly: I am certain that there is a God! I have become certain that I will be and will live eternally. I have become certain that Christianity is divine revelation and that Catholicism is the true Christianity! And that is the reason why I also wish with my whole heart (and what would I be if I did not wish it?)--that all men acquire the same conviction as mine, and be united to me in the same faith and the same hope in the one God and the one Catholic Church of His Son our Lord-Saviour Jesus Christ.[79]

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[77] See A. Thouvenin, "Hermes", DTC, 6.2 (1920) 2288.

[78] See Hocedez, op.cit., 1.178.

[79] "Et ainsi je suis maintenant parvenu à la conviction--Dieu en soit loué, car j'ai trouvé:--je suis arrivé à la conviction que je souhaitais si ardemment et que je cherchais: Je suis certain qu'il y a un Dieu! Je suis devenu certain que je serai et vivrai éternellement! Je suis devenu certain que le christianisme est révélation divine et que le catholicisme est le vrai christianisme! Et voilà pourquoi je souhaite aussi de tout mon coeur (et que serais-je si je ne le souhaitais pas?)--que tous les hommes acquièrent la même conviction que moi, et par la même foi et la même espérance scient unis à moi en l'unique Dieu et l'unique Église catholique de son Fils Notre-Seigneur Jésus-Christ." Philosophische Einleitung in die Christkatholische theologie, p.11, from Hocedez, op.cit., 1. 178-179.

Though Aubert says his works were written in obscure language, these words, at least, are moving and clear.[80]

Between faith and reason, according to Hermes, there is no contradiction. Reason is, rather, the champion of faith; it protects faith against any contrary claims. This negative approach is as far as reason may go; any positive use is condemned. Yet, Hermes did not condemn all rational processes. He did permit reason to draw a conclusion from two formally revealed truths. What he scorned was the conclusion which results from the use of a revealed principle and a natural premise. Indeed, for him this is not an exaggerated use of reason; it nearly suppresses it.[81]

It is surprising then that he insinuates reason's role is much greater. All dogmas are subject to it. They are not doubted en masse, but each one must submit to doubt until it can be proved that it is contained in revelation. In addition they must not be labelled as contrary to or found to be contradictory to reason. For if they are, there remains a doubt which cannot be solved; they do not have certainty; they cannot be believed.[82]

This follows quite logically from the definition Hermes gives to faith. Here he probably makes his greatest single mistake:

> A state of certitude or persuasion in regard to the reality of a thing known, a state to which we are drawn by the necessary assent of theoretical reason or by the consent of practical reason, because outside of "holding as true", necessary to speculative reason, and "admitting as true" necessary to practical

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[80] See Aubert, Le problème, 103.

[81] See Ibid., 193.

[82] See Ibid., 193-4

reason, there is no other way which guarantees truth or reality.[83]

As so defined, if one has such certitude of moral truths he has faith. Does the motive matter? Evidently not. Hermes does profess that the authority of God is a choice motive for faith. But surely not the only possible motive. For in this case many truths would be outside the realm of faith, or even, for that matter, beyond any knowledge. A case in point is the statement, God exists. A motive would be lacking if the authority of men was invoked since it is man who searches for authority. And it could not rest on the authority of God since the motive then would be founded on belief. One is bound then to base ones conviction on the moral necessity of obeying practical reason commanding belief--the motive of faith.[84]

A faith necessitated by theoretical reason or compelled by practical reason eliminates the need for grace. But to deny the need of grace, undermines the freedom of the act of faith. Yet Hermes would counter that only the speculative reason imposes physical necessity. That obligation of practical reason, "to admit as true" is not restraining, but free.[85]

Even though he tries to smooth over this difficulty, Hermes is not successful. He distinguished a twofold faith, passive and active. One is of the understanding, the other of the heart. And the first, passive, is a necessary consent to demonstrated truths. The second is a free submission to these truths; it establishes the dignity of man.

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[83] "Un état de certitude ou de persuasion par rapport à la réalité d'une chose connue, état auquel nous sommes amenés par l'assentiment nécessarie de la raison théorique ou par le consentiment de la raison pratique, car en dehors du 'tenir pour vrai' nécessaire de la raison spéculative, et de 'l'admettre pour vrai' nécessaire de la raison pratique, il n'y a pas d'autre voie qui garantisse la vérité et la réalité." Positive Einleitung, #4, 258; from Hocedez, op.cit., 1.187.

[84] See Hocedez, op.cit., 1.187-8; also Thouvenin, art.cit., 2294; also Aubert op.cit., 105.

[85] See Hocedez, op.cit., 1. 188-9.

But is this, in fact, a free submission? Hardly. For passive faith which comes from understanding, purely natural, prepares for acting or active faith. The object to be believed is presented, all its relations are observed, and they are taken to heart. This is as it should be, says Hermes. When taken to heart a new, entirely free decision is made and becomes active or acting faith. It is a free act. It seems he protests too much. What happens is this: The intellect is determined to faith (passive) by knowledge of the truth intimately known; it in turn determines the practical intellect to faith (acting).[86]

What emerges from this confusion of ideas? The assent of faith is necessary; the necessity flows from rational exercise, grace is not needed. The act of faith is of the same order as belief in a natural truth such as an historical fact. Our motive for an act of faith is not the authority of God revealing. Rather, each dogma must be submitted to a positive doubt and thus reason becomes the sole rule of faith.[87]

These errors, Rationalism, Traditionalism, Semi-rationalism, are a partial list of the subjects which occupied the Fathers at the Vatican Council, and indicate the intellectual clime in which the Council opened.

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[86] See Ibid., 189-91.

[87] See Ibid., 194.

CHAPTER TWO

PRELIMINARY TO COUNCIL AND FIRST SCHEMA

On December 6, 1863, an extraordinary thing happened. Pius IX called a meeting of the Sacred Congregation of Rites, dismissed its officers and sent for all the Cardinals of the Curia who were absent, (there were twenty-one members of the Cardinalate living in Rome at that time.) What transpired happened quickly, but its results will end only with the last moment of time. Piux IX felt a general Council was due, to put an end to the many and varied errors rampant in the world. What did they think about its necessity and the matters to be dealt with in such an august assembly? This they were to study and report to him. And much to the chagrin of those whose interest had been piqued by this extraordinary event, their dealings were to be completely secret.[1]

Response from fifteen Cardinals was quite rapid. For within two months they had answered; the other six members of the Curia, however, delayed their answers over a two year period. Generally, opinion was favorable. The Cardinals saw no absolute need for such a council since the Holy See had condemned contemporary errors as they had arisen. But as the Holy See had previously condemned the errors of Luther, and then convoked a council in which this matter was again treated, so they thought there was a relative necessity now to do the same. Certainly the position of the Church would be greatly clarified. And the disciplinary measures needing attention were properly matters to be dealt with by a council. One member strongly opposed the convocation. He, Marius Cardinal Matthei, charged councils were to be called only in dire necessity. But such a need was not verified since all errors had been condemned.[2] Another, Francis Cardinal Pentini, saw the relative need, but because there was no chance of civil sanction he concluded: "Non esse locum."[3] A few others suggested it might be a bit inopportune, but they did not oppose its convocation.[4]

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[1] See L. Petit and J.B. Martin, Mansi. Sacrorum conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio (Arnheim & Lipsig; Walter, Libraire-Editeur, 1923) 49.8-9; also Cecconi, Histoire du Concile du Vatican Bonhomme (Paris: Libraire Victor Lecoffre, 1887) 1.15-6.

The following were the principal evils affecting the world as is seen from the replies of the Cardinals.[5] They were not too much concerned with the material evils prevalent in the world. Those things which countered the Word of God were foremost in their minds. As we have seen[6] the character of this age was one of destruction. Past institutions no longer satisfied the reason of modern man. It was in actuality rationalism, both in philosophical and religious circles, that presented the greatest evil to be fought. Outside the Church relations with the State were vexing. For the supremacy of the State was affirmed in many ways all to the detriment of the Church. The State had appropriated the duty of education and charity; it had interfered in the realm of marriage, religious orders, and the civil power of the Pope.[7] Within the Church herself disciplinary matters were marked as subject to the greatest abuses. Ecclesiastical teaching was faulty and sorely needed bolstering. Laxity among the laity could easily be traced to the reprehensible activity of many of the clerics. Remedies to establish closer ties between the bishops and the Holy See were demanded. And Religious Communities must be counselled to re-enliven the observance of their rules.[8]

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[2] See Mansi, 49.26-9

[3] See Ibid., 64.

[4] See Cecconi, op.cit., 22-4.

[5] The replies are contained in Mansi, 49.9-94; a summary by Mariano Spada, O.P., Mansi, 49.93-8.

[6] Above, Chapter 1.

The possibility of many difficulties was foreseen. Governments were infected by errors which would certainly be condemned at the council. There was a chance those concerned would not allow the dissemination of such decrees. And there was no surety that the governments would allow the bishops to leave for this council foreseeing such a conclusion. Then, if the bishops were away from their dioceses, the foes of religion could launch an all out attack against the Church. Another possibility was scandal. For with such a large group of bishops, differences of opinion were bound to arise; this could get out of hand. The danger of war, finally, was imminent. In fact, the question could validly be asked, was this a time of peace?[9] These and many other considerations were weighed. Nevertheless a council was deemed advisable and the resolve was expressed by Prospero Cardinal Caterini on December 22, 1864:

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[7] See Cecconi, op.cit., 17-9.

[8] See Ibid., 21-2.

[9] See Ibid., 124-8.

> God, as I believe, who has given Your Holiness the idea of a general council in order to build a powerful bulwark against such great evils, will smooth the way. He will overcome all difficulty and will give to Your Holiness and to the Bishops quiet, peace and time to complete so great a work.[10]

Heartened by the replies Pius IX appointed Cardinals Patrizi, Reisach, Panebianco, Bizzarri, Caterini as a Commission to study the feasibility of the council. This took place on March 5, 1865.[11] And on March 9, 1865 the Cardinals met for the first time and made five preliminary decisions. There was as they saw it a relative need for a council and now was the propitious time. An extraordinary Congregation or Commission should be formed to direct the affairs to be treated at the council. This Commission would send a letter to the bishops designated by the Pope to get their ideas concerning the necessity and matters relevant to their countries. It would not be opportune to ask the consent of Catholic princes before convoking the council because the answer could be "no" and would be tantamount to a capitulation by the Church. And certainly this notion of State supremacy in Church affairs was an evil to be treated at the council. Notification would be made, then, after the Holy Father officially convoked the council. And lastly, the Pontiff would decide what recourse he would make to the Sacred College before publishing the bull of Convocation.[12] At their second meeting they decided to call in theologians and canonists. Their scientific knowledge was advantageous and "their ideas for the most part purely scientific and abstract would be reduced to the concrete by the discussion and help of the others who will be on the commission."[13]

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[10] "(Quel) Dio che ha ispirato, come io credo, a vostra santità, l'idea di un concilio generale per fare un'argine potenta a mali gravissimi, appianerà le vie, supererà tutte le difficoltà, e darà all santità vostra ed ai vescovi tregua pace e tempo per compiere una si grande opera, ..." Mansi, 49.55D.

[11] See _Ibid_., 97-8.

[12] See _loc.cit_.; also Cecconi, _op.cit_., 42-3.

By the end of May 1865, the Pope had chosen a representative group of bishops to whom the letters would be sent. Another letter was sent shortly afterwards to the Oriental rite bishops. All replies were made in a little over a year (May 1865-August 1866).[14]

For the most part the bishops held the same views as the Cardinals about the necessity. The errors, they noted, were old evils re-fashioned, and expressing especially a great confusion in principles and fundamentals of faith. Doctrinally they thought the subjects to be discussed were those already contained in the Syllabus and in the encyclical Quanta Cura. Some of the evils included: rationalism, naturalism, freemasonry, spiritism, socialism, regalism, civil interference in re matrimonii, the Bible, and some mentioned the ex cathedra definition of infallibility.[15]

Even though about one quarter of the bishops thought the time inopportune, the Pope was convinced all things pointed to convocation. Even so he held off for over a year before announcing the proposed council.[16]

It was on June 26, 1867, the centenary feast of Saints Peter and

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[13] "le cui idee per lo più puramente scientifiche ed astratte potrebbero ridursi al concreto colla discussione e coll'aiuto degli altri che si troverranno nelle commissione." Mansi, 49.105C$_{7-10}$ See also Cecconi, op-cit., 44.

[14] The replies are contained in Mansi, 49.107-202.

[15] For a summary see Ibid., 202-38; also Cecconi, op.cit., 48-50.

[16] See Cecconi, op.cit., 68.

Paul, that Pius IX addressed the five hundred bishops assembled and told of the coming council.[17] And on July 1, the bishops declared their willingness and desire for the council.[18] On the same day Pius announced definitely that it would be convoked and that it would be under the care of the Blessed Virgin, under the title of the Immaculate Conception.[19]

Five commissions were formed twenty-eight days later to study and draw up the schemas to be presented at the council. This step had been dictated by the Directive Commission in one of its early sessions. The Commission on Faith and Dogma was the only one to see its work near completion. Louis Cardinal Bilio was chosen to head this task when Cardinal Panebianco asked to be relieved of the burden.[20]

The theologians resolved to construct their dogmatic constitution along the lines set down by Trent. First a short expose of doctrine was to be given followed by a condemnation of the errors involved. Having set this as their goal they began searching for errors meriting the attention of the council. This was not restricted to those which were heretical, but also extended to those which were dangerous to faith. They were to indicate where this evil was to be found, where it was widespread, precisely where it was evil. If this error was already condemned, the reasons for its condemnation and how it was condemned were to be listed. For they would consider recondemning an old error only if it had been revivified in a new form. Otherwise mention would be made in the chapter. They were to formulate the error and state how it was contrary to the Church including in this a judgment on the degree and nature of the error. A list of the sources in Scripture and in Tradition was to be compiled which would counter the errors. They were then ready to decide whether a condemnation should appear in the canon or in the chapter. This was to be given a logical and proper order.[21] When the letters from the bishops were received it was decided also to act on theological opinions which were dangerous and to construct the chapter as an exhortation or detestation.

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[17] See Mansi, 49.243-8.

[18] See Ibid., 247-62.

[19] See Ibid., 261-4.

[20] See Cecconi, op.cit., 74-5; for full details on choosing the consultors see Ibid., Vol. 1, Ch. 7: also vol. 1, pp. 90-4 for the qualifications of its twenty-four members. The other members of this theological and dogmatic commission were: Archbishop Joseph Cardoni, Msgr. Raephael Monaco La Valetta, Rev. Mariano Spada, O.P.; Rev. Giacinto de'Ferrari, O.P.; Rev. Anthony Maria Adragna, O.F.M. Conv.; Rev. John Perrone, S.J.; Rev. Tommaso Martinelli, Aug; Camillo Santori, Canon; Msgr. Placido Petacci, Rev. Bonafiglio Mura, Servite; Msgr. Joseph Pecci, Rev. John Baptist Franzelin, S.J.; Canon Phillip Cossa; Rev. Clement Shraeder, S.J.; Msgr. John Schwetz; Rev. Francis Hettinger; Msgr. James Macquenet; Canon Charles Gay; Rev. John Alzog; Msgr. James Corcoran; Rev. Stephen Moreno Labrador; Msgr. William Weathers; Rev. Tommaso Tosa, O.P.; Rev. August Guidi. Mansi, 49.467-9.

Such was the procedure which led to the formulation of the schema De doctrina catholica contra multiplices errores ex rationalismo derivatos. John Baptist Franzelin, S.J. (later Cardinal) presented this to the dogmatic commission on August 5, 1869 and discussion continued till September 9, 1869.[22] On November 7, 1869 Cardinal Bilio received final approbation of it from the Directive commission.[23]

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[21] See Vacant, Études théologiques sur les constitutions du concile du Vatican (Paris: Delhommet Briguet, Éditors, 1895) 1,21; also Mansi, 49.619-22, 654-55.

[22] See Ibid., 719-30; on faith chapters 4-7, August 12 and 17, see Ibid., 722,724-5

[23] See Ibid., 612-3

The first part of the schema deals with the Catholic teaching against materialism, pantheism and absolute rationalism which denies the possibility of Revelation and the supernatural order. The second part studies the errors of semi-rationalism which confuses grace and nature, faith and reason. This is in turn divided into three parts: the first concerns supernatural Revelation, its source, necessity and object; the second treats faith, the motive of credibility, freedom of assent, necessity and firmness of faith; the third concerns the relation of faith and reason, the authority of the Church guarding the deposit of faith, the unchangeableness of truths of the Church as compared to the very changeable natural sciences. The third major division deals with the Catholic teaching against special errors: God and the Trinity, the Incarnation, Nature of man, The Elevation of man.[24] Accompanying the schema were remarks or annotations explaining the errors and reasons for the chapter.[25] Of the eighteen chapters of the schema four, chapters six through nine, are the subject of this thesis on faith.

CHAPTERS SIX THROUGH NINE OF FIRST SCHEMA: ON FAITH

CHAPTER VI: THE DISTINCTION OF DIVINE FAITH FROM HUMAN KNOWLEDGE	CAPUT VI: DE FIDEI DIVINAE DISTINCTIONE A SCIENTIA HUMANA
Faith which responds to divine revelation is truly a supernatural virtue by which because of the authority of God	Revelationi divinae fides respondet, virtus nimirum supernaturalis, qua per divinam gratiam propter auctoritatem

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[24] See Mansi, 50.59-74.

[25] See *Ibid.*, 74-119.

speaking we believe through divine grace that these things are true which are divinely revealed. St. Paul writing to the Thessalonians praises this faith in the Christians: When you heard and received from us the word from God, you welcomed it not as the word of man, but as it truly is the word of God, who works in you who have believed. And the Apostleship to bring about obedience to the faith among all the nations through Jesus Christ is commended by the same Apostle; and thence it is said faith depends on hearing, and hearing on the word of Christ. Wherefore it must first of all be held by all the children of the Catholic Church that for the excellent virtue of faith,

Dei loquentis credimus vera esse, quae divinitus revelata sunt.[26] Hanc fidem in christianis laudat Paulus apostolus Thessalonicensibus scribens: Cum accepissetis a nobis verbum auditus Dei, accepistis illud non ut verbum hominum, sed sicut est vere, verbum Dei, qui operatur in vobis qui credidistis.[27] Et ab eodem apostolo commendatur apostolatus per Jesum Christum ad obediendum fidei in omnibus gentibus;[28] atque inde dicitur fides ex auditu, auditus autem per verbum Christi[29] Quare ab omnibus catholicae ecclesiae filiis tenendum imprimis est, ad excellentem virtutem fidei, qua fideles

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[26] See Trent, Sess. VI, ch. 6; ES, 798.

[27] 1 Thessalonians 2:13. Scriptural translations are taken from the Confraternity edition.

[28] Romans 1:5, 26:26.

[29] Romans 10:17.

by which we are called and are faithful, and by which because of the authority of God revealing, assent is to be given, that the persuasion which arises from the perception of the intrinsic truth of things through the natural light of reason does not suffice for truths concerning God and religion. For, a persuasion of this kind cannot be deemed to be that faith in the proper sense without which it is impossible to please God without throwing into confusion all the things concerning the distinction between human knowledge and divine faith which ought to remain quite firm.

Wherefore we condemn the doctrine with anathema, if anyone says, divine faith which has for its object moral or religious truths, is not distinguished from natural knowledge and that it is not required for the act of faith

nominamur et sumus, et qua propter auctoritatem Dei revelantis assensus praestandum est, non sufficere illam mentis humanae persuasionem de veritatibus ad Deum et ad religionem spectantibus, quae ex intrisecus perspecta rerum veritate per naturale lumen rationis oriatur; hujusmodi enim persuasio fides proprie dicta, sine qua impossibile est placere Deo,[30] censeri nequit, quin omnia perturbentur, quae firmissima manere debent de distinctione inter humanam scientiam et fidem divinam.

Quapropter anathemate damnamus doctrinan, si quis dixerit, fidem non distingui a scientia naturali, quae veritatem moralem aut religiosam pro obiecto habeat; ac propterea ad actum fidei, qua fideles nominamur et sumus, non requiri, ut revelata

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[30] Hebrews 11:6; Trent, Sess. 6, ch. 8; ES, 801.

(by which we are named and are the faithful) that the revealed truth be believed on the authority of God revealing.	veritas propter auctoritatem Dei revelatoris credatur.

This sixth chapter in giving the correct notion of faith opposes the rationalists and semi-rationalists. Franzelin explains[31] that since the rationalists disdain revelation as a locutio Dei they deprive their admitted religious faith of any meaning. The notions of this religious faith vary with the many rationalists, yet none ever amount to more than a rational knowledge of God and religious things. And the semi-rationalists, though admitting a faith which is an assent to truth, do not arrive at the correct idea of faith. For they also derive their basic ideas from the rationalists. For them any firm persuasion about God and divine things constitutes faith in the proper sense. The Hermesian teaching continues: the intrinsic connection of ideas and the penetrating knowledge of a thing form the motive of that faith which suffices for justification.[32] And since this faith depends so essentially on a natural motive and process, it follows that the most sublime truth will be the rational knowledge had of God from the study of the universe.[33]

Thus in this chapter we find a real definition of faith; the specific difference or formal motive of faith being the authority of God revealing. And a faith lacking this, lacks an essential element which makes faith salvific and constitutes us Christians.

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[31] See Mansi, 50.85-7.

[32] See Hermes, Intro. phil. ad theol., pp.259,265; from Mansi, 50.85, n.2.

[33] G.C. Mayer, Lexicon, ecclesias., IV, p. 522; from Mansi 50.86, n.1.

This is the doctrine propounded by Saint Paul when he says: When you received and heard from us the word of God, you welcomed it not as the word of men, but as it truly is the word of God.[34] Like testimony of God's revelation and its acceptance because of Him is given by Saint Paul[35] and is adopted by the Council of Trent.[36]

Now some of these divinely revealed truths are within the province of reason. But when a knowledge of them springs from this source it cannot be called faith; nor is it the beginning of faith; nor is it the root of justification. This kind of faith Franzelin shows was condemned by Innocent XI.[37]

As is evident Trent's influence is great. But whereas Trent was concerned with faith in relation to justification the definition of faith here deals with faith in se and as distinct from human knowledge. By the definition Franzelin established the proper act of faith as a supernatural virtue pertaining to the intellect; he gave the material object, revelation; the formal object, the authority of God revealing; the principle sparking (eliciting principle) man's assent, grace; and never too often repeated the distinguishing feature between faith and human knowledge, the authority of God revealing.

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[34] 1 Thessalonians 2:13.

[35] Romans 10:7, Galatians 3:5, Romans 16:26, 2 Corinthians 10:5.

[36] See Trent, Sess. 6, chs. 6,8; ES, 798,801.

[37] Proposition 23, March 2, 1679. "Fides late dicta ex testimonio creaturarum similive motivo ad iustificationem sufficit." ES, 1173.

CHAPTER VII: THE NECESSITY OF THE MOTIVES OF CREDIBILITY

Although faith by which we are named and are faithful does not arise from the perception of the intrinsic truth of the thing believed, it is nevertheless a rational service, since God the revealer has made his testimonies quite credible. For he did not set up the order of his revelation in such wise that men would be led by an interior instinct to faith, but rather willed to be furnished with it the internal helps of the Holy Spirit as well as external motives of credibility as clear arguments of divine revelation. For our Savior when he gave the command to his apostles to preach the Gospel in the whole world professing it to all creatures, sent them in power and the Holy Spirit. Then they went forth and preached everywhere while the Lord worked with them and confirmed the preaching

CAPUT VII: DE NECESSITATE MOTIVORUM CREDIBILITATIS

Quamvis autem fides, qua fideles nominamur et sumus, non sit ex intrinsecus perspecta veritate rei creditae; ea tamen est rationabile obsequium, quoniam revelator Deus testimonia sua credibilia fecit nimis. Neque enim talem instituit suae revelationis ordinem, quo homines interno dumtaxat instinctu ad fidem perducerentur, sed cum internis Spiritus sancti auxiliis externa credibilitatis motive, veluti certa revelationis divinae argumenta, praesto esse voluit. Ita namque salvator noster cum mandatum suis apostolis daret, ut in universum mundum proficiscentes omni creaturae evangelium praedicarent, in virtute et in Spiritu sancto eosdem misit; illi autem profecti praedicaverunt ubique Domino cooperante et sermonem

by the signs that followed, and made it evident that God had truly spoken. Therefore according to the Gospel of Jesus Christ and the preaching of the apostles it must be held that some notes are furnished by God Himself for the recognition of divine revelation. To these notes in accord with the order set up by God belong the divine facts which are external and knowable to men as signs of the divine locution even before faith is received. For human reason as long as it has not reached true faith, ought to acquire diligently into the fact of revelation to convince itself that God has spoken lest it be deceived and err in an affair of such great importance. Then recognizing the God of revelation and having cast away any difficulty and doubt, let it show full obedience to the same supreme majesty

confirmante sequentibus signis,[38] quibus constaret , Deum esse vere loquutum. Secundum ipsum igitur evangelium Jesus Christi et secundum praedicationem apostolorum tenendum est, notas aliquas ad dignoscendam divinam revelationem a Deo ipso esse dispositas, atque ad has notas iuxta ordinem a Deo institutum pertinere facta divina, quae externa sint et hominibus etiam ante fidem susceptam cognoscibilia tanquam signa divinae loquutionis. Humana enim ratio, dum ad veram fidem nondum pervenit, ne in tanti memento negotio decipiatur et erret, divinae revelationis factum diligenter inquirat oportet, ut certo sibi constet, Deum esse loquutum; tum vero, cognoscens Deum revelatorum, quavis difficultate et dubitatione penitus abiecta plenam eidem supremae maiestati et infinitae

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[38] Mark 16:15-17, 18,20.

and infinite truth of faith.	veritati praestet fidei obedientiam.
Wherefore we condemn under anathema the opinion of those who claim that it is not possible for revealed truth to be rendered credible by external signs and therefore that internal experience of the soul alone ought to move man to faith.	Quare sub anathemate damnamus eorum sententiam, qui affirmant, non posse fieri, ut veritas revelata signis externis reddatur credibilis, atque ideo sola interna animi experientia homines ad fidem moveri debere.

The Adnotationes in reference to this chapter[39] indicate the various claims made by protestants as the reason for faith: a religious sense, an internal experience, some immediate certitude of faith. In all, faith was the result of a spontaneous and immediate act produced through the efficacious impulse of grace. This position is a direct corollary of their contention that: to know any supernatural fact one needs the supernatural help of faith. Thus miracles and prophecies cannot be allowed as motives of credibility since to recognize them and accept them a previous act of faith is required.[40]

These errors have been just as variously attacked and combatted through papal documents. Innocent XI condemned (March 2, 1679) the proposition which said a fear of error remains in the assent of faith which intimates then there is no certain way to know revelation.[41] The theses subscribed to by Bautain[42] are approved by Gregory XVI on September 8, 1840. These propose the miracles of Christ as strong, clear proofs of revelation for all. Further reason is able to prove with certitude the authenticity of revelation. The encyclical of Pius IX, Qui Pluribus teaches that reason is able to prove to itself the fact of revelation.[43]

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[39] Number 16, Mansi, 50.87-8.

[40] See Ibid., 87.

[41] "Assensus fidei supernaturalis et utilis ad salutem stat cum notitia solum probabili revelationis, immo cum formidine, qua quis formidet, ne non sit locutus Deus." ES, 1171.

Franzelin then reasons: if all extrinsic evidence is invalid then there is no objective criteria and there can be no way to separate the true from the false. And certainly contradictions and manifest errors are and will be attributed to the Spirit of Truth from whom these internal experiences come. The greatest danger of this position, however, is the religious indifference it fosters. This is not merely a possibility; it is a teaching gaining in popularity.[44] And because of this a more detailed treatment of the error will follow.

CHAPTER VIII: THE SUPERNATURAL VIRTUE OF FAITH AND THE LIBERTY OF THE WILL IN THE ASSENT OF FAITH.

Moreover since some renew in these days an error already condemned by the Church, affirming that faith itself by which revealed truths are to be believed, is a natural conviction

CAPUT VIII: DE SUPERNATURALI VIRTUTE FIDEI, ET DE LIBERTATE VOLUNTATIS IN FIDEI ASSENSUS.

Quoniam praeterea nonulli errorem ab ecclesia iam pridem damnatum postremis his temporibus renovarunt, affirmantes, fidem ipsam, qua credendae sunt veritates revelatae, rationis of reason brought about by the necessary arguments according to the laws of human knowledge so that faith in itself, unless it be already alive and working through charity, must not be ascribed to a supernatural grace nor is a free virtue and is not even mediately salutary: wherefore adhering to divine revelation according to previous councils and the declarations of the holy Fathers we teach and define again that very faith in se, by which we are faithful, is a supernatural gift of God, the beginning of human salvation, the foundation and root of all justification, and hence this faith itself and assent of faith is a work of divine grace For with the external proposal of faith an internal grace of illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit, who gives to all a sweet-

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[42] See Ibid., 1624,7; ch. 1, p.12-13.

[43] See ES, 1634-39.

[44] See Mansi, 50.88.

convictionem esse naturalem necesariis argumentis inductam secundum leges scientiae humanae, ita ut fides per se, nisi iam viva sit et per charitatem operetur, nec gratiae supernaturali adscribenda nec virtus sit libera, et ne mediate quidem salutaris: propterea inhaerentes divinae revelationi secundum praecedentium conciliorum et sanctorum patrum declarationes iterum docemus et definimus, fidem ipsam in se, qua fideles sumus, donum Dei esse supernaturale, humanae salutis initium, fundamentum et radicem omnis justificationis,[45] et proinde hanc ipsam fidem fideique assensum esse opus divinae gratiae. Cum externa enim fidei propositione gratia interna illuminationis et inspirationis Spiritus sancti, qui dat omnibus suavitatem in

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[45] See Trent, Sess. 6, ch. 8; *ES*, 801.

ness in consenting and believing, is necessary, that the act of faith be as it ought to be, that is, supernatural and pertaining to salvation.

However just as the acts of the virtues of which faith is the foundation remain under the help of grace, so God also wills the free obedience of faith in consenting to truth. We are reminded of this freedom in the precepts of faith; while we are ordered to believe truths and pertinacious incredulity in the face of revelation sufficiently proposed is condemned: for not all obey the gospel; and those who do not believe are already judged.

Wherefore we declare and we condemn as heretical the opinion, if anyone says, this faith by which Christians believe the preaching of the gos-

consentiendo et credendo,[46] necessaria est, ut actus fidei sit, sicut oportet, hoc est supernaturalis et pertinens ad viam salutis.

Sicut autem actus virtutum, quarum fides fundamentum est, sub adiutorio gratiae manent, ita vult Deus etiam liberam obedientiam fidei in consentiendo veritati. Huius libertatis admonemur in praeceptis fidei, dum iubemur credere veritates, et pertinax contra sufficientem propositionem revelationis incredulitas damnatur: non omnes obediunt evangelio;[47] qui autem non credit, iam iudicatus est.

Quare haereticam esse declaramus et damnamus sententiam, si quis dixerit, hanc fidem, qua christiani evangelicae praedicationi consentiunt,

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[46] See II Orange, can. 7(Mansi, 8.714A,B.)

[47] Romans 10:16-21.

pel unless it be already a living faith which works through charity, is not a supernatural gift of God; but is a natural and necessary conviction of human reason.	nisi sit iam fides viva quae per charitatem operatur, non esse donum Deo supernaturale; sed esse naturalem et necessariam persuasionem rationis humanae.

The explanation accompanying the preceeding chapter[48] indicates it is against the Hermesian error concerning the liberty of faith. Hermes distinguishes a faith of cognition and a faith of the heart.[49] The faith of cognition is passive and a necessary assent to the truths of the Christian religion because of their intrinsic demonstrative worth. The faith of the heart is active and acting through charity. It is the free element of faith. It maintains its freedom in its absolute subjection to things revealed since it is completely turned from earthly things to God. But, even in this hypothesis, this assent cannot be freely willed for it is dependent on and subject to that necessity induced by a compelled reason. Consequently grace is not necessary since assent is the result of rational powers alone. It follows, too, that faith (faith of cognition) is not salutary in se, but derives its salvific effect from its operation through charity (faith of the heart).

The semipelagians, argued Franzelin, had distinguished faith from the beginning of faith which for them did not need grace and they were condemned at the second Council of Orange.[50] That condemnation applies here when one considers the similarity between the "beginning of faith" and "the faith of cognition."

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[48] See Mansi, 50.88-90.

[49] See Ch. 1, pp. 20-21.

[50] See Mansi, 8.714A,B,C,D.

At the Council of Trent this idea is also soundly routed when it says that man comes to justice and is freely moved to faith by grace.[51] Certainly the sense of Trent's definitions is clear when dealing with the necessity of grace for a supernatural act.[52] The use of sicut oportet in this reference must needs be perverted to restrict its meaning to living faith. Further: that faith, even dead, is a true faith as defined at this council.[53]

CHAPTER IX: THE NECESSITY AND SUPERNATURAL FIRMNESS OF FAITH

From these condemned errors the most dreadful fallacies follow, arranged for weakening the firmness of faith whereby it is said to be right for a Catholic man after the faith has been acknowledged and accepted under the magisterium of the Catholic Church, to call this faith into real doubt, and to suspend his assent, in order to examine more freely

CAPUT IX: DE NECESSITATE ET SUPERNATURALI FIRMITATE FIDEI

Ex damnatis his erroribus consequitur funestissima fallacia ad labefactandam fidei constantiam composita, qua dicitur, homini catholico post fidem sub magisterio catholicae ecclesiae iam agnitam et susceptam, fas esse fidem eandem in reale dubium vocare, suumque assensum suspendere, quo liberius fundamenta ac motiva

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[51] Trent, Sess. 6, ch. 6; ES, 798.

[52] See Ibid., can. 3; ES, 813.

[53] See Ibid., can. 28; ES, 838.

the foundations and motives of faith according to the norm of reason and human knowledge. (All this) so that in his examination the condition of faithful Catholics ought to be the same as the conditions of others who are living in a heterodox religion. In order that all the faithful might beware of such a pernicious error as this, let the Catholic doctrine concerning the necessity of divine faith and concerning the duty of the unyielding constancy in this same faith be kept constantly before their eyes.

The reception of the true faith and its firm profession, is entirely necessary for justice before God and for eternal salvation since without faith it is impossible to please God, and the statement of Our Savior who commanded His Gospel to be preached to all creatures remains: He

fidei secundum norman rationis et scientiae humanae examinet, ita ut in hoc examine par esse debeat conditio fidelium catholicorum ac aliorum, qui in religione heterodoxa versantur. Ab huiusmodi perniciosissimo errore ut fideles omnes sibi caveant, doctrina catholica de necessitate divinae fidei et de officio incommutabilis in eadem constantiae perpetuo eis ob oculos versetur.

Verae fidei susceptio nimirum et eiusdem constans professio, ad iustitiam apud Deum[54] et ad salutem aeternam omnino necessaria est; quoniam sine fide impossibile est placere Deo,[55] et Salvatoris nostri, qui iussit evangelium suum praedicari omni creaturae, manet sententia: Qui non crediderit,

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[54] See Romans 4:2-5.

[55] Hebrews 11:6.

who does not believe shall be condemned. Hence so much the more unhappy are those who once were illumined and tasted the good word of God and have fallen away. Again they crucify for themselves the Son of God and make him a mockery. They are compared by the Apostle to the reprobate land which is nigh unto a curse and its end is to be burnt. That men might be able to satisfy this necessary obligation of embracing the true faith and persevering firmly in it, God Himself who gave the precept goes before with his help. For just as according to the order instituted by the author and finisher of our faith for leading men to the admir-

condemnabitur.[56] Hinc eo etiam magis illi infelices, qui semel illuminati sunt gustaveruntque bonum Deo verbum et prolapsi sunt, rursum crucifigentes sibimetipsis Filium Dei et ostentui habentes, comparantur ab apostolo terrae reprobae, quae maledicitioni proxima est, et cuius consummatio in combustionem.[57] Ut autem huic necessariae obligationi amplectendi veram fidem et in eadem constanter perseverandi homines satisfacere valeant, Deus ipse qui instat praecepto, etiam praecurrit auxilio.[58] Sicut enim secundum ordinem institutum a fidei nostrae auctore et consummatore[59] ad deducendos homines in ad-

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[56] Mark 16:15-16.

[57] See Hebrews 6:4-8; 2 Peter 2:21.

[58] See Saint Leo the Great, Sermo 67, al. 65, ch. 6 (ML 54.371C$_{8-9}$).

[59] See Hebrews 12:2.

able light of faith, internal grace is joined with the word heard of God, so each grace both the external grace of the proposal of faith, and especially the internal, help our weakness to firmness and constancy in faith already rereceived.

The Savior of the human race willed to accomodate the proposition and preaching of his revealed doctrine to all nations and times by sending his legates to the ends of the earth and even to the consummation of the world. And the divine character of their mission would be signified by their perpetual succession and harmony under a visible head. So He instituted the Catholic Church and marked it with manifest notes of his institution so that the guardian and

mirabile lumen fidei cum verbo auditus Dei[60] coniungitur gratia interna: ita gratia utraque tum externa propositionis fidei tum maxime interna adiuvat infirmitatem nostram[61] ad firmitatem et constantiam in fide iam suscepta.

Propositionem et praedicationem totius doctrinae revelatae Salvator humani generis voluit accommodatam reddere omnibus gentibus et omnibus temporibus sucs mittendo legatos usque ad ultimum terrae[62] et usque ad consummationem saeculi[63] in perpetua successione et consensione sub visibili capite insignitos charateribus divinae missionis; atque ita catholicam ecclesiam instituit suaeque institutionis manifestis notis distinxit, ut

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[60] See 1 Thessalonians 2:13.

[61] See Romans 8:26.

[62] Acts 1:8.

[63] Matthew 28:20.

teacher of the revealed word would be recognized by all men. For this reason, to this alone and to no other religious communion belongs all motives, both many and wonderful, which are divinely given to make the christian faith evidently credible. Hence just as for those who have not yet come to this true Church of Jesus Christ, it is a sign raised unto the nations by God Himself and a perpetual admonition, that they seek and embrace the truth once it is found, so in the same Church One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic, the faithful, learned and unlearned, resting upon the most firm foundations for the full certitude of credibility, are always prepared, to the extent that it concerns each person in view of their condition, to satisfy everyone demanding a reason for that hope which is

ab omnibus hominibus agnosceretur custos et magistra verbi revelati. Ad hanc propterea solam et ad nullam aliam religionis communionem pertinent motiva omnia, quae ad evidentem credibilitatem fidei christianae tam multa et tam mira divinitus sunt disposita. Quocirca sicut haec vera ecclesia Jesu Christi illis, qui ad eam nondum pervenerunt, est signum a Deo ipso levatum in nationes[64] et perpetua admonitio, ut quaerant et repertam amplectantur veritatem: ita in eadem ecclesia una, sancta, catholica et apostolica fideles docti et indocti fundamentis innituntur firmissimis ad plenam credibilitatis certitudinem,[65] parati semper, quantum ad singulos pro eorum conditione spectat, ad satisfactionem omni poscenti rationem de ea, quae in ipsis

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[64] See Isaias 11:12.

[65] See Saint Augustine, De utilitate credendi, ch. 17(ML 42.91).

in them. Everyone, therefore, who by the ineffable mercy of God has already reached safety in the secure port from the waters of human opinions and errors by which miserable mortals outside the Church are tossed around, should remember the most grave admonition of the Apostle: How shall we escape if we neglect so great a salvation? For it was first announced by the Lord, and was confirmed unto us by those who heard Him; God also, bearing them witness by signs and wonders, manifold powers and impartings of the Holy Spirit.

Above all these things, however, the faith and its firmness is owed to an internal grace for one labors in vain building the faith by preaching unless the Lord builds it from within by having mercy. As the grace of God who

est spe.[66] Omnes igitur, qui ineffabili Dei misericordia in tutum hunc portum salvati iam sunt ex fluctibus humanarum opinionum et errorum, quibus miseri mortales extra ecclesiam circumferuntur, meminerint gravissimae admonitionis apostoli: Quomodo nos effugiemus, si tantam neglexerimus salutem? Quae cum initium accepisset enarrari per Dominum, ab iis qui audierunt, in nos confirmata est contestante Deo signis et portentis et variis virtutibus et Spiritus sancti distributionibus.[67]

Super haec autem omnia fides eiusque firmitas gratiae internae debetur; in vanum namque laborat praedicando aedificans fidem, nisi eam Dominus miserando intus aedificet.[68]

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[66] 1 Peter 3:15.

[67] Hebrews 2:3-4.

[68] Saint Augustine, De praedestinatione Sanctorum, ch. 7 (ML 44.970).

wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of truth, is given to those in error for this reason that these same ones by freely assenting and cooperating with grace might be led away from error and turned toward truth; so through an internal supernatural grace with opportune helps the strength of those who believe is the Lord who does not abandon unless he is abandoned, so that one may live always piously and justly. For since divine faith is not a natural persuasion but an infused virtue through which we adhere to revealed truth by the elevating and strengthening grace of the Holy Spirit; so also the firmness of assent is supernatural through this same grace, so that our faith is not in the wisdom of men, but in the

Sicut gratia Dei, qui omnes homines vult salvos fieri et ad agnitionem veritatis venire,[69] ad hoc datur errantibus, ut eidem gratiae libere assentiendo et cooperando[70] ab errore reducantur et convertantur ad veritatem; ita per supernaturalem gratiam internam in auxilio opportuno fortitudo credentium Dominus est, qui non deserit, nisi deseratur, ut pie semper iusteque vivatur.[71] Quoniam enim fides divina non persuasio naturalis est, sed virtus infusa,[72] per quam Spiritus sancti gratia elevante et confortante adhaeremus revelatae veritati; ideo etiam firmitas assensus per eandem gratiam supernaturalis est, ut fides nostra non sit in sapientia hominum, sed in virtu-

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[69] 1 Timothy 2:4.

[70] See Trent, Sess. 6, ch. 5; ES, 797.

[71] Trent Sess. 6, chs. 11, 13; ES, 804,806, from Saint Augustine, De natura et gratia contra Pelagium, ch. 26 (ML 44.261).

[72] Trent, Sess. 6, ch. 7; ES, 799,800.

power of God. Hence this light of faith and help of grace distinguished by an immense distance the faithful (who grasping first truths are taught of God and believe on divine faith) from those who in error adhere to a false religion because of human opinions and that wisdom of which it is written: I will destroy the wisdom of the wise and the prudence of the prudent I will reject.

Wherefore we declare and we condemn as heretical the opinion: if anyone says that the condition of the faithful is the same as those who have not yet come to the true faith, so that the Catholic faithful can licitly call into real doubt and suspend assent to the faith which they have received and believed under the magisterium of the Church, until they themselves have found a demonstration of

te Dei.[73] Unde hoc ipsum lumen fidei et adiutorium gratiae fideles, qui docibiles Dei,[74] et inhaerentes primae veritati, fide divina credunt, immenso intervallo discernit ab iis, qui errantes religioni falsae adhaerent ex opinionibus humanis et ex illa sapientia, de qua scriptum est: Perdam sapientiam sapientium et prudentiam prudentium reprobabo.[75]

Quapropter haereticam esse declaramus et damnamus sententiam, si quis dixerit, parem esse conditionem fidelium ac eorum, qui ad fidem unice veram nondum pervenerunt, ita ut fideles catholici licite possint fidem, quam sub ecclesiae magisterio iam susceperunt et crediderunt, in reale dubium vocare et assensum suspendere, donec demonstrationem credibilitatis et

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[73] See 1 Corinthians 2:5.

[74] John 6:45.

[75] 1 Corinthians 1:19.

credibility and truth according to the rules of human knowledge.	veritatis secundum regulas humanae scientiae ipsi absolverint.[76]

This ninth chapter opposes what Franzelin estimates as the most insidious error flowing from all the above: religious indifference.[77] It comes about in this wise. Since these errors deny objectively credible motives, there is no objectively credible religion. Because of this faith is not beyond doubt. And so the supernatural firmness of faith, supernatural grace, and the divine light of faith became useless. Without these faith becomes a conviction produced by demonstration. And the degree of assent then depends on the strength of the rational arguments used in the demonstration.[78] Therefore man should give credence to that religion which offers the most weighty rational arguments. This, of course, is subjective but it is the rule to be followed and is evidently contrary to the fifteenth article of the Syllabus: "Man is free to embrace and profess the religion he thinks true by the light of reason."[79] One must take note, too, that the present section of the schema is directed against those Catholics who condone this opinion.[80]

Actually the error is contrary to Catholic and revealed doctrine concerning: "the necessity and divine precept of the true faith, the credibility of all revealed truths, as revelation proposed and preached by the Catholic Church, and the unchangeable certitude even for the unlettered in the face of a scientific and philosophical examination; the light of faith and the supernatural firmness of faith."[81] Each of these is treated so that non-Catholics will know the obligation of embracing the true faith and that Catholics will be constant in it. Tertullian, as Franzelin points out, speaks of this dual obligation of seeking the truth and once having found it to rest secure in it.[82]

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[76] These chapters VI through IX are contained in Mansi, $50.63A_1$-$66B_{12}$.

[77] See Mansi, 50.90-95.

[78] Hermes while advising this procedure limited it to the teachers of theology or those who had enough intelligence for a critical judgment. See Ibid., 90, n.1.

[79] "Liberum cuiqui homini est eam amplecti ac profiteri religionem, quam rationis lumine quis ductus veram putaverit" (8,26). ES, 1715.

[80] See Mansi, 50.91D-92A.

Saint Paul declares the necessity of embracing the faith.[83] This command presumes the possibility of belief as is attested to by Saint Augustine when he says, "God does not command the impossible."[84] To insure the attainment of this faith helps are given which, as Saint Thomas indicates, are both internal and external.[85]

The annotations continue: the custodian of all these helps, motives of credibility, is the Church. She has been made knowable, a sign accomodated to all men and times. Her continuity with and from Christ and the Apostles makes her the ideal motive of credibility. For the person already in the fold a strengthened faith is obtained by their study of her. And one outside the fold, even the unlearned, although unable to fathom the depths of her doctrine, can know of her holiness, unity. catholicity, and apostolicity. For these know many natural truths with certainty but without comprehension. So also they can know the Church. The Adnotationes then, show the strength of the evidence by citing Richard of Saint Victor: "...could we not say with all confidence in God: Lord if there is error, we are deceived by you yourself; for those things confirmed in us by great signs and wonders are such that they could not be done except by you."[86]

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[81] "1) de necessitate et divino praecepto verae fidei; 2) de credibilitate totius veritatis revelatae, ut revelatio ab ecclesia catholica proponitur et praedicatur, atque de incommutabili certitudine etiam pro rudibus citra inquisitionem scientificam et philosophicam; 3) de lumine fidei ac fidei firmitate supernaturali." Mansi, 50.92A$_{7-14}$.

[82] See Liber de praescriptionis, ch. 9 (ML 2.22-3).

[83] See Hebrews 11:6.

[84] "Non igitur Deus impossibilia jubet," De natura et gratia, Bk. 1, ch. 43 (ML 44.271).

[85] See Saint Thomas, IIa IIae, q.2, art, 9, ad. 3.

That internal help which makes faith salutary and which actually is the beginning of faith itself is grace.[87] It is a grace which enters into the very examination of truth and error. While one who is seeking truth requires this grace which God will unfailingly give since He wills the salvation of all, the faithful obtain this grace to confirm their faith.[88] Thus should any lack faith it is due to their neglect or resistance of these internal helps which God has given.

Franzelin continues. Since this internal help is essentially the eliciting principle of faith, and is supernatural, the kind of firmness required must correspond to it--supernatural. The intellect assents because it is supernaturally elevated and strengthened by grace. And the firmness of assent is greater in faith, as Saint Thomas says,[89] even though there is more evidence in science or knowledge. For faith is based on the First Truth--God. Thus the intellect adheres with an assent corresponding to the divine authority.

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[86] ". . .nonne cum omni confidentia Deo dicere poterimus? Domine, si error est teipso decepti sumus: nam ista in nobis tantis signis et prodigiis confirmata sunt et talibus, quae nonnisi per te fieri possunt." De Trinitate, Bk.1, ch.2, (ML 196.891).

[87] See Trent, Sess. 6, ch. 7; ES, 799,800.

[88] See Saint Thomas, IIa IIae, q.8, art.4, ad.2.

[89] See III, dist. 23, q.2, art. 2, sol.3.

It can be said, then, that this firmness is estimatively above all. And that faith can be so constant, it is elevated, illumined and strengthened by grace. Certainly the degree of this firmness does not depend on the understanding had of the motives of credibility but rather on the authority of the one revealing. Therefore those opinions are entirely false and condemned which say: the will is incapable of a greater assent than the reasons so impelling; and, one can prudently repudiate assent which is supernatural.[90]

Franzelin notes that the schema does not discuss whether or not a Catholic can fall from the faith without fault. Nor does it concern the false motives which per accidens can lead the simple astray. What is condemned specifically is the Hermesian dictum which states that everyone has the right to examine and doubt doctrine and to suspend faith till all doubts are resolved.

Just from what we have reproduced here on the schema and the Adnotationes Butler's remark becomes clear:

> It will be seen that the entire schema was a piece of highly technical dogmatic theology; and it may be surmised that the average elderly bishop, whose recollection of theological niceties had grown dim in the work of the pastorate, must have perused this very stiff bit of theology for the subject matter of debate with feeling akin to consternation.[91]

Though it would be contrary to fact to extend this to all the fathers of the council, it does not seem naive to bear it in mind when one reads the replies made by the bishops.[92] Seven bishops replied the first day of the discussion. Because their objections are fairly well representative of the general feeling we will summarize each of their reports. And then, we will occupy ourselves with those objections which are more specifically related to this thesis.

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[90] Theses 19,20; Innocent XI, March 2, 1679; ES, 1169,70.

[91] Cuthbert Butler, The Vatican Council (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1936) vol. 1, 186.

The discussions began at the fourth General Congregation on December 28, 1869. The first to comment was Joseph Cardinal Rauscher: the schema was too long, vague, academic, not pertinent, did not condemn present errors; he requested it be sent to the deputation.[93]

Archbishop Peter Kenrick followed him and in a very short passage expressed much the same thought: the council should propose doctrine as Our Lord did, not recount errors; he also suggested it be sent back to the deputation.[94] Archbishop Vincent Tizzani remarked: it was too long, wordy; its style that of the schools, not of a council; should be redone.[95] Archbishop Francisco Apuzzo said: it was to be praised in some things, but it was lacking in others, namely, the Latin was not fluid, sometimes hard, obscure; it was too much like the schools; it was wrong to identify each chapter by title of the error; the chapter should first present Catholic doctrine, then the errors and lastly a condemnation; the canons should be uniform; the council should take no sides in theological discussions; the condemnations should be clarified to give them a proper theological note.[96] Archbishop Vincent Spaccopietro who was of the same general opinion believed: Catholic teaching should be clarified; charity should be observed in condemning.[97] Archbishop Cajetan Pace-Forno who surprisingly was pleased and on the whole thought the schema was well done made three definite changes in terminology, but of no great moment.[98] The most vitriolic and the last of this group was Archbishop Thomas Connolly. It is enough to say he condemned it for treating "de omni scibili in re dogmatica"[99] and the language which was that of the theologian not the magisterium.[100]

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[92] Yet note how well these bishops conducted the revamping of the schema. See Butler's impressions on this, Ibid., 2.239-40.

[93] See Mansi, 50.122-5.

[94] See Ibid., 126.

[95] See Ibid., 126-8.

Against these general views rose a champion on January 4, 1870 in the person of Bishop Conrad Martin. As he saw it there were three objections. The first was that the schema did not propose remedies for the age. To this he countered that it would be impossible to deal with all the evils of the day. The schema satisfactorily opposed the major errors. The second objection was that too much scholasticism was propounded which had no sanction. But he said, since the schools today are not teachers of truth but rather mothers of errors, it was best to use the language of the schools to battle the errors. And last, it was too prolix and demanded greater brevity. This he contended was a natural consequence of the evils treated. The older Councils never had to fight the errors of the schools. And in any case brevity would come with discussion, but surely whatever the defect it did not warrant discarding this highly competent work.[101]

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[96] See Ibid., 128-30.

[97] See Ibid., 130-2.

[98] See Ibid., 132-4. He was the only one of this first group who was really satisfied with the schema. It is to be supposed that the dogmatic commission and the Holy Father had anticipated this type of objection. See Butler, op-cit., 1, 198.

[99] Mansi, 50.134D.

[100] See Ibid., 134-6.

We will now direct our study to the specific areas dealing with faith which displeased the bishops. On December 30, 1869 Bishop Joseph Caixal y Estradé presented his objections. In reference to chapter eight he thought greater clarity between the supernatural motive (a divine illumination of the will) and the others is essential, since the latter concern a discursive process which is entirely accidental. The first draws the will to action and gives the impulse for belief. The second leads to belief because the wonders noted could only attest to a divine revelation. But God can touch the hearts of men so that the external motives are unnecessary. Their judgment of credibility is formed and exposure to the word of God alone is sufficient to elicit a firm belief.[102]

Bishop Lawrence Gastaldi was next to offer objections to the chapters on faith (January 3, 1870). He observed that the words Ac propterea ad actum. . . credatur[103] should be stricken. He reasoned these words demanded an impossible simultaneity between the act of faith and a knowledge of the formal object. He pointed to the child's act of faith which needs no such awareness of God's authority in believing. Also in reference to chapter seven he advised a change of terminology so that it is evident truth is obtained by the internal light of faith. This should be stressed for that light is certainly intrinsic and of the mind whose object is truth. And the word instinctus[104] in this chapter and adiuvat in chapter nine[105] bothered him. Instinctus connotes a blind or animal faculty, he said. It is not an internal light, "a light revealing the truth." Adiuvat in relation to grace smacks of Pelagianism.[106]

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[101] See Ibid., 198-200. For others who were defenders see 233-41, 248-52.

[102] See Ibid., 158A,B.

[103] See above, p. 39.

On the next day Bishop Peter M. Ferrè suggested a change in chapter seven which would better indicate that man is sometimes brought to faith by a supernatural grace of repentance and that even the rational processes leading up to faith depend on a higher grace.[107]

Bishop Simon Spilotros (January 10) advised mentioning the infallible authority of the Church since this is also needed to know revelation along with a supernatural grace.[108] The Bishop also saw a need to distinguish between the virtue and act of faith. For, as he saw it, one who has the virtue of faith needs no motive of credibility since by the virtue he already elicits an act of faith with ease, perfection and sweetness. Because the virtue is infused with the grace and gifts of Baptism, the faithful are moved simply by an illumination to accept the truth proposed for belief by the Church.[109]

During this same ninth General Congregation Bishop Emmanuel del Valle in one short paragraph denied the validity of the "new precept" placed on one without the faith to seek the motives of credibility and fact of revelation. This he contended, is not to be found in Sacred Scripture nor in Tradition. And furthermore it is contrary to reason and the authority of the Church. His reason? God does not command the impossible but impossible it is for the greater part of the non-Catholics to examine the motives of credibility.[110]

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[104] See above, p. 41.

[105] See above, p. 51.

[106] See Mansi, 50.172D, 173A,B,C.

[107] See Ibid., 203C,D.

[108] This, of course, has to do with the material object of faith not with the motive of faith. Infallibility of the Church protects the material object, but does not enter into the formal object of divine faith.

[109] See Mansi, 50.259-60.

Again Butler is to the point:

> It may safely be averred that perhaps never in the history of the world has any legislative act been subjected to a discussion more free, or a sifting more thorough, or a criticism more searching, or a weighing of objections more complete, than found place in this Vatican dogmatic Constitution on the Catholic Faith.[111]

It is also interesting to note Archbishop Ullathorne's remarks.

> It is pretty sure to be sent to its proper deputation for revision, although a most splendid piece of theology. It is not the first time that I have seen the work of the ablest theologians, when the episcopate bring their deeper instinct and keener experience upon it, go to pieces like chaff and consigned to reconstruction. It was so with the Constitution on the Immaculate Conception.[112] It does not however follow that the preliminary work is not thoroughly orthodox. . . .[113]

And so the schema was sent to the Deputation on Faith "mangled and pulled to pieces", "bleeding in every limb." This as was mentioned before was very much a surprise to those who had drafted it and to the pope also.[114]

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[110] See Ibid., 269D. For a summary of all the objections to the entire schema see Ibid., 277-310.

[111] C. Butler, op.cit., 1, 187.

[112] In reference to the Immaculate Conception he said: "I am delighted to see the bishops capsizing the theologians; the bishops are all authority and the theologians all reason." Letters of Archbishop Ullathorne. p. 59, from Butler, op.cit., 1, 193, n.1.

[113] Letters of Ullathorne from Butler, op.cit., 1, 193.

[114] See Butler, op.cit., 1, 198.

The Deputation which had been elected in the beginning of the Council, December 14, 1869[115] and officially promulgated on December 20[116] was awaiting this move. It was inevitable. And Cardinal Bilio anticipating this action had called the members of the deputation together and placed these questions before them: Should a new schema be drafted or should the present be kept substantially, and should its form be changed? The answer: It should be retained substantially though emended; it should be shortened and clarified; its tone should be kept tranquil as befitting a counciliar decree; the language of the schools should be deleted; any harshness of expression should be removed; and anything binding or curtailing the liberty of the schools should be avoided.[117] The catalogued objections were presented to the deputation on January 11, 1870. Then Franzelin who it is said confused his students[118] was called on to defend his schema.

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[115] Unlike Trent which elected Deputations as the need arose. Cecconi gives the probable reason for this difference: "La lourde responsabilité, qui pèserait sur les présidents s'ils avaient à juger de l'opportunité ou de la nécessité de former la commission; la difficulté de déterminer chaque fois le nombre et les qualités de ceux qui seraient appelés à en faire partie; le temps considérable qu'll faudrait consacrer aux votes et surtout à l'examen des voeux de tous les Pères présents au Concile; la probabilité qu'on devrait recourir souvent à ce moyen, sinon pour le fond, du moins pour la forme des questions, cause si fréquente de trouble dans les affaires: tels furent les motifs qui décidèront les Eminentissimes Cardinaux à modifier leurs premières résolutions et à penser qu'il serait plus avantageux d'avoir des commissions fixes, permanentes". Eugene Cecconi, Histoire du Concile du vatican, trans. Jules Bonhomme, M.D. Duvillare (Paris: Libraire Victor Lecoffre, 1887) 1.190.

[116] See Mansi, 50.49.

[117] See Mansi, 53.160-1.

[118] ". . .avec la reputation mérité d'un savant de premier ordre et d'un saint religieux. Mais ses élèves souvent été déroutés par la nébulosité de son enseignement." Fernand Mourret, Le concile du vatican (Paris: Bloud and Gay, Editeurs, 1919) 205.

Franzelin begins by noting the approval generally given to the matter of the schema which thus needs little change. He notes equally that the form displeases the majority of the fathers of the council. He approaches his defense by discussing three things: the end or scope of the schema and how this affects the form, the doctrine and its influence on the form; the order adopted in the schema; the way of expressing Catholic teaching and the errors opposed.[119]

Since the Church is constantly teaching her doctrine, he said, it is not the express scope of the schema to propose this teaching alone. Yet it is apropos for the council to include as much of this teaching as is necessary to manifest and exclude any pertinent errors. The usual manner of doing this is by stating the error, condemning it and giving or making a declaration of the Catholic teaching. A condemnation may sometimes take the form of canons. Now, in the present schema the form of exposition is very much determined by the nature of the errors which are both philosophical and theological. Since they are speculative errors, it is right they be treated in the same way in the schema. Certainly it is not novel, for papal pronouncements and the Syllabus make use of this speculative method. Nor is it foreign to previous Councils. A cursory glance at the Lateran (IV) Council shows that both the expository and declaratory method were used effectively. Thus the chapter Firmiter against the Albigensians is merely an exposition of Catholic doctrine. While the chapter Damnamus is a more reasoned affair. Texts and arguments make up a long preliminary exposition. The mystery of the Trinity, then, is declared in a simple manner which is both accommodated to the laity and which forms the foundation for subsequent speculative theology. And because many of the errors arose over a misinterpretation of the Scriptures, these passages are correctly explained. Finally a condemnation is made of those errors exposed in the beginning of the chapter. From this council one sees how the form of the errors encountered demands diversity of exposition and declaration.[120]

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[119] See Mansi, 50.317-9.

The next point discussed is the order of treatment. That order is accidental which does not depend on the matter to be treated, and essential which does depend on the formal concept under which they are known. If the entirety of dogma were to be treated the order would be derived from the intrinsic relation between the individual dogmas and faith. But if errors are to be the subject matter, the logical connection of the errors regulates the order. Thus a sifting and sorting is necessary to establish the right order among the dogmas violated; to choose the correct and most effective arguments; and to decide under what formal notion they are to be treated. The present schema uses the genetic and connatural order of the errors whose root is rationalism. In this arrangement not only is complete incredulity condemned but also the misconceptions that arise from the errors regarding the preambles to the faith.

Thus the first errors to appear concern the objective revelation of God and the fonts of revelation. Naturally there follow errors concerning the distinction between supernatural revelation and natural manifestation. Next to arise are mistakes about the suprarational object of this revelation.

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[120] See Ibid., 319-22.

In this logical course Christian faith itself is attacked. First the motives of faith which formally distinguish it from knowledge come under fire; the motives of credibility and the conditions preceding faith and the freedom of the will in consenting creep in. Obviously in this progression the necessity and supernatural firmness of faith is suborned.

Faith and reason, both valid sources of knowledge, are next cast as apponents in the contest for supremacy. Here errors arise from the philosophical sciences followed by those from the theological sciences.

Semi-rationalist teachings err in special areas about: God, creation, the Incarnation, the nature of man, his elevation to the supernatural order, the fall and original sin, eternal punishment due to sin, and the state of grace.

In this treatment it is evident how naturally Rationalism, semi-rationalism and the special errors which spring from these are combatted. This, Franzelin contends, is not a fictitious arrangement. Neither is it more repetitious than the Lateran nor more disordered than Trent where like topics were widely separated. He contends when a repetition does seem to appear it is usually a further clarification with reference to a different point.

In reply to the objection that the titles should indicate Catholic doctrine rather than the errors, Franzelin disagrees. For a title should announce what is to follow. And what does follow is a detestation of error, not the exposition of Catholic doctrine. As is customary in his argumentation he adds this was also the procedure at Trent.[121]

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[121] See Ibid., 322-8.

Franzelin enters upon the third point of his defense with a bit of gusto where he counters the specific objections to the matter of his schema. Again he distinguishes what is essential and accidental. The essential pertains to the very substance of the doctrine; the accidental, the many ways the doctrine may be formulated.

Theology is concerned universally with the essential form of any declaration since a dogmatic truth to be accurately expressed must have its own proper terminology. More specifically theology is concerned for it indicates what is properly definable as dogma and those things which are not, even though immediately connected with a dogmatic truth; it makes sure the censure fits the error; it takes care that nothing freely disputed by the doctors is favored. "Truly this is the most grave of all to which the infallibility of the holy council under the assistance of the Spirit of truth is properly referred, but this does not therefore, make vain the human work even in reforming the schema, for all the wisdom, doctrine and industry of the reverend fathers will be demanded by right."[122]

With that preface he enters on the actual objections. We are interested only with the answers given for the chapters on faith. Bishop Emmanuel del Valle had objected that a new precept had been formulated which demanded an inquiry into the motives of credibility. And, he continued, this was not to be found in the Scriptures nor in Tradition. Further, it was repugnant to reason and the authority of the Church. Franzelin countered that the Apostolic letters of the Holy Father, from which these words are taken, do not deserve such an absurd attribution. Actually the words in question condemn an error: "It is not possible that revealed truth be rendered credible by external signs and therefore only internal experience of the soul ought to move men to faith."[123] In the first part of the error it is said no external motive of credibility can be presented. Therefore the miracles of Christ and the Apostles, and the prophecies which were fulfilled are incapable of rendering the Christian religion credible. The second follows naturally. Because no external motive is allowed nor can be allowed, then revealed truth is not objectively credible for anyone. For this reason the economy of faith demands that man be moved to faith by internal experience alone.

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[122] ". . .verum res haec omnium gravissima, ad quam proprie infallibilitas sancti concilii sum assistentia Spiritus veritatis refertur, sed non ideo operam humanam reddit supervacaneam, etiam in refingendo schemate certe omnem reverendissimorum patrum sapientiam, doctrinam et industriam iure suo postulabit." Ibid., $32B_{11-17}$.

Now Catholic doctrine in its declarations is opposed to both these errors. The words of Scripture oppose the first part: "certain signs have been given by God for recognizing divine revelation."[124] And the words taken from the encyclical letter of the Holy Father (Nov. 9, 1846),[125] intimate the answer to the second part. Here it is stated that human reason, while not yet arrived at the true faith, ought to diligently inquire into the fact of revelation to know that God has spoken.

Thus in the seventh chapter only the external proposal of divine revelation which God rendered knowable as divine revelation by sure signs is treated. There is no teaching here concerning the internal grace which is necessary for faith. This is treated in the following chapters.

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[123] Mansi, 50.333B, italics his; see ES, 1638-9.

[124] This is evidently a reference to citations in Mark, n.39 supra.

[125] Pius IX, "Qui Pluribus", ES, 1637 seq.

Moreover individual circumstances which might render reason invincibly ignorant are not included, rather only that it is radically possible for reason to know revelation is encompassed here. The diligence and inquiry required can not be defined, for it is as diverse as the conditions of men. When the simple make an act of faith they do so because of a motive accommodated to them. But this still demands that they believe on the authority of God revealing. Of course thinking or reflecting on the motive or giving a valid analytical explanation of the motives of faith is not necessary. In the case of the simple it must be held that internal grace supplies for that which is lacking in the external proposal of faith. But this is not to infer that diligence ought to be denied in the search of the proposal of faith. Nor can the motive be reduced to some internal experience and internal impulse.

For these reasons, Franzelin argues, the doctrine of the schema does not seem so obscure that such an absurd sense be derived from its obvious sense.[126]

The next rebuttal he gives is directed to the contention that the use of the word adiuvat in the ninth chapter is Pelagian. He argues: to demand a change here would require changing the language used by Saint Paul, Saint Augustine, the doctors, theologians, the Sacred Scriptures, the Councils. For all of these sources use this word in the same context as it is used in the schema. Besides the Pelagian notion of grace is not something internal. They had, rather, the notion of an external grace which would facilitate action.[127] Thus he answered the objections to the chapters on faith.

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[126] See Ibid., 333-4.

[127] See Ibid., 336-7.

Next Franzelin attends to the accidental form of the schema. The form is contested, he said, as foreign to a council and more proper to a scholastic demonstration. But he countered, different Councils have used diverse methods, and within the same Council will be found various forms. Again, look at Trent.[128] And with finality he mentions the words have been taken from the Scripture, Councils, from the Fathers and from the Holy Father where the matter is found. "Some however, do not know of the oft repeated detestations of these very grave errors to be found in the sacred Scriptures, among the holy Fathers and in nearly all the Councils among which suffice it to mention the prologue and first chapter of the thirteenth session of Trent and the prologue of the twenty-first session where they are called the cockles of execrable errors, a most contemptible act, satanical lies, monstrous errors."[129] With little more he concludes his defense.[130]

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[128] Throughout Franzelin refers to Trent in support of his form. This is natural since many of the Fathers in a disparaging way compared his schema with the decrees emanating from Trent.

[129] ". . .quis autem ignorat, huiusmodi errorum gravissimorum detestationes frequentissimas reperiri in sacris scripturis, apud sanctos patres et fere in omnibus conciliis, inter quae sufficiat commemorare Tridentinum, sess. XIII, in proemio et cap. 1, et sess. XXI, proemio, ubi zizania exsecrabilium errorum, indignissimum flagitium, commenta satanica, errorum monstra nominantur." Mansi, 50.339A$_{3-10}$; See Matt. 13:30; ES, 837a 874, 929.

[130] See Ibid., 338-40.

CHAPTER THREE

THE CONSTITUTION "DEI FILIUS"

Dei Patris aeternis Filius Dominus noster Iesus Christus. . . .[1] So begins the new schema of the dogmatic constitution on the Catholic faith which Bishop Martin presented to the Deputation. With the help of Father Kleutgen he worked about a month and a half after Franzelin's schema had been rejected and was delivered for revision (January 11-March 1).[2]

At a glance the comparative brevity of the new document stands out. Even with a rather lengthy prologue it is some one hundred and fifty lines shorter.[3] Its four chapters include the matter in chapters one to eleven in the first schema. The chapters on special dogma, the second part of the schema, never even came up for discussion before the council. After a closer look it is evident that the brevity is equalled by its clarity and continuity. This results from a slightly changed order and considerably less abstraction.

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[1] This begins the prologue. Subsequently it is changed so that the beginning words are Dei Filius as we have come to identify this Constitution. Mansi, 53.164A_9.

[2] Butler, op.cit., 1.200, mentions that Charles Gay of Poitiers also helped in this task. But see the following works of Theodore Granderath, S.J. who does not mention his help. Lacensis, 1647d; Constitutiones dogmaticae sacrosancti oecumenici concilii Vaticani, (Friburgi Brisgoviae: Herder, 1892) 5; Histoire du Concile du Vatican (Bruxelles: Libraire Albert Dewit, 1911)2.12.

[3] The relative part of the first schema took up 9 columns and approximately 550 lines in Mansi plus some 27 columns of Adnotationes; Mansi, 50.52A-68A_{11}; 74B_{12}-101B_1. The revised formula including prologue comprises 7 columns, approximately 400 lines in Mansi, 51.31C_{13}-38C_7.

When the antecedents to faith--God and revelation--are established in the first two chapters, the third takes up faith itself.[4] The fourth then studies the relation between faith and reason.

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[4] That text reads: "Fidem autem, quae humanae salutis initium est, ecclesia catholica profitetur virtutem esse infusam seu supernaturalem, qua Dei aspirante gratia vera esse credimus, quae divinitus revelata sunt, non propter rerum veritatem ex se ipsa perspectam, sed propter Dei revelantis auctoritatem. Est enim fides, testante Apostolo, argumentum non apparentium. (Heb. 11:1)

"Ut nihilominus rationabile esset obsequium nostrum, voluit Deus una cum interna Spiritus sancti motione externa praesto esse revelationis suae argumenta, facta imprimis divina, nominatimque miracula et vaticinia, quae cum Dei potentiam et sapientiam manifeste revelent, divinae locutionis signa sunt certissima, et omnium intelligentiae accomodata. Quare scriptum legimus: Illi autem profecti praedicaverunt ubique, Domino cooperante et sermonem confirmante, sequentibus signis.

"Licet igitur non crederemus, nisi videremus esse credendum, atque adeo fidei assensus nequaquam sit motus animi caecus et ab operatione intellectus disiunctus; nemo tamen evangelicae praedicationi consentire potest, sicut expedit ad salutem consequendam, absque illuminatione Spiritus sancti, qui dat omnibus suavitatem in assentiendo et credendo. Est ergo fides ipsa in se, etiamsi nondum per charitatem operatur, donum Spiritus sancti et opus ad salutem pertinens, quo homo liberam praestat Deo obedientiam, gratise eius, cui resistere posset, assentiendo et cooperando.

"Haec illa est fides, sine qua impossibile est placere Deo, et ad filiorum eius consortium pervenire. Quare sicut nulli unquam sine illa contigit iustificatio, eta nullus, nisi in ea perseveraverit usque ad finem, vitam assequetur aeternam. Hanc autem fidei firmitatem et constantiam Deus "instans praecepto et praecurrens auxilio", in nostra posuit potestate. In vera scilicet ecclesia Christi fideles, docti et indocti, fundamentis ad credendum innituntur firmissimis, cum ad solam ecclesiam catholicam, nec ad ullam aliam religionis communionem, ea pertineant omnia, quae ad fidei christianae evidentem credibilitatem tam multa et tam mira divinitus sunt disposita. Quare ecclesia per se ipsa magnum quoddam et perpetuum est motivum credibilitatis, et velut signum levatum in nationibus, divinae suae legationis testis irrefragabilis. Piissimus autem Dominus, qui non deserit, nisi deseratur, eos, quos de tenebria transtulit in admirabile lumen suum, in hoc eodem lumine ut perseverent, sua gratia confirmat. Itaque vere fideles, per caeleste hoc donum primae veritati adhaerentes, magno intervallo discernuntur ab iis, qui falsam religionem, opinione humana ducti, sectantur: neque fieri potest, ut fideles catholici ullam unquam iustam habeant rationem fidem mutandi aut in dubium vocandi. Quapropter gratias agentes Deo Patri, qui dignos nos fecit in partem sortis sanctorum in lumine, tantam ne neglexerimus salutem, se aspicientes in auctorem fidei consummatorem Iesum, teneamus spei nostrae indeclinabilem confessionem." Mansi. 53, 166C-167B. The canons are:

The Deputation in its sixth through ninth meetings suggest and make a good number of changes.[5] Indeed instead of four paragraphs, now there are six. The first has a large addition which results from the transfer of the second paragraph of chapter two at the suggestion of Bishop Gasser.[6] A new paragraph is added, the fourth; and the fifth is made into two. This results in a lengthened but more lucid chapter.

At the thirtieth General Congregation Archbishop Simor anticipates the discussions with some preliminary remarks.[7] He sketches the sacred role of the Church: "The principal duty and office of the Church is to guard and preserve in its pristine form the deposit of faith so that not

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"1. Si quis dixerit, fidem divinam non distingui a scientia naturali, quae veritatem religiosam aut moralem pro obiecto habeat, ac propterea ad actum fidei, qua fideles nominamur et sumus, non requiri, ut revelata veritas propter auctoritatem Dei revelatoris credatur; anathema sit.

"2. Si quis dixerit, fieri non posse, ut revelatio divina externis signis reddatur credibilis, ideoque sola interna cuiusque experientia homines ad fidem movendos esse; anthema sit.

"3. Si quis dixerit, miracula nulla fieri posse, ad demonstrandum non valere, aut certo cognosci nunquam posse; et non confiteatur, vera esse miracula, quae in Scriptura narrantur, iisdemque religionis christianae divinam originem rite comprobari; anathema sit.

"4. Si quis dixerit, fidem qua christiani evangelicae praedicationi consentiunt, esse persuasionem necessariis scientiae humanae argumentis inductam; anathema sit.

"5. Si quis dixerit, non ad fidem ipsam, sed ad fidem vivam, quae per charitatem operatur, gratiam Dei necessariam esse; anathema sit.

"6. Si quis dixerit, fidelibus catholicis haud secus atque iis, qui ad veram fidem nondum pervenerunt, licitum esse fidem, quam sub magisterio ecclesiae susceperunt, ut dubiam habere, assensu animi suspense, donec scientificam credibilitati inquisitionem absolverint; anathema sit." Mansi, 53.169B,C.

[5] See Mansi, 53.187C-190B.

[6] See Mansi, 53.186A$_{16}$. Its previous form: "Iam vero homo, cum a Do tanquam supremo suo auctore totus pendeat, et ratio creata increatae veritati penitus subiecta sit, revelante se Deo, ad plenum intellectus et voluntatis obsequium tenetur." Ibid.,165D$_{7-10}$. Also Lacensis, 1665b.

[7] His report contained in Mansi, 51.42-48.

one jot or tittle is lost from it nor truly changed." This is, of course, the intent of the four chapters of the first section of the schema. "And further the doctrine proposed in this newly revised schema is the same as that which was contained in the original schema, the same errors are condemned which were condemned in the first schema."[8]

The form is changed, for besides expanding the prologue and shortening the chapters, as we have noted, the titles now indicate the Catholic doctrine contained in the chapters. These same titles are also prefixed to the Canons. The form follows more closely that of Trent, that is, Catholic doctrine is given in the chapters, and canons condemning the errors are added at the end.

The errors condemned cover a wide range and include those deviations of the schools inimical to Catholic teaching. Since the Holy See has a less direct influence over these Institutions these censures are a necessity. And even though the prescribed speculative and philosophical errors are not an immediate danger to the simple faithful, they are, states the Archbishop so pernicious as to effect them in the future. Because these errors are condemned under their formal concept in the canons Catholic doctrine must be given in its formality in the chapters. Should any ambiquity arise from this arrangement he continues it must be resolved in the light of the canon.[9] He then treats specifically each chapter and paragraph indicating against whom it is directed or what error is condemned.[10]

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[8] Depositum enim fidei illibatum custodire atque conservare, ita ut ex eodem nec iota unum, nec apex unus aut pereat aut vero immutetur, hoc est praecipuum ecclesiae munus et officium." ". . . atque ideo in hoc nove reformate schemate eadem doctrina proponitur, quae fuit in originario schemate, iidem errores condemnatur, qui condemnati fuerunt in eodem priori schemate." Ibid., $42B_{9-12}$; $43A_{16}$-B_1. This is important since the explanation of the Adnotationes will still apply.

[9] Franzelin makes the same remark. Mansi,50.319D.

Eight prelates asked to be heard during the thirtieth and thirty-first General Congregations to discuss the new schema in general. Their remarks attest to the general satisfaction with it taken as a whole. Two dissent: Archbishop Kenrick objected that he did not think the council was convened to write a text of philosophy and theology,[11] and Bishop Bravard contended that a good deal of revision would be needed to make the work acceptable.[12] Of course even those praising the work had some objections. Archbishop Ginhoulhiac thought some new questions had been introduced, specifically ontologism and traditionalism.[13] Archbishop Schwarzenberg felt the canons were too numerous and far reaching.[14] Kenrick and Bravard were somewhat dismayed by the use of the word "anathema".[15] And, it seemed perennially, the style was still obscure.[16] It should, then, be made more simple and easy especially in the prologue[17] by one who knows the language and has a facile hand.[18]

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[10] Since Bishop Martin does the same thing in his Relatio we shall wait till we treat the exceptions before listing the errors condemned.

[11] See Mansi, 51.62C$_{4-5}$.

[12] See Mansi, 51.63D-65C. Those commending the schema were: Archbishops Tizzani, Spaccapietro, Schwarzenberg and Bishops Moreno, Ginoulhiac, Salzano. See Ibid., 48C-62B.

[13] See Ibid., 56A$_{8-10}$.

[14] See Ibid., 61A$_{2-3}$.

[15] See Ibid., 63B$_{5-7}$; 64C$_{9-12}$.

[16] See Ibid., 64D$_{12-14}$.

[17] See Ibid., 55A$_{5-6}$.

[18] See Ibid., 62D$_{1-9}$.

At this same meeting Archbishop Simor replied to these charges--a simple response lauded for its brevity, approved in its substance[19] which served as the springboard for the objections in specie. The additions, if real he said, plus the reasons for them must wait till the appropriate time: when the pertinent sections were appraised.[20] The matter of style (which should have been rather irksome by now) was not so settled that a more elegant, suitable language was precluded. In fact (and here Simor seemed to show that impatience) the Deputation had never maintained this was a paragon of Latinity.[21] And although the anathemas, conforming to the pattern of Trent, seemed to be in the best interests of the council, the fathers could increase or decrease their number, augment or change them as they saw fit.[22]

And so the discussions began. On March 30 and 31, 1870, the objections to chapter three were heard.[23] Twenty-one bishops prodigiously poured forth one hundred and twenty-two comments.[24] And Martin commenced his reply at the forty-second General Congregation on April 6. He deemed it advisable to outline again the task and objectives of the Deputation.[25] His first remark not at all unexpected was directed against the seeming irascible and unwarranted charge made by Kenrick. For, in truth he said, this schema, to the point and abbreviated, does not propose to be a full philosophical or theological treatment of the matter.[26]

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[19] See Ibid., $66B_{17}$; $67A_{18}$.

[20] See Ibid., $66B_{2-7}$.

[21] See Ibid., $66B_{11-17}$.

[22] See Ibid., $66C_{1-13}$.

[23] The 37th and 38th General Congregations. See Ibid., 202-39.

[24] They are gathered and sorted in Mansi, 51.297D-312A.

[25] By this we find there has been no marked change from the original plan. See Ibid., 312-335.

He continued: The second and third chapters are connected by establishing the foundation and root of faith, namely, God as our creator, the supreme author upon whom all men depend.[27] The second portion of this paragraph provides a real definition of faith.[28] And this definition is confirmed by the authority of Saint Paul.[29] The effect of this is to reject the false notions of faith propounded by the rationalists and to adequately distinguish faith from natural knowledge.[30]

In the second and third paragraphs the evident signs of revelation are presented which attest to the reasonableness of faith's obedience. Besides this faith is free and a gift of God, in that, prior to it grace is required. Here is countered the rationalists and pietists who propose an intrinsic experience as the raison d'être of belief. Then Hermes' necessitated will is combatted.[31]

Having thus posited the definition, motive and reasonableness of faith, Martin explained, the material object of faith is further determined. This is the totality of revelation as set forth either by the ordinary or extraordinary magisterium of the Church for belief.[32] The paragraph is evidently against those who limit the scope of belief to those truths which are formally defined.[33]

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[26] See Ibid., 313A.

[27] See Ibid., 313A-B.

[28] In the philosophical sense, i.e., containing a genus and specific difference. This surely is what is meant by the "genuinam definitionem". Ibid., 313C_2. Vacant would agree, ". . . ce qui marque les éléments essentiels de tout acte de foi, se retrouve. . . dans notre constitution." Études, 2.25.

[29] See Hebrews 11:1.

[30] In the final analysis the rationalist definition equates these two. See Mansi, 51.313C-D.

[31] See Ibid., 313D-314A.

In the fifth paragraph is found the necessity of faith--a strict obligation of embracing it and persevering in it. And to help men to this end the Church is named as the concrete evidence, a powerful motive of credibility, needed to present revelation.[34]

Lastly, the sixth paragraph portrays the internal helps given both to bolster the belief of the faithful and to lead the non-believer to the faith. This effectively forms the antithesis of the Hermesian doctrine which recommends a suspended faith till one discovers the motives of credibility by natural means.[35]

With that Martin entered upon the task of each objection.[36]

CHAPTER III

De Fide

Cum homo a Deo tanquam *su-*	Cum homo a Deo tanquam crea-

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[32] He says simply, proposed for belief by the Church in some way; ". . .ad omnia, quae a Deo revelata esse quomodocumque per magisterium ecclesiae nobis certo constiterit." *Ibid.*, 314A$_{10-12}$.

[33] See *Ibid.*, 314A.

[34] See *Ibid.*, 314B.

[35] See *Ibid.*, 314B-C.

[36] The schema as presented for discussion appears on the left. Mansi, 51.34B-35C, 37C-38A. The approved form is on the right. Mansi, 51.432A-433B, 435B-D. Paragraph by paragraph the objections will be reviewed including any change reviewed by Martin, even stylistic ones. The subsequent changes made in the schema--words or word order--are indicated by underscoring those words in the schema (left). Words which do not find a counterpart in the schema are shown by underscoring in the approved text (right).

premo suc auctore et Domino totus pendeat, et ratio creata increatae rationi penitus subiecta sit, plenum intellectus et voluntatis obsequium, revelante se Deo, fide praestare tenemur. Hanc vero fidem, quae humanae salutis initium est, ecclesia catholica profitetur virtutem esse supernaturalem, qua, Dei aspirante et adiuvante gratia, vera esse credimus, quae divinitus revelata sunt, non ob intrinsecam, quam perspiciamus, rerum veritatem, sed propter auctoritatem Dei revelantis, qui nec fallere nec falli potest. Est enim fides, testante apostolo, argumentum non apparentium.

tore et Domino suo totus dependeat, et ratio creata increatae Veritati penitus subjecta sit, plenum revelanti Deo intellectus et voluntatis obsequium fide praestare tenemur. Hanc vero fidem, quae humanae salutis initium est, ecclesia catholica profitetur, virtutem esse supernaturalem, qua, Dei aspirante et adiuvante gratia, ab eo revelata vera esse credimus, non propter intrinsecam rerum veritatem naturali rationis lumine perspectam, sed propter auctoritatem ipsius Dei revelantis, qui nec falli nec fallere potest. Est enim fides, testante Apostolo, sperandarum substantia rerum, argumentum non apparentium. (Heb.11:1)

The procedure: The objections were first discussed by the members of the Deputation which after deliberation either admitted or rejected the proposal. This decision with pertinent reasons was then presented to the General Congregation. The fathers of the council in turn voted either to abide by or overrule these recommendations. Now the changes.

The first appears in the first line where creatore is substituted for supremo suo auctore.[37] This was suggested by Archbishop Vancsa[38] since the logical sense of supremum suggests an inferior which in turn condones the error that God created the universe through an intermediary.[39] It is especially fitting since this paragraph shows so well that by the fact of creation our being and perfections come from and do not exist without the Creator.[40]

Though the next difference is stylistic, still it is a change and the reason for it is interesting. It was worthy of Martin's commendation.[41] The prefix "de" in the word dependeat (1.2) connotes a moral dependence which Archbishop Vancsa says is intended, rather than a physical dependency illustrated by pendeat alone.[42]

Archbishop Melchers also suggests inserting quae est ipsa veritas after *increatae rationi*.[43] This objection had merit since the use of *rationi* was incorrect attribution. It was then altered to *veritati* (l.4) in line with but not exactly as Melchers proposed.[44]

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[37] The sign ("l." plus a number) will indicate the line where the change occurs.

[38] See Mansi, 51.204B.

[39] Archbishop Melchers also desired this though he gave no reason for it. See Ibid., 220D.

[40] Furthermore the possibility of excepting reason from this suggestion since its object is eternal and necessary truth is obviated by the statement that created reason is subject to Uncreated truth. See Vacant, Etudes, 2.23.

[41] Changes in style are not put to a vote. If the Deputation thinks well of the form the fact is merely mentioned and recommended for use.

[42] See Mansi, 51.204C. Abstracting from the style, the writer does not see how Archbishop Vancsa could have reasoned only a moral dependency was intended. For totus is far from restrictive and in the next part of the sentence penitus is likewise as comprehensive. Martin in accepting the prefix "de" as stylistically preferred does not allude to the validity of the reason offered by Vancsa. But surely he would have denied it for farther on he states, ". . .agitur de hac ipsa subiectione naturali et omnigena". This in reference to the inclusiveness both moral and physical of subiecta sit. See Ibid. 316A.

Bishop Rivet thought *revelante se Deo, plenum ei intellectus et voluntatis obsequium fidei praestare tenemur* more clearly expressed the idea intended in this sentence.[45] And Martin agreed the text was poor in structure. However, the Deputation favored *plenum revelanti Deo intellectus et voluntatis obsequium fide praestare tenemur* (ll.5-7). Here the repetition of genitives is avoided (*intellectus, voluntatis, fidei*).[46]

The next modifications stem from Bishop Rivet's recommendations.[47] He offered *Dei aspirante et adiuvante gratia, ab eo revelata esse credimus, non quidem propter perspectam intrinsecam rerum veritatem, sed propter auctoritatem revelantis qui nec falli nec fallere potest*. (ll.11-19) The Deputation accepted the two changes here with an omission of *quidem* and the substitution of Bishop Dabert's *naturali rationis lumine*.[48] The intent here was to make more manifest the cause of belief and to exclude rational powers as a possibility. The other change contained is the reversing of fallere and falli. As Bishop Dupanloup[49] asserts this is more logical.[50]

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[43] See *Ibid.*, 220D.

[44] See *Ibid.*, 315D. The Deputation decided to capitalize the "v" as stylistically preferred; April 20, 1870. See Mansi, 53.224A.

[45] See Mansi, 51.206C.

[46] Bishops Vancsa and Gignoux had proposed the dative *revelanti* instead of the ablative *revelante*. See *Ibid.*, 204C, 208B, 316D-317A.

[47] See *Ibid.*, 206C.

[48] See *Ibid.*, 233A. The word "ipsius" was added by the Deputation at their 28th meeting. See Mansi, 53.224A. Charles comments on the beauty of language and mentions that even in this phrase a certain precision and euphony are manifested. Pierre Charles, S.J. "Le concile du Vatican et l'acte de foi", *Nouvelle revue théologique*, 52 (1925) 513.

The final revision in this paragraph is simply incorporating the full text from Saint Paul's epistle to the Hebrews, chapter eleven, verse one. This was requested by Bishops Amat[51] and Caixal y Estradé.[52]

Naturally there are a far greater number of changes presented which are not admitted. Archbishop Maupas submitted a new version of the chapter.[53] The Deputation, as Martin related hailed its style and beauty but still did not see the advantage of reworking the chapter entirely.[54]

Bishop Rivet wished the fourth paragraph to be transferred to the section on the Church and refashioned part of this chapter.[55] Martin explained this reference to the Church was directly related to faith as a necessary preamble for an accurate description of the faith. Besides it was not to be accepted because in this revision the Bishop omitted some of the errors condemned in the original.[56]

The third amendment by Estradé[57] and the twelfth by Hefele[58] suggest a revision which would mark the wisdom, goodness and sanctity of God as playing important roles as motives of faith. Though true, the salient point in this sentence is to give the foundation or fundamental reason for the obligation of faith. In Estradé's objection the relationship of faith and knowledge was expressed. Martin refused its admission because the fourth chapter is devoted entirely to this question.[59]

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[49] See Mansi, 51.228B.

[50] See Ibid., 317B-318B.

[51] See Ibid., 231C.

[52] See Ibid., 210C.

[53] See Ibid., 226D-228B.

[54] See Ibid., 314C-D.

[55] See Ibid., 206D-207A.

[56] See Ibid., 314D-315A.

[57] See Ibid., 210B.

[58] See Ibid., 236B.

The next two proposals rewrote the first sentence of the paragraph but had no special merit replied Martin.[60] The ninth and tenth were dismissed as affecting style only even though Archbishop Vancsa[61] considered the replacing of et (1.3) with ideoque significant as indicating a causal relationship rather than a simple connection.[62]

Three bishops[63] submitted esse debeat to replace sit (1.4) because the moral duty was better expressed in this way. The Deputation as was indicated above did not particularly value this.[64]

The thirteenth was a matter of style. The fourteenth by Bishop Amat[65] which substituted assensum for obsequium (1.6) was rejected as Martin said, because the idea is better conveyed by the original.[66]

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[59] See Ibid., 315B.

[60] See Ibid., 237B, Bishop Gandolfi; 213B, Bishop Ferrè; 315B-C.

[61] See Ibid., 204B.

[62] See Ibid., 315D-316A.

[63] See Ibid., 231B, Amat; 228B, Dupanloup; 209C, Contimorri.

[64] See above page 82 and note 42. See also Mansi, 51.316A.

[65] See Mansi, 51.231B.

[66] See Ibid., 316C.

A clear indication of the mind of the Deputation can be obtained from the next objection (#17). Here Bishop Estradé wanted assensum used instead of virtutem (l. 10). This, said he, was more appropriate since it was the act of faith being discussed and non-formed faith was not properly a virtue.[67] Martin's reply reaffirmed the position that the primary interest was placed on the virtue of faith, ". . . quia omnino hoc loco de virtute fidei agitur."[68] Martin did not respond to the other reason, namely, that dead faith is not properly a virtue. Nevertheless the rejection was approved by nearly all the Fathers[69] thus favoring the theological opinion which holds that non-formed faith is a virtue.[70] Obviously the Fathers are not referring to fides informis as a "good, operative habit."[71] A habit it remains and which by ordination of God "is as a seed of the supernatural life" which will make it "easier for man to return to God."[72]

The twenty-first amendment is also discarded. This was by Bishop Contimorri who presented the word interdum after perspiciamus (1.15) in order to obviate the ambiguity.[73] Martin did not see any ambiguity.

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[67] See Ibid., 210D.

[68] See Ibid., 317B_2. This is the constant refrain. However, it must be noted there is a simple transfer from virtue to act.

[69] See Ibid., 319A.

[70] Aubert says, ". . .semble donc avoir les preferences du concile." Le problème, 160. .15 And Vacant, op.cit., 2.27 where he says the difference is one in language rather than of doctrine, but states, ". . . le Concile du Vatican a consacré notre sentiment par sa manière de s'exprimer."

[71] Henricus Lennerz, S. J. De Virtutibus theologicis (5th ed., Rome: Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, 1947) 345.

[72] See Ibid., 384.

[73] See Mansi, 51.209D.

For, as he explained even if all truths were perceived the motive of faith remained the same. Nor does this chapter concern man's ability to know rationally some revealed truths.[74]

Amendments twenty-four and twenty-five[75] seek to add an explanation at the end of the paragraph. Martin having recognized the beauty of the former and the truth of the latter did not see that they were to the point and useful in this place. Both, therefore, were rejected.[76]

The next paragraph and the changes made therein deal with the reasonableness of faith.

Ut nihilominus fidei nostrae obsequium rationi consentaneum esset, voluit Deus cum internis Spiritus sancti auxiliis externa iungi revelationis suae argumenta, facta scilicet divina, atque imprimis miracula et *vaticinia*, quae cum Dei omnipotentiam et *sapientiam* luculenter commonstrent, divinae *locutionis* signa sunt certissima et omnium intelligentiae acomodata. Quare scriptum legimus: *Illi autem profecti praedica-*	Ut nihilominus fidei nostrae obsequium rationi consentaneum esset, voluit Deus cum internis Spiritus sancti auxiliis externa iungi revelationis suae argumenta, facta scilicet divina, atque imprimis miracula et prophetias, quae cum Dei omnipotentiam et infinitam scientiam luculenter commonstrent, divinae revelationis signa sunt certissima et omnium intelligentiae accomodata. Quare *tum Moyses et prophaetae, tum maxime Christus*

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[74] See *Ibid.*, 318A.

[75] See *Ibid.*, 211D, Estradé; 228B, Dupanloup.

[76] See *Ibid.*, 318C

verunt ubique, Domino cooperante, et sermonem confirmante, sequentibus signis. (Mk. 16:20) Et rursum: Annuntiate, quae ventura sunt in futurum, et sciemus quia dii estis vos. (Is. 41:20)	Dominus multa et manifestissima miracula et prophetias ediderunt: et de apostolis legimus: Illi autem profecti praedicaverunt ubique, Domino cooperante, et sermonem confirmante, sequentibus signis. (Mk. 16:20) Et rursum scriptus est: Habemus firmiorem propheticum sermone, qui bene facitis attendentes quasi lucernae lucenti in Caliginoso loco. (2 Pet. 1:19)

This paragraph has only four differences though the last lengthens it considerably. Bishops Rivet and Dabert advised the use of *prophetia* for *vaticinia* (1. 7).[77] The latter considered the original a bit pagan in sound, while there was ample use of *prophetia* in Catholic sources to warrant its use. Martin announced the approval of the Deputation.[78]

Next *infinitam scientiam* is substituted for *sapientiam* (1.9). The change here was championed by Bishops Hefele and Gandolfi. Although they proposed something else their reasons are similar and do obtain the desired result.[79] Both men thought the balance of omnipotentiam...*miracula* should be maintained with regard to *vaticina* (prophetia). Their suggestions would have preserved this as does the change proposed by the

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[77] See *Ibid*., 206C, 234A.

[78] See *Ibid*., 320B; 53.218A.

[79] See Mansi, 51, 236C, Hefele, omniscientiam; 237C, Gandolfi, praescientia.

Deputation and incorporated into the approved schema.[80]

Divinae locutionis gives way to dininae revelationia (l. 10) because Bishops Hefele and Rivet suggest a misunderstanding could arise.[81] That possibility is this: the act of speaking, teaching, or the manner of speaking and teaching is connoted by locutionis rather than the thing itself which is said or taught.[82] The Deputation found this reasonable and worthwhile.[83]

The last is an extensive change by Bishop Dupanloup.[84] Actually he rewrote the paragraph, but the first part of his revision was not accepted.[85] It reads: Ut nihilominus in hoc fidei nostrae obsequio ratio quoque suas partes haberet, nempe ex perspecto divinae revelationis facto, voluit Deus cum internis Spiritus sancti auxiliis externa etiam iungi revelationis suae argumenta, facta scilicet divina atque imprimis miracula et vaticinia, quae cum a Deo solo omnipotenti et sapientissimo esse possint, divinae revelationis signa sunt certissima et omnium intelligentiae accommodata.[86] The second beginning with the word Quare (l.13) was approved with the passage II Peter 1:19 instead of Isaias proposed by Dupanloup and also found in the revised schema.[87] Dupanloup gave this reason for his rejected first part:[88] That this shows precisely that God and only God can be the author of these wonders. Martin echoing the Deputation rejected this as not adding anything to the paragraph.[89]

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[80] See Ibid., 320C; 53.218B.

[81] See Ibid., 236C, 206B.

[82] See Ibid., 236C.

[83] See Ibid., 320C and 53.218A.

[84] See Ibid., 228C.

[85] See Mansi, 53.218A.

[86] See Mansi, 51.302A$_{5-13}$.

[87] See Mansi, 51.319D. Note also the deletion of "scriptum" (l. 17) and the addition of "Scriptus est" (l. 21). These were effected by the Deputation at their 28th meeting, April 20, 1870. See Mansi, 53.224A.

As Bishop Estradé had objected in reference to the first schema[90] there was not a sufficient division between the extrinsic and intrinsic judgments of credibility which distinction is amply made by the scholastics. Again he attempted a remedy by altering the first part of the paragraph.[91] It did not make much of an impression when first put forth and Martin, at this point, said that although the suggestion was good, it was not pertinent here.[92]

Bishops Amat, Ferrè and Vancsa wanted a change in the first sentence. As far as the Deputation was concerned Amat and Vancsa did not give anything more than the present text.[93] Ferrè's proposal, *posset demonstrari, (esse consentaneum posset demonstrari) is irrelevant* since faith in itself is treated not how different people come to make an act of faith.[94]

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[88] See Mansi, 51.302A$_{5-13}$.

[89] See. *Ibid.*, 319D and Mansi, 53.218A.

[90] See above chapter 2, p. 62; also Mansi, 50.158AB.

[91] Mansi,51.211D; "Ut nihilominus fidei nostrae obsequium Deo esset rationabile, atque essemus *parati ad satisfactionem omni poscenti nos rationem de ea, quae in nobis est spe* (1 Peter 3:15) per fidem veram, voluit Deus auctoritatem divinae suae revelationis reddere prudenter credibilem omnibus hominibus per stupenda divinitatis opera, in primis per miracula..."

[92] See *Ibid.*, 319C.

[93] Amat: "Ut nihilominus hic fidei nostrae assensus, non caecum, sed ut ait idem apostolus, rationabile obsequium esset, voluit Deus. . . ." *Ibid.*, 231D. Vancsa: "Ut vero fidei nostrae obsequium ipsi quoque rationi congrueret, voluit Deus. . . ." *Ibid.*, 204D. The first takes note of the words of the Apostle and the second supposedly shows that the "obsequium" is consonant with faith and reason, and that reason has a function in faith.

The final request for the paragraph would have replaced *auxiliis* with *operatione*.[95] For *operatione*, it was thought, suggested the great power of the Holy Spirit rather than just a helping agent. Martin replied that *auxiliis* used often by the Church seemed to do the job as well if not better.[96]

Next, the paragraph on the supernaturality and freedom of faith is discussed.

Licet autem *non crederemus nisi videremus esse credendum*, (a.a,q.1, a.4.ad.2.) *atque adeo* fidei assensus nequaquam sit motus animi caecus, *et ab intellectus operatione disiunctus*; "nemo tamen evangelicae praedicationi consentire potest, sicut oportet ad salutem consequendam, absque illuminatione et inspiratione Spiritus sancti, qui dat omnibus suavitatem in assentiendo et credendo veritati." 2 Or. c.7. Quare fides ipsa in se, etiamsi

Licet autem fidei assensus nequaquam sit motus animi caecus nemo tamen evangelicae praedicationi consentire potest, sicut oportet ad salutem consequendam, absque illuminatione et inspiratione Spiritus sancti, qui dat omnibus suavitatem in consentiendo et credendo veritati. 2 Or. c.7.[97] Quare fides ipsa in se, etiamsi per charitatem non operetur, donum Dei *est*, et actus eius est opus ad salutem pertinens, quo homo liberam praestat ipsi Deo

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[94] See *Ibid*., 319D-320A.

[95] By Bishop Gandolfi. See *Ibid*., 237C.

[96] See *Ibid*., 320B.

[97] See Mansi, 8.714A.

nondum per charitatem operetur, donum Dei, et actus eius opus est ad salutem pertinens, quo homo liberam praestat ipsi Deo obedientiam, gratiae eius, cui resistere posset, *assentiendo* et cooperando.

obedientiam, gratiae eius, cui resistere posset, consentiendo et cooperando.

The substantial changes wrought in the first sentence shorten this paragraph considerably. Such a revision was advised by Bishops Amat, Meurin, and Vancsa. Although that part taken from Saint Thomas can be defended said Martin, the Deputation saw no necessity in keeping them[98] and approved *Licet autem fidei assensus nequaquam sit motus animi caecus*. . . put forward by Vancsa.[99] Amat suggested a change here also by omitting *atque adeo fide assensus nequaquam sit motus animi caecus, et ab intellectus operatione disiunctus* since it was for him a repetition of the first part of the sentence.[100] Martin recognized its value by accepting the last part of that proposal, namely omiting et ab intellectus operationis disiunctus.[101]

The next variations revolve around a missing *est* (l. 16). Amendments forty through forty-four try to make this sentence read a bit easier. The one selected is by Bishop Rivet which uses the *est* after *donum Dei* (l. 16) and also places the *est* of line seventeen before *opus*. The Deputation makes one further change here, substituting *non* for *nondum* which effectively removes the doubt as to whether the habit of faith can be had in the soul before justification.[102]

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[98] See Mansi, 53.218A.

[99] See Mansi, 51.205A.

[100] See *Ibid.*, 231C.

[101] See *Ibid.*, 320D. Meurin advanced this also; see *Ibid.*, 234A.

There is, then, the substitution of *consentiendo* for *assentiendo* (l. 21). Since the second Council of Orange had used *consentiendo* rather than *assentiendo* it was deemed best to retain it for the sake of accuracy. Such was the reason given by Bishop Atanasio for his *juxta modum* vote. Bishop Gasser who answered the exceptions concluded this should be accepted without a vote.[103]

Now, the object of faith is presented succinctly and neatly.

Porro fide divina et catholica ea omnia credenda sunt, quae in verbo Dei scripto vel tradito continentur, et ab ecclesia sive solemni iudicio sive ordinario magisterio credenda proponuntur.	Porro fide divina et catholica ea omnia credenda sunt, quae in verbo Dei scripto vel tradito continentur, et ab ecclesia sive solemni iudicio sive ordinario *et universali* magisterio *tamquam divinitus revelata* credenda proponuntur.

Bishop Martin had to reiterate the meaning given to this short paragraph. Infallibility, he said, is neither implied in this paragraph nor should anyone make that inference. But since the formal object had been rather completely detailed, here a delineation is given of the material object of faith. Again this counteracts the opinion of those theologians who held: that only is to be believed on divine faith which is openly defined by an ecumenical council. The doctrine is not new, but was enunciated by Pius IX as the traditional doctrine of the Church in an Apostolic Letter to the Archbishop of Monaco in 1863.[104]

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[102] See *Ibid.*, 320D-321A.

[103] See *Ibid.*, 402A; 421C.

Martin took all of the proffered amendments and answered them in globo. There was no doubt a great amount of misunderstanding concerning this paragraph. Archbishop Errington pointed out some of the different meanings assigned to the words sive solemni iudicio sive ordinario magisterio. The Bishop of Havana had this understanding: solemni iudicio means the decree of councils; ordinario magisterio equals the decrees of the Roman Pontiff. Errington thought: solemni magisterio equalled that which is ordinarily said through definitions of articles of faith; ordinario magisterio meant the doctrine of the Church drawn from the deposit of faith and taught by the pastors to their flocks before it is established as an article of faith.[105] Some wished to delete the entire paragraph and connect the third and fifth.[106] Martin offered that in se what was presented was not difficult, and possibly with a few changes the seeming problems would disappear. The universali was borrowed from the fiftieth amendment by Meurin[107] and placed after ordinario. This was used to prevent anyone thinking that here was opposed the ordinary infallibility of the Holy See to that of a council. Infallibility is not its purpose.

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[104] "Namque (in fine litterarum apostolicarum) etiamsi ageretur de illa subiectione, quae fidei divinae actu est praestanda, limitando tamen non esset ad ea, quae expressis oecumenicorum conciliorum, aut Romanorum pontificum huiusque apostolicae sedis decretis definita sunt, sed ad ea quoque extenda quae orinario totius ecclesiae per orbem dispersae magisterio tanquam divinitus revelata traduntur." ES 1683, See Mansi,51.224D-225A.

[105] See Mansi, 51.222C-223A.

[106] See Ibid., 220D-221A, Melchers; 231D-232A, Amat.

[107] See Ibid., 234B.

Universal has the meaning given it by the Holy Father when he referred to the magisterium of the entire Church dispersed throughout the world. Then the words *tamquam divinitus revelata* are inserted after *magisterio*.[108] Martin also explained that this is not merely an opinion of the schools. For the Church teaches it as divinely revealed. Thus it is impossible to reckon it as an opinion only. It is, rather, a certain teaching of the Church taught through the schools.[109]

The next thing to be considered is the necessity of faith.

Haec illa est fides, sine qua impossibile est placere Deo, et ad filiorum eius consortium pervenire, *quare sicut* nemini unquam sine illa contigit iustificatio, *ita nemo*, nisi in ea perseveraverit usque *ad* finem vitam aeternam assequetur. Ut autem *huic* officio veram fidem amplectendi in eaque constanter perseverandi satisfacere possemus, Deu per Filium suum unigenitum ecclesiam instituit, suaeque institutionis manifestis notis instruxit, ut custos et

Quoniam vero sine fide impossibile est placere Deo, et ad filiorum eius consortium pervenire; ideo nemini unquam sine illa contigit iustificatio, nec ullus nisi in ea perseveraverit usque in finem, vitam aeternam assequetur. Ut autem officio veram fidem amplectendi, in eaque constanter perseverandi satisfacere possemus, Deus per Filium suum unigenitum ecclesiam instituit, suaeque institutionis manifestis notis instruxit, ut ea tamquam custos et magistra verbi revelati ab omnibus posset agmagistra verbi revelati ab omnibus *facile agnosceretur*. *Ad nullam enim religiosam societatem praeter solam catholicam ecclesiam* ea pertinent omnia, quae ad evidentem fidei christianae credibilitatem tam multa et tam mira divinitus sunt disposita. Quin etiam ecclesia per se ipsa magnum quoddam et perpetuum est motivum credibilitatis et divinae suae legationis testimonium irrefragabile.

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[108] Proposed by Bishop Dupanloup. See *Ibid.*, 230B.

[109] See *Ibid.*, 322A-D.

nosci. Ad solam enim catholicam ecclesiam ea pertinent omnia, quae ad evidentem fidei christianae credibilitatem tam multa et tam vira divinitus sunt disposita. Quin etiam ecclesia per se ipsa, *ob suam nempe admirabilem propagationem, eximiam sanctitatem et inexhaustam in omnibus bonis foecunditatem, ob catholicam unitatem, invictamque stabilitatem* magnum quoddam et perpetuum est motivum credibilitatis et divinae suae legationis testimonium irrefragabile.

Because the preceeding paragraph had been hastily formulated and inserted, an improper transition resulted. A few changes in the first sentence of this paragraph were in order to obviate the difficulty. Originally the *Haec illa* referred to the supernatural virtue of faith mentioned in the third paragraph. In the present context, then, it meant that the divine and catholic faith of paragraph four was necessary for salvation. Many of the fathers recognized this and recommended some change.[110] The consequent change was: Quoniam vero sine fide impossibile est placere Deo, et ad filiorum eius consortium pervenire; ideo nemini unquam sine illa contigit iustificatio, neo ullus,. . .[111] This satisfied the various objections and emendations proposed by the fathers.[112] And since the paragraph deals with the necessity of faith as a means Bishop Rivet advised striking the word huic (1.9) before officio which refers not to the virtue of faith but to the duty of embracing and making an act of faith once it is known.[113] This judgment is commended and the change adopted by the Deputation.[114]

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[110] See *Ibid*., 207BC, Rivet; 232A, Amat; 220D-221A, Melchers: 230BC, Dupanloup. It must be noted, however, that Dupanloup advised a change because he thought the original suggested that all truths of the faith had to be believed explicitly in order to please God. Aubert, *op.cit*., 187, attributes the change solely to Dupanloup whereas the words can also be found in the objection of Rivet. In fact Dupanloup's suggestion because of its erroneous reason should be entirely discounted as the cause of this change. He suggested: "Sine revelatione necessaria, sine fide

The next change noted (1.16) is stylistic. It adds the word tamquam after ut for clarity. Vancsa who recognized the obscurity had submitted qua[115] but the Deputation favored tamquam.[116]

In the next line the word facile is omitted. Archbishop Errington explained at length why the whole phrase ab omnibus facile should be stricken from the text. Abstractly or theoretically, he said, all might easily recognize the truth of the Church from the notes, but practically

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impossibile est placere Deo, et ad. . . ." Furthermore Rivet's suggestion more closely approximates the sense adopted. He proposed: "Sine fide autem impossible est placere Deo. . . ." Surely the autem is closer to "Quoniam vero" than "sine revelatione necessaria".

[111] See Ibid., 322D-323AB. Note also the "ad finem" is changed to "in finem". This was done by the Deputation at their 28th meeting. See Mansi, 53.224A.

[112] See Mansi, 51.324CD.

[113] See Ibid., 207B.

[114] See Mansi, 53.218B.

[115] See Mansi, 51.305D. This is not taken from his Oratio. In this case the folio of the secretary was used. See Ibid., 227, n.3.

[116] See Mansi, 53.218B.

history does not attest to it. For if it were easy to know the Church through the notes then Catholics should, at least, be in the majority, Further Catholics themselves, if they had not been instructed by their pastors would not find easy recognition of the Church through these notes.[117]

Exception was taken to the use of ad nullam enim religiosam societatem (l. 19) for a number of reasons. Martinez thought this gave a legitimate religious status to non-Catholic sects as societies.[118] But as he remarked, there can be only one such society under one head, professing the same beliefs, with the same sacraments--the Church alone. He, therefore, suggested the use of ad ecclesiam tantummodo catholicam ea pertinent. Bishop Ferrè objected because a society is established by right and any other society besides the Church was contra ius. Furthermore a society tends toward the common good which goal is not verified outside the Church.[119] Bishop Dupanloup without offering a reason presented this change: ad nullam enim aliam religiosam societatem.[120] The objections were well taken, agreed Martin, but the Deputation had its own form--ad solam enim ecclesiam catholicam ea pertinent--which should be agreeable to all.[121]

The last sentence of this paragraph was changed considerably at the instigation of Bishop Dupanloup. Here again he does not give a reason for his suggestion. But when Martin adopted it he praised it highly as containing a most beautiful exposition of the motives of credibility as contained in the Church. That text with a few stylistic changes is incorporated into the paragraph as approved.[122]

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[117] See Mansi, 51.223B-224B.

[118] See Ibid., 217D-218A.

[119] See Ibid., 214BC.

[120] See Ibid., 230C.

[121] See Ibid., 218B and 53.325D-326A.

The rejection column testifies to the care taken by the Fathers in preserving the source of a text. When Bishop Cantimorri suggested using sicut nemo unquam sine illa iustificatio consequi potuit instead of the text (l. 5-6) Martin dismissed it because the document contains the words used at Trent.[123] No doubt the most important words are taken from Trent, contigit iustificatio.[124] And they are preferred even though the amendment more forcefully illustrates man's inability to arrive at justification without faith.

Again prompted by the suggestions made by Bishops Ballerini and Dabert, Martin was compelled to remind the fathers that the virtue of faith was under discussion, not the act of faith. Ballerini wished to insert the words eorum, qui ad usum rationis pervenerit after unquam (l.5) For he contended children and imbeciles would then be excepted since they have justification through baptism alone.[125] Dabert proposed using fide seu explicite vel implicite professa contigit after sine illa for much the same reason.[126]

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[122] "Quin etiam ecclesia per se ipsa, per suam nempe tum mirabilem propagationem, tum sanctitatem eximiam et in omnibus bonis operibus inexhaustam foecunditatem, tum et catholicam unitatem, invictamque stabilitatem, magnum quoddam et perpetuum est motivum credibilitatis et divinae suae legationis testimonium irrefragabile." Ibid., 230D. The stylistic changes were wrought at the 28th meeting of the Deputation. See Mansi, 53.224A.

[123] Session 6, Chapter 7; ES 799, ". . .sacramentum baptismi, quod est 'sacramentum fidei'. sine qua nulli unquam contigit iustificatio."

[124] "Igitur ipsissima verba concilii Tridentini etiam a nobis adhibita sunt. . . ." Mansi, 51. 324D-325A.

[125] See Ibid., 202D-203A.

Bishop Dabert also suggested an addition in this paragraph which would indicate that the Church was not instituted solely as the depository of the faith.[127] Martin grants the various ends for which the Church was instituted. But, while the text does not exclude these ends, it would seem superfluous to include them here.[128]

Bishop Dupanloup submitted his preference for: Deus per Filium suum unigenitum ecclesiam instituit, cui verbi revelati custodiam et magisterium commisit, suaeque institutionis ita manifestis notis ipsam instruxit, ut ab omnibus facile agnosci posset in place of the text (l. 13-18) as a matter of style. Martin allowed that it was well conceived, but the text was shorter and to be preferred.[129] Yet previously this had been admitted by the Deputation with only the exclusion of the word facile.[130]

With the sixty-ninth amendment[131] by Father Jandel, the General of the Dominicans, a controversy of some interest arose. Jandel contended the word evidentem (1.22) was not apropos and submitted certam or indubiam. He felt the word evidentem often resulted from oratorical fervor but surely should not be given place in a precisely and accurately worded dogmatic definition. He reasoned against the usage: the mind, intellect, must necessarily assent when presented with proper evidence. Since this is the case the use of evidentem would advance this syllogism: God is the highest truth. But it is evident God revealed Christian dogma. Ergo it is evident that Christian dogma is true. This makes faith a logical and necessary consequence of reason, the very thing the schema tries to disprove. Now, for him, this was not simply a grammatical subtlety since it necessitated our belief. Perhaps, he said, there was certain evidence of revelation, namely that God has spoken, but this does not lead to the conclusion that there is evidence of revealed dogma. These remain obscure, mysterious and thus are subject to faith. Or else, as Saint Thomas said if evidence is had, there is no faith.

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[126] See Ibid., 233AB.

[127] "Possent homines, Deus ab initio societatem religiosam, seu ecclesiam, constituerat, quae, cum illum glorificaret, simul provideret deposito fidei, quo salus obtinetur; novissime vero per Filium suum unigenitum hanc ecclesiam in ultimo statu instituit suaque. . . ." See Ibid., 233D.

[128] See Ibid., 325AB.

[129] See Ibid., 325C.

[130] See Mansi, 53.218B. Why this was admitted and then summarily rejected by Martin is puzzling. One might suppose that since Martin was the relator he held some more decisive authority. Yet this does not seem likely.

[131] See Mansi, 51.219D-220C.

Jandel was joined by Bishop Moreyra[132] in his objection of evidentem. The testimony of God, according to Moreyra, led to certitude not to evidence. In any case Meurin took up the challenge and explained: A thing is called credible which prudently can and ought to be believed. And this is the only assertion in the schema. A revelation of which we are morally certain ought to be believed. Saint Thomas said: "One would not believe unless he saw it to be believable or because of the evidence of the signs or because of something like that."[133] Thus, Meurin continued, theologians commonly distinguished between evidence of a truth and evidence of credibility. Now faith, say theologians, is evidently credible but not evidently true as is evidenced from history.[134]

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[132] See Ibid., 238C-239C.

[133] "Non enim crederet quis, nisi videret ea esse credenda vel propter evidentiam signorum vel propter aliquid huiusmodi." IIa, IIae, q.1, a.4, ad 2.

One must agree with Jandel this is not a grammatical subtlety, but one can hardly agree with his contention. And on this fact the Deputation rejected his amendment.[135]

Amendments seventy and seventy-two were rejected. The former[136] asserted the words Quin...irrefragabile were superfluous and should be deleted. The latter[137] tendered a delineation of the wonders of the Church. Martin stated that these words as amended by Bishop Dupanloup were sufficient indication of the Church's evidence of credibility and that they were certainly not beyond the scope of the paragraph since they provided a certain gradation and complement of those which had preceded.[138]

The discussion on the necessity of faith was finished. Next was that on perseverance in the faith.

Quo fit, ut ipsa veluti	Quo fit, ut ipsa veluti signum
"Signum levatum in nationes"	levatum in nationes, Is. 11:12
(Is. 11:12), et ad se invitet	et ad se invitet, qui nondum
qui nondum crediderunt; et filios	crediderunt, et filios suos cer-

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[134] See Mansi, 51.235BC.

[135] See Ibid., 326A and 53.218B.

[136] See Mansi, 51.224B.

[137] See Ibid., 203B.

[138] See Ibid., 326BC. See David Granfield, O.S.B. "The Church as a Motive of Credibility", American Ecclesiatical Review, 1958, 188.2-8 for a discussion of this paragraph.

suos certiores faciat, firmissimo niti fundamento fidem, quam profitentur. Cui quidem testimonio efficacius etiam subsidium accedit ex superna virtute. Siquidem piissimus Dominus errantes gratia sua adiuvat, ut ad agnitionem veritatis venire possint; et eos, quos de tenebris transtulit in admirabile lumen suum, in hoc eodem lumine ut perseverent, gratia sua confirmat, non deserens, nisi deseratur. Quocirca minime par est conditio ecrum, qui per caeleste fidel denum primae veritati adhaeserunt, ac eorum, qui ducti opinionibus humanis, falsam religonem sectantur; nam nullam unquam instam habere possunt causam mutandi, aut in dubium revocandi fidem, qui eam sub ecclesiae magisterio susceperunt. Quae cum ita sint, gratias agentes Deo Patri, qui dignos fecit in partem sortis sanctorum in lumine, tantum ne neg-

tiores faciat, firmissimo niti fundamento fidem, quam profitentur. Cui quidem testimonio efficax subsidium accedit ex superna virtute. Etenim benignissimus Dominus et errantes gratia sua excitat atque adiuvat, ut ad agniticnem veritatis venire possint; et eos, quos de tenebris transtulit in admirabile lumen suum, in hoc eodem lumine ut perseverent, gratia sua confirmat, non deserens, nisi deseratur. Quo circa minime par est conditio serum, qui per caeleste fidei donum catholicae veritati adhaeserunt, atque ecrum, qui ducti opinionibus humanis, falsam religionem sectantur; illi enim, qui fidem sub ecclesiae magisterio susceperunt, nullam unquam habere possunt iustam causam mutandi, aut in dubium fidem eandem revocandi. Quae cum ita sint, gratias agentes Deo Patri, qui dignos nos fecit in partem

ligamus salutem, sed aspicientes in auctorem fidei et consummatorem Iesum, teneamus spei nostrae *indeclinabilem confessionem*.	sortis sanctorum in lumine, tantam ne negligamus salutem, sed aspicientes in auctorem fidei et consummatorem Iesum, teneamus spei nostrae confessionem indeclinabilem.

The first modification in this paragraph concerns the use of the words *efficacius etiam*. (1.8). Four of the fathers urged a change here because the combined usage of *etiam* with the comparative *efficacius* could infer an equality of kind and order of the motives of credibility predicated of the Church and of supernatural grace.[139] Martin offered that the due dignity of grace would be preserved if the word *etiam* were stricken from the text and *efficacius* changed to *efficax* which thus avoids a comparison.[140]

The next qualification allowed by Martin is the addition of the word *excitat* after *sua* (1.11). Bishop Magnasco counselled this addition since not only does faith need a helping grace, *gratia adiuvans*, but pre-it demands a praevenient or *gratia excitans*. Rightly, said he, did Trent incorporate this into their treatment of justification.[141]

Primae veritati (1. 20-1) is an ambiguous term in the context of this paragraph advised Bishop Rivet.[142] And Bishop Dupanloup simply recommends a change to revelatae veritati.[143] However, Martin rejected revelatae and accepted that proffered by Rivet, catholicas.[144]

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[139] See Mansi, 51.237D-238A, Gandolphi; 218D-219A, Magnasco; 214CD, Ferrè; 306D-307A, Cantimorri.

[140] See *Ibid*., 327CD.

[141] See *Ibid*., 219B, 328A; *ES* 798, 813.

[142] See *Ibid*., 207C.

Three changes in style are contained in this paragraph. Actually they amount to several substitutions of words. In line ten two words are replaced and one is added: Etenim for Siquidem, benignissimus for piissimus,[145] and et after Dominus.[146] The et would show that God helps equally the errantes and those who have come to the truth. Then in order to clarify the relationship between the two parts of the sentence nam (1.24) is deleted in favor of illi enim.[147]

Three other amendments attempt to change the wording of lines three through seven.[148] In rejecting them Martin conceded the thoughts were well conceived but hardly provided anything more or better than the text.[149]

Martin rejected as without foundation and neither necessary nor useful the alteration by Bishop Gandolfi. For it seemed to imply about the sentence Quocirca. . . that possibly there could be some circumstances when the condition of Catholics and non-Catholics would be the same as regards the suspension or doubting of faith.[150]

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[143] See Ibid., 230D.

[144] See Ibid., 328B. There is no doubt "first truths" even in this context does not refer to the first principles known by all men. Yet this could be construed to mean that we need faith for the knowledge of these truths which are purely rational.

[145] See Ibid., 307A.

[146] See Ibid., 307A.

[147] See Ibid., 308B, 328C.

[148] See Ibid., 306C, Dupanloup; 237D, Gandolfi; 306D, Cantimorri

[149] See Ibid., 327B.

In this same sentence Bishop Caixal y Estradé wished to distinguish the reasons for belief occurring in those reared in the faith and those who had been instructed in a sect. Each said he, has commonly the essential for the intrinsic judgment of credibility. But the inequality arises in the external judgment of credibility. And these should be differentiated.[151] And Martinez who changed the whole sentence would have excluded by his proposal the possibility of knowing any dogmatic truth or any "mysteriorum caelestium". If nothing else, this last is ambiguous and subject to a host of meanings. Both of these, concluded Martin, introduced matter not pertinent to the definition and did not satisfactorily express the doctrine or the error to be condemned.[152]

Bishop Gignoux felt the position of the Catholic and non-Catholic with their relative obligations should be clarified. He offered: *Isti enim, veritate detecta, errorem tenentur abiicere; illi autem nullam unquam habere possunt legitimam causam mutandi vel in dubium revocandi fidem, quam ab ecclesia susceperunt*.[153] But Martin retorted the primary purpose of this text is to show the Catholic's obligation of persevering in the faith not the Protestant's duty to reject error and embrace the faith.[154]

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[150] "Qocirca re in se spectata minime par est. . ."; or "Omnibus inspectis atque perpensis." Ibid., 238A, 328B.

[151] Before this sentence he would have inserted: "Mirabilis sane est et varia ratio divinae providentiae, qua iuvat homines ad concipiendum rationabile iudicium de veritate revelationis a se factae, tum quoad eos, qui ab alienati a magisterio infallibili ecclesiae vagantur incerti inter opiniones privatae humani intellectus in sectis acatholicis, tum quoad illos, qui a primo usus rationis, post susceptum habitum fidei in lavacro baptismi, semper adhaeserunt dociles magisterio divino, tamquam filii lucis. Ibid., 212CD.

[152] "Quocirca, quia manifeste magnum est pietatis sacramentum, quod praedicatum est gentibus (1 Tim. 3:16), et Dominus noster Christus Jesus testatus est, omnia, quaecumque audivit a Patre, nota nobis fecisse (1 John 15:15) et nos omnes vidimus gloriam eius quasi unigeniti a Patre plenum gratiae ac veritatis (Is. 1:14), et donum fidei ab illo descenderit, apud quem non est transmutatic nec vicissitudinis obumbratio (James 1:17); firmiter profitendum est ecs omnes, fidei acceperunt, intellectum suum in obsequium fidei subiicere (2 Cor. 10:5) nulloque modo illis licere vel fidem, aut quaecumque ecclesiae dogmata, in dubium revocare, aut eam mutare, multo autem minus contendere, ut per scientiam humanam ad mysteriorum caelestium cognitionem possint pervenire, cum Deus lucem inhabitet inaccessibilem, quam nullus hominum vidit nec videre potest (1 Tim. 6:16)." Ibid., 218AB, 328AB.

This paragraph should be concluded with a resume of Catholic teaching, said Bishop Ballerini.[155] But Martin found nothing to be gained by reiterating the doctrine already contained.[156] The final rejected amendment of the section suggested making this the first chapter following the prologue. Thus initially the faith and the Church's role in it would be explained capped by what the Church teaches. Together with that Bishop Amat would have substantially changed the entire chapter.[157] Martin, however, submitted it was better to teach the preambles to the faith before the treatment of the faith itself.[158]

Two other revisions should be noted: The first switches the phrases *Nam* (changed to *illi enim*) *nullam unquam isutam habere possunt causam mutandi, aut in dubium revocandi fidem* with *qui eam* (left out) sub ecclesiae magisterio susceperunt.[159] The second simply interchanges the words indeclinabilem confessionem. The Deputation decided this at their twenty-eighth meeting.[160] Again the reason is fairly obvious since it is more proper for the adjective to follow the noun.

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[153] See *Ibid*., 208D.

[154] See *Ibid*., 328C.

[155] See *Ibid*., 203BC.

[156] See *Ibid*., 328D.

[157] See *Ibid*., 232B.

[158] See *Ibid*., 328D-329A. One can almost feel the dismay at the thought of reworking another schema.

THE CANONS

The first canon and thus part of the doctrine contained in the first paragraph is against the fundamental error which makes human reason autonomous and completely sufficient to itself.[161]

Si quis dixerit, rationem humanam ita independentem esse, ut fides ei a Deo imperari non possit; anathema sit.	Si quis dixerit, rationem humanem ita independentem esse, ut fides ei a Deo imperari non possit; anathema sit.

The first thing that strikes one is that there are no changes allowed in this first canon. Bishop Rivet counselled that this (and the fourth) canon be suppressed. These, he said, pertain to those who are cut off from the Church. And since the Church does not judge those who are outside of it and since he who does not believe is already judged, there is no need for them. He proposed, rather, a long paragraph to be added to the first which would prescribe those erring.[162] Martin countered by indicating that the first chapter contained canons directed against those unbelieving and these were accepted by the fathers of the council. The canons here in question are solely directed against the believing--those who are baptized and glory in the name of Catholic, but who, in fact are unbelieving because of their errors. And since they are baptized the Church rightfully exercises her power in judging them. Moreover, he said, it is not entirely true to assert that the Church has no jurisdiction over those outside the fold.[163]

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[159] The writer cannot cite any suggestion for this, nor can he find when it was done. However the reason seems clear enough: it reads more easily and sensibly. Now this may have been changed when Dupanloup proposed the "illi enim" since Martin mentioned at that time that the two parts of the sentence were then better connected.

[160] See Mansi, 53.224A.

[161] See Mansi, 51.329CD.

[162] See Ibid., 207CD.

Four other recommendations for this canon went astray in that they purported to condemn the opinion which says human reason can withhold assent even if God reveals.[164] But this is not the point, offered Martin, for the error would result in the denial of revelation itself and the subsequent impossibility of faith since human reason is so perfect--capable of all knowledge.[165]

Reason alone is the bearer of truth. This would be the error condemned in the following canon, which posits the distinction between rational knowledge (proceeding solely from reason) and faith. The distinction is adequately drawn from the fact that the formal object of faith is the authority of God revealing.[166]

Si quis dixerit, fidem divinam a scientia naturali, quae veritatem religiosam aut moralem pro	Si quis dixerit, fidem divinam a naturali de Deo et rebus moralibus scientia non distingui, ac

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[163] See Ibid., 330D.

[164] See Ibid., 221A, Melchers; 206B, Vancsa; 212D, Caixal y Estradé; 309B, Gandolfi.

[165] See Ibid., 330D-331B.

[166] See Ibid., 329D.

obiecto habeat, non distingui, ac propterea ad *eam* non requiri, ut revelata veritas propter Auctoritatem Dei revelantis credatur; anathema sit.	propterea ad fidem divinam non requiri, ut revelata veritas propter auctoritatem Dei revelantis credatur; anathema sit.

Unlike the first canon this does not go unaltered. The change is submitted by Bishop Dupanloup who again is commended for his clarity.[167] There is no reformation of doctrine though; it is, rather, a better expression of the canon.[168]

The other proposed redactions are unacceptable either because they extend the scope of the canon[169] or limit it.[170]

In the next canon reason regains its rightful place which had been impugned by the error which attributes nothing to it but a vague sentimentality in matters of faith.[171]

Si quis dixerit, *fieri non posse, ut revelatio divina externis signis reddatur credi-*	Si quis dixerit, revelationem divinam externis signis credibilem fieri non posse,

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[167] See *Ibid.*, 309D, 331D.

[168] Melchers' change also incorporated: "Si quis dixerit, fidem divinam a scientia rationali in rebus divinis et moralibus non esse diversam neque Dei revelantis auctoritate inniti, anathema sit." *Ibid.*, 221A.

[169] "Si quis dixerit, ad fidem divinam non opus esse lumine supernaturali Dei; adeoque, eam non distingui natura sua a scientia quacumque, solo lumine naturali rationis acquisita; illamque idcirco aequalis esse dignitatis ac certitudinis cum scientia naturali religionis; anathema sit. Ibid., 213A, Caixal y Estradé.

[170] "Si quis dixerit, ad fidem divinam non requiri, ut revelata veritas propter auctoritatem Dei revelantis credatur; anathema sit." *Ibid.*, 208A, Rivet.

[171] See *Ibid.*, 329D-330A.

bilis, ideoque sola interna cuiusque experientia homines ad fidem moveri; anathema sit.	ideoque sola interna cuiusque experientia aut inspiratione privata homines ad fidem moveri debere; anathema sit.

A suggested alteration of this canon was rejected because, as Martin stated, it offered a divergent sense than that of the text. For in using the past perfect *reddidisse* in the change, a fact is encountered rather than a possibility or right expressed by *fieri non posse*.[172]

Three other propositions are admitted in a combined form. *Inspiratione privata* advanced by Gandolfi is added but not with his recommendation to delete the word *experientia*. For Martin contended that with the addition to the text both internal experience and internal inspiration--two possibilities were eliminated.[173] Bishop Amat's suggestion to add *debere* after *moveri* neatly rid the canon of a possible misunderstanding. As originally presented it would mean that anyone is condemned who says man is moved to faith by internal experience alone. But this is not impossible. In the normal economy this does not happen, but God could so move one to faith solely by these internal impulses. The insertion of the *debere* establishes this possibility by saying he alone is condemned who says faith must come by internal experience.[174] Because of the difficulty experienced in formulating this canon satisfactorily the Deputation revamped it. The form which Martin presented to the Fathers was that of the approved decree. He had presented the word sed in place of ideoque, but the version voted on had ideoque returned.[175]

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[172] "Si quis dixerit, Deum externis signis non reddidisse revelationem divinam vere credibilem omnibus; adeoque homines sola interna experientia ad fidem moveri, secundum ordinariam divinae providentiae legem; anathema sit." *Ibid.*, 213D; see 331D.

[173] See *Ibid.*, 309D, Gandolfi, "ideoque sola interna cuiusque inspiratione privata homines ad fidem. . ." 221B, Melchers, "Si quis dixerit, revelationem divinam ex signis externis non esse vere credibilem, sed homines sola experientia interna ad fidem moveri, anathema sit." See also 331D-332AB.

The error combatted in the fourth canon is this: the denial of the possibility of miracles and consequently the denial of the possibility of demonstrating the fact of revelation.[176]

Si quis dixerit, miracula nulla fieri posse, proindeque omnes eiusmodi narrationes, etiam in Sacra Scriptura contentas, inter fabulas vel mythos ablegandas esse; aut miracula certo cognosci nunquam posse, nec iis divinam religionis christianae originem rite probari; anathema sit.	Si quis dixerit, miracula nulla fieri posse, proindeque omnes de iis narrationes, etiam in sacra Scriptura contentas, inter fabulas vel mythos ablegandas. esse; aut miracula certo cognosci nunquam posse, nec iis divinam relgionis christianae originem rite probari; anathema sit.

Vaticinia was proposed an an addition to this canon by Bishops Melchers and Ballerini. But this was rejected because included in the word miracula is vaticinia, a miracle of the infinite wisdom and omnipotence of God.[177] But more important still is Melchers entire suggestion: Si quis dixerit, non posse fieri miracula et vaticinia, proindeque ea quae huiusmodi in sacra Scriptura narrantur vera non esse, aut certo non posse, anathema sit. For incorporated in this is the assurance of the authenticity and discernibility of these scriptural miracles. And for this reason it is surprising that Martin just skipped past it. Though that he ignored it does indicate how untenable it is.

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[174] "Si quis dixerit, non posse fieri miracula et vaticinia, proindeque ea quae huiusmodi in sacra Scriptura narrantur vera non esse, aut certo cognosci non posse, anathema sit." Ibid., 232A.

[175] See Ibid., $335D_2$.

[176] See Ibid., 330A.

Bishop Ferrè advised the use of sive a iudicio ecclesiae probantur so as to include a miracle so approved by the Church in this canon. Martin, however, felt this was not pertinent since the primary concern is the fact of revelation. But even so, the word etiam, said he, would cover this contingency.[178]

Actually the only change in this canon is a slight one--instead of eiusmodi, de iis is used. This is better style and has no theological import. It does, however, narrow the number of narrationes for a possible consideration, although the writer considers this far from the intention of the Deputation. They were not interested in establishing the conditions for miracles, nor in defining what was and was not a miracle.[179]

In the series of Canons the next combats the twofold Hermesian error about the freedom of faith and the need for grace in faith. The makes faith a necessary conclusion deduced scientifically by reason.

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[177] Ibid., 221B, "Si quis dixerit, non posse fieri miracula et vaticinia. . .", Melchers; 203D, Si quis dixerit, non posse fieri miracula nec vera dari posse vaticinia,. . .", Ballerini. Also 332D.

[178] See Ibid., 215A, 332D-333A.

[179] It must be noted though, that many of the conditions for miracles were mentioned in the chapter. See Vacant, Études, 2.40-4. See Mansi, 53.224A.

The second follows logically from the first: if faith is not free, that is, faith *in se spectata*, and is necessary no help is required to make this act.[180]

Si quis dixerit, *fidem, qua christiani evangelicae praedicationi consentiunt, non esse nisi persuasionem necessariis scientiae humanae argumentis* inductam; aut tantummodo ad fidem vivam, quae per charitatem operatur, gratiam Dei necessariam esse; anathema sit.

Si quis dixerit, assensum fidei christianae non esse liberum, sed argumentis humanae rationis necessario produci; aut ad solam fidem vivam, quae per charitatem operatur, gratiam Dei necessariam esse; anathema sit.

To say there was difficulty with this canon would be a grand understatement. For even when submitted by Martin to the Deputation it underwent the rigors of change. Father Kleutgen had composed two canons out of it, four and five. It was then joined into one. Archbishop Gil preferred a negative statement.[181] But this was only the beginning of a tedious and frustrating road.

It seems that even though Martin had explained the errors condemned the Fathers did not see that this canon also rebutted the error which denied the liberty of faith. Thus Bishop Dupanloup decided *naturalem* after *persuasionem* would have the desired results. Bishop Rivet suggested leaving *necessariis* out altogether since he contended, this only confused the meaning of the text. For *necessariis* Bishop Hefele considered firmis as more explanatory since this firmis in relation to mathematics gives the desired meaning of forcing assent on the intellect. In order to make this element more precise Bishop Cantimorri submitted absque ullo gratiae Dei auxilio after inductam. Bishop Amat sought clarifica tion by enlisting the use of assensum fidei. Bishop Melchers believed the solution came in making the necessariis an adverbial--necessario--modifying the adjective productam. Others dissatisfied with the last portion of the text gave their emendations: Caixal y Estradé wished to exclude the magisterium as the ordinary law sufficient for faith. And Gandolfi would have replaced fidem vivam with habitum fidei vivae.[182]

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[180] See Mansi, 51.320AB.

[181] See Mansi, 53.189C$_{13-16}$.

With all these various suggestions Martin felt that a new rendition was in order. It was: Si quis dixerit, assensum fidei christianae non esse liberum, sed necessariis humanae rationis argumentis produci; aut ad solam fidem vivam, quae per charitatem operatur, gratiam Dei necessariam esse, anathema sit. There still remained that troublesome word necessariis; it was presumptuous to leave it unchanged. Nevertheless Martin tried to justify its use: no one should object to the word since it is the word used by Hermes. The exact expression, notigenden Grunden, is rather difficult to render in Laten. Necessitans as suggested could be used, but admittedly it is poor Latin. Cogens is better since it does imply a necessity of the intellect which cannot be resisted, but it has the connotation of physical force. What is desired here is to show that this force cannot be resisted; man must assent. Yet when it came time to vote Martin reviewed again the many objections (some of which had been presented privately)[183] and concluded that the Deputation ought to reconsider this canon and seek a form favorable to all.[184]

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[182] See Mansi, 51.310C, 208A, 236D, 209C, 232B, 221D, 213B, 311A.

On the next day, April 8, Martin gave the results of this deliberation. *Necessariis* was out. Contemplated was *cogens*, *argumentis cogentibus* but these were judged unsatisfactory since they cannoted a physical force. Thus the use of *necessario produci* as suggested by Bishop Melchers was selected. The canon then submitted remained with one minor exception: the words *humanae rationis* were reversed.[185] How or when this happened is not evident. But this form is found when it was proposed for approval on the same day.[186]

Si quis dixerit, parem esse conditionem fidelium atque eorum, qui ad fidem unice veram nondum pervenerunt, ita ut fideles catholici licite possint fidem, quam sub ecclesiae magisterio iam susceperunt, assensu suspenso in dubium vocare, donec demonstrationem scientificam credibilitatis et veritatis fidei suae absolverint; anathema sit.

Si quis dixerit, parem esse conditionem fidelium atque eorum qui ad fidem unice veram nondum pervenerunt, ita ut catholici iustam causam habere possint, fidem, quam sub ecclesiae magisterio iam susceperunt, assensu suspenso in dubium vocandi, donec domonstrationem scientificam credibilitatis et veritatis fidei suae absolverint; anathema sit.

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[183] See *Ibid*., 332D-333D, and for some of the privately presented objections, see 361C-362D.

[184] See *Ibid*., 336B.

[185] See *Ibid*., 365A-366A.

[186] Tacked on the end of canons for chapter four. See *Ibid*., 376C.

Hermes had suggested that theologians begin their search by first positively doubting all truths and then suspending assent to the truths of religion until they had arrived at their own motives of credibility from the use of their reason. Martin deemed this a most dangerous error and the object of this canon.[187]

Only one bishop had any success in editing this canon and that was Dupanloup. He advised the use of veram et iustam causam habere before possint, the deletion of scientificam, and according to the listing of the amendments the use of vocandi instead of vocare. He gave two reasons: the words of the canon should conform to those of the chapter when possible, and these changes will preclude any truly objective cause for doubting or suspending the faith.[188]

One request would have moved this canon to that section dealing with the Church. But as Martin had explained before, the Church plays a very important role in faith and is necessary for an explanation of it. Nor would anything be accomplished by supressing this canon since there is a corresponding chapter on this subject.[189]

Archbishop Melchers urged this amended canon: Si quis dixerit, fidem a fidelibus licite assensu suspenso in dubium vocari posse, donec de ea demonstratione scientifica firman persuasionem sibi comparaverint, anathema sit. But a correct interpretation of this canon depends on the first part of the canon left out in this suggestion. For actually it is not wrong for non-Catholics to call their faith into doubt. The error consists precisely in establishing a parity between Catholic and non-Catholic in this regard.[190]

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[187] See Ibid., 330BC.

[188] See Ibid., 310A, 231A. A discussion of these changes will be found in the next chapter.

[189] See Ibid., 208A, Rivet; 334BC.

There was a wish expressed by two bishops to determine the reason why the Catholic does not have reason for doubting his faith, namely because the external motives of credibility are present to him. But, replied Martin this was beyond the scope of the canon.[191] The addition of the words quoad officium circa doctrinam revelatam before parem rather than clarify the text, as Ballerini asserted, would, in fact, make the canon more difficult.[192] And finally two of the fathers proposed another canon which condemned those who denied that faith was indicated in solemn judgments of the Church. Martin, however, did not see the need of multiplying canons and asked these to be rejected.[193] And this concluded the Relatio on Chapter Three.

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[190] "Si quis dixerit, fidem a fidelibus licite assensu suspenso in dubium vocari posse, donec de ea demonstratione scientifica firman persuasionem sibi comparaverint, anathema sit." Ibid., 221C; 334D.

[191] "Si quis dixerit, fideles catholicos rationabiliter posse fidem, quam sub ecclesiae magisterio iam susceperunt, assensu suspenso, in dubium vocare; quod iidem careant argumento credibilitatis extrinsecae, qua Deus voluit omnibus, sive iis, qui iam illuminati sunt, communem esse, ex lege ordinario a se statuta; anathema sit." Ibid., 213C, Caixal y Estradé. Bishop Amat also advised something of this nature. He favored adding after the canon: "Minime vero his innuere intendimus, ne fideles motiva credibilitatis percurrant, cum ex eorum debita consideratione maximum emolumentum, sive ad se firmandos in fide, sive ad alios adducendos ad fidem, percipere possint; testimonia enim Dei credibilia facta sunt nimis! 232B. See also 334D.

[192] See Ibid., 203D,335A.

[193] Ibid., 226A, "Si quis dixerit, non esse credenda fide divina et catholica ea omnia, quae in verbo Dei scripto vel tradito contenentur, et ab ecclesia, sive solemni iudicio, sive ordinario magisterio omnibus fidelibus tanquam fide divina credenda proponuntur; anathema sit." Monzon y Martins. 235A, "Si quis dixerit, quidquid ab ecclesia solemni iudico tamquam fidei dogma definitum non sit, credi non posse nisi fide humana; anathema sit." Meurin. See also, 335B.

On April 12, 1870, five hundred and ninety-eight fathers voted on the entire Constitution as amended. And of those voting only eighty-three had any reservations about the work. Sixteen of the one hundred and forty-eight exceptions (along with the juxta modum vote the bishops were to give the reason for it) dealt with the third Chapter and its canons. Only one was recognized as having any validity.[194]

Then at the third General Session on the twenty-fourth of April, 1870, after six hundred and sixty-seven fathers had voted, Pius IX said: "The decree and canons which are contained in the Constitution just read please all the fathers with none dissenting. And we, approving the sacred Council, define and confirm by our apostolic authority that (decree) and those (canons) as they have been read."[195]

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[194] The change from "assentiendo" to "consentiendo". See above p. 92-93.

[195] "Decreta et canones, qui in constitutione modo lecta continentur, placuerunt omnibus patribus nemine dissentiente, nosque, sacro approbante consilio, illa et illos ut lecta sunt definimus, et apostolica auctoritate confirmamus." Ibid., 436D6-10.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE MEANING OF THE THIRD CHAPTER--DE FIDE

FIRST PARAGRAPH: CANONS ONE AND TWO

The first sentence in the chapter--Cum homo a Deo tanquam creatore et Domino suo totus dependeat. . .--is connective in nature. But this is not the only value of this sentence.[1] Here the foundation, the bedrock of faith is given: "quod Deus sit supremus auctor, quod Deus sit creator noster, quod Deus sit Dominus supremus noster."[2] Nor can it be said that the first part alone has this meager value. If such were the case the first canon against the sufficiency of reason would not have its counterpart in the chapter. And a condemnation made without an introduction would have been contrary to the wishes expressed by the fathers at the council. But the doctrine of this sentence is stated quite explicitly: man is not, can not be independent of God because all man's powers are derived from or depend on Him.[3] The dependence is total. No more emphasis is placed on the physical than the moral or vice versa. In fact when three bishops requested a change stressing man's moral dependence which they thought was intended here, the total dependence was again declared.[4]

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[1] J. C. Murray claims, "Hence this sentence has only the value of a transition and introduction." John Courtney Murray, "The Root of Faith," Theological Studies, 9 (1948) 41. Bishop Martin does make the statement in his Oratio that this does connect the second and third chapters. But he does not say this is its only purpose. See Mansi, 51.313B.

[2] See Mansi, 51.313B$_{13-15}$.

[3] ". . .a quo toti cum omnibus viribus nostris dependemus." Ibid., 313B$_{15-16}$.

In this ambit of dependence on God, the intellect and will are included. And, the manner of their subjection has its own peculiar note --faith. This is clear when the pertinent Latin phrase is analyzed. It reads ". . . plenum revelanti Deo intellectus et voluntatis obsequium fide praestare tenemur." A neat expression: the plenum-obsequium brackets the subject (intellect and will) of this obedience and the person who is its end (God). The manner of this full obedience of intellect and will is expressed by the adverbial ablative fide. Now if this is how the intellect and will show obedience to God revealing they must necessarily be a part of faith. This may seem to be overstating the obvious. Yet Aubert objected because Vacant implied the council had posited the role of the will in faith.[5] For Aubert this obedience of the will was one previously made at a time when man discovered his own intellectual insufficiency. It was a subjection which allowed him to accept any means of knowledge in order to advance toward absolute Truth.[6] Nor can there be found in this, as Garrigou-Lagrange states, a free intellectual assent under the command of the will: "Sed assensus iste intellectualis est sub imperio voluntatis, et propterea dicitur liber. Concilium Vaticanum dicit enim: 'plenum revelanti Deo intellectus et voluntatis obsequium praestare tenemur'."[7]

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[4] See Ch. 3, p. 82.

[5] See Jean M. A. Vacant, Études theologiques sur les constitutions du concile due vatican(Paris: Delhommet Briguet, Éditors, 1895) 2.24-5.

[6] See Roger Aubuert, Le problème de l'acte de foi(2nd ed, Louvain: E. Warny, Ed., 1950)159-60.

[7] Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P. Theologia fundamentalis: De Revelatione (4th ed., Rome: Libreria Editrice Religiosa, F. Ferrari,

This is too much to draw from that phrase. It does show the intellect and will play a part in faith. It does not designate how they conspire in the act. It indicates only that the intellect and will show full submission by faith. The manner of assent is not given.[8]

The next sentence introduces the intimate nature of faith.[9] A definition is offered which satisfies both the act and virtue of faith. And, the definition of the act is a real definition; one which expresses the genus and specific difference. Martin called it a "genuinam definitionem".[10] The Adnotationes point out that faith is formally on set of knowledge--thus the genus; and its own characteristic which differentiates it from any other act of intellection--the authority of God revealing--its specific difference.[11]

As a virtue: It is supernatural because it is powered by grace eliciting the act.[12] But is it disclosed how this is supernatural? Whether substantially so or quoad modum? At this point nothing can be said which favors one or the other. It is simply a supernatural virtue

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1945)1.402. There is no dearth of evidence which states Garrigou-Lagrange's conclusion. But this phrase does not. That faith is free is treated in the third paragraph; that it is an imperated intellectual act is mentioned in the 19th Adnotatio, Mansi, 50.94C. Martin's preliminary remarks also contain this. Mansi, 51.313D.

[8] For a distinction between the assent of faith and knowledge, see F. R. Hoare, "The Darkness of Faith", Dublin Review, 192 (1933) 95.

[9] For a resume of the Protestant notion of faith as an experience, see Stephen Harent, S. J. "Expérience et foi," Études(Paris: Victor Retoux, Libraire-Editeur) 113 (1907) 221-50; also 115 (1908) 20-51. See Ilse Forest, "The Meaning of Faith," The Thomist, 6 (1943) 230-50, for a short presentation of the scholastic thought on faith and a few modern notions, including James, Santayana, Dewey and A. E. Taylor.

[10] See ch. 3, n.28.

[11] See Mansi, 50.86-7; see also ch. 2, p.39-40.

[12] See Mansi, 50.87; see also ch. 2, p.40

which is the beginning of human salvation, "humanae salutis initium est".[13]

This same fifteenth Adnotatio provides enough material so that we may express the causes of faith in this way. The material cause is the adherence of the undetermined and non-specified intellect. The formal cause, specifying the adhesion, is the authority of God revealing. The efficient cause is threefold: the intellect which assents; the will which commands the assent; and grace which supplies the impetus. The final cause is the direct vision of the things assented to by faith on the command of the will.[14]

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[13] See Lagrange, op.cit., 401 n.1, where he states that since the time of Trent faith has been considered as entitatively supernatural but rightly he does not attempt to relate a proof to this definition.

[14] See John Brunsmann, S.V.D. adapted by Arthur Preuss, Handbook of Fundamental Theology(St. Louis, Missouri: B. Herder Book Co., 1932) 4.263. See also Paul Farrell, O.P. "The Portals of Doubt," The Thomist, 8 (1945) 293-368, for the role of the intellect in faith; Eugene Joly, What is Faith? trans. Dom Illtyd Trethowan(New York: Hawthorn Books, Publishers, 1958) 44-52 for the part faith plays in man's life, 130-36 for a good explanation of the definition of faith; Jean Mouroux, I Believe, trans. Michael Turner(New York: Sheed and Ward, 1959) for faith's effect on the person; Jean Levie, S.J. Sous les yeux de l'incroyant (2nd ed., Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1946) 67 and following for the role of reason in faith; Martin Cyril D'Arcy, Belief and Reason(London: Burns Oates and Washbourne Ltd., 1944) for the rational credibility of faith, and The Nature of Belief(St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1958) for explanation of Newman's illative sense; Xavier la Bonnardiere, Devoir de Croire(Paris: Aubier, 1949) which attempts to throw some light on the act of faith itself as it is presented to consciousness and reason. Faith and its Rational Justification by the Rev. Gabriel Brunhes must be cited as a clear presentation of doctrine and remarkably well done. This is the translation by Rev. W. A. Spence and published by Sands and Company, London, in 1931. M.-L. Guerard des Lauriers, O. P. Dimensions de la foi, 2 vols.(Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1952) should be consulted in a study on faith; Jean Vincent Bainvel, Faith and the Act of Faith, trans. Leo Sterck from 3rd ed.,(St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1926) for an account which enjoyed great popularity in the early part of this century; Alexis Decout, S.J. L'acte de foi(Paris: Beauchesne, 1947) discusses the logical and psychological elements of faith; Henry Bars, The Assent of Faith, trans. Ronald Halstead(Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1960) like Fr. Brunhes' work this by Fr. Bars is concise and clear. See also his Faith, Hope and Charity, trans. P. J. Hepburne Scott(New York: Hawthorn Books, Publishers, 1961). In The Motive and the Act of Faith

Aubert maintains the position from the text in question that outside of the theoretical a natural faith will not be found.[15] The force of the argument depends on the use of the demonstrative pronoun Hanc. Now the demonstrative relates directly to the faith mentioned in the first sentence. Thus this faith offered by the intellect and will and which is the initium salutis is supernatural in character.[16] But is there a natural faith? Is it theoretically possible? Is such found or able to be found? The council does not say so here, nor can it's words be made so decisive.

There has been much discussion on the question whether revelation is part of the formal motive of faith. Vacant[17] and Aubert[18] concur: the council had not treated the case at all. Neither did it endorse those who say it is part of the motive nor those who claim it is only a prerequisite condition to faith. However, a distinction can be made between active revelation and passive revelation and upon it some evidence

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According to John of St. Thomas a dissertation by William J. Winter the doctrine of St. Thomas is presented as this commentator saw it.(Rome: Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, 1958). Two works on the concept of faith as it appears in the Epistles of St. Paul and the synoptic Gospels should be cited: Ceslaus Spicq. O. P. St. Paul, Les epitres pastorales, Études Bibliques(Paris: Libraire Lecoffre, 1947) and Edward D. O'Connor, C. S. C. Faith in the Synoptic Gospels(South Bend, Indiana: U. of Notre Dame Press, 1961). Both give the meaning of faith as found in the respective works, its meaning and understanding, trust, fiducia, faithfulness.

[15] See Auburert, op.cit., 160.

[16] For one should not claim this obedience of the intellect and will mentioned in the first sentence as supernatural. It is this faith, the initium salutis, which is supernatural.

[17] See Vacant, op.cit., 2.32-3.

[18] See Aubert, op.cit., 161, n. 17. The writer agrees with this statement. What is suggested is that the fathers understood that revelation was part of the motive of credibility.

can be garnered for asserting: Revelation is part of the formal motive of faith. Active revelation is the act of God whereby He wills to expose Himself to us; the act of the will of God ordaining that His thoughts should reach us. Passive revelation entails the methods and means used to so divulge His thoughts.[19] It is well to add that actively viewed it is the "Veritas Prima in dicendo."[20] Clearly, then, it is synonymous with God Himself.

Now in note nineteen the premise is substantiated. Here although the motive of faith is not being discussed ex professo it is not out of context to use the assertion made. For the author in showing that the supernatural dignity and firmness of faith derives from the dignity of the divine authority says this:

> Indeed faith is not a natural conviction insofar as it requires the weight of reasons in order to impel assent, but the assent of faith is supernatural due to the grace which elevates and strengthens both the will by whose command and inclination it is elicited, and the intellect which adheres to the revealed truth with a firmness of assent corresponding to the dignity of the divine authority because of the first truth revealing, which is God.[21]

There is, then, an equation between the reason why the intellect assents (the formal motive) and the first truth revealing. Vacant mentions that the adversaries defend their idea by pointing out the council did not place revelation and the authority of God on the same plane. For the text does not read propter auctoritatem Dei et propter revelationem.[22] But propter primam veritatem revelantem adequately replaces Dei and concludes to the statement.

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[19] See G. Van Noort, Dogmatic Theology: The Sources of Revelation, Divine Faith, trans. John J. Castelot, S.S., and William R. Murphy, S.S. 3(Westminster, Maryland: The Newman Press, 1961)200. And see Ludovico Billot, S.J. De virtutibus infusis(4th ed., rev., Rome: Gregorian University, 1928)208.

[20] Garrigou-Lagrange, op.cit., 158.

[21] "Fides quippe non est naturalis convictio, 'quantum mereatur pondus rationum ad assensum impellentium,' sed fidei assensus est supernaturalis ex gratia elevante ac confortante tum voluntatem, ex cuius imperio et inclinatione elicitur, tum intellectum, qui propter veritatem primam revelantem, quae Deus est, adhaeret veritati revelatae assensu firmissimo respondente dignitati auctoritatis divinae." Mansi, 50.94C$_{4-12}$.

Nor is it incorrect to affirm that the motive of faith is the infallibility of God[23] as long as the truthfulness of God is not excluded. For in the 18th note there is expressed: "the subjection of a rational creature and the bondage of every intellect demands an infinite majesty, truth and wisdom which is the authority of God speaking."[24]

Those qualities also point to the kind of submission envisioned in faith. Is obedience in the proper sense called for? That is, has the council presented as the formal motive of faith God, the superior; does one believe propter auctoritatem Dei imperantis? Granted there is a submission in faith which resembles obedience. But the motive of faith is the authority of God revealing, not Him commanding. Now if one is to submit because of the testimony of a witness, certain qualities, the knowledge and veracity, of that witness must be assured. And listed in the annotations and incorporated in the paragraph are these qualities.

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[22] See Vacant, op.cit., 32-3. Also Billot, op.cit., 206-10; and Ioanne B. Alfaro, S. J. De virtutibus(Rome: Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, 1959) 28-39, for full treatment of this. Billot and Alfaro do not draw any conclusion from the conciliar discussions, annotations or decrees.

[23] Henry Edward Manning, The Vatican Council and its Definitions, (New York: D. & J. Sadlier, 1871) 52. See also Vacant, op.cit., 32.

[24] See Mansi, 50.91A_{18}-B_3. "Haec enim subiectionem rationalis creaturae et captivitatem omnis intellectus infinita maiesta, veritas, et sapientia, hoc est auctoritas Dei loquentis postulat." See Joly, op.cit., 86-95 for Church's place in faith.

The council proposes that faith rest on the authority of God who is neither deceived (thus having perfect knowledge and opposed to error) nor can deceive (embodying perfect veracity and thereby opposed to lies).[25]

Another question asks whether the Church herself is not part of the motive of faith. This could have been prompted by the insistence of Bishop Spilotros who saw a need to mention the infallibility of the Church as a prerequisite of faith.[26] To this, however, a negative answer is mandatory. For although the Church is the "vestibule to belief",[27] divine faith does not rest on her authority. She is the rule of faith; she is the "presuppositive cause"[28] since it is she who presents the matter to be believed. Her role is important as such but it is not in the realm of the formal motive of faith. Nowhere does the council intimate this. From no passage can such an inference be made.[29]

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[25] See Stephen Harent, S.J. "Foi", DTC, 6.1(1915) 116-17.

[26] See Mansi, 50.259; also ch. 2, p.63.

[27] See Harent, art. cit., 166.

[28] See Billot, op.cit., 211.

[29] Aubert, op.cit., 735, agrees with Lennerz,H. "Ist jede Zustimmung wegen der Autoritat Gottes ein Glaubensakt?", Scholastik, 4 (1929) 572-596, when he says it is impossible to speak of an act of divine faith when the Church defines a truth not formally contained in Revelation, but which one adheres to because of the authority of God who preserves His Church from error. But Fidel G Martinez, D.D. "Aproposito dela llamade 'Fe eclesiastia'", Revista español de teologia, (Madrid: Redaccion y Administracion, Duque de Medianaceli) 11 (1951) 209-253, proposes these truths to be believed on divine faith and answers the objections made by Lennerz, Aldama and Salaverri against him. He contends there is no need for such a note as de fide ecclesiastica. See Charles Journet, The Church of the Word Incarnate, tran. A.H.C. Downes (London: Sheed and Ward, 1955) 1.338-346 for a discussion of the power the Church has to announce speculative truth. She preserves intact the Explicit revelation, she develops and makes explicit the deposit left to her care, she safeguards revealed deposit by defining those things closely connected with faith and morals. See also

In the first canon those who affirm the independence of reason which is the principal error of Rationalism and those who hold that God cannot command faith which is consequent upon the primary tenet are condemned.[30] This is not contested; nor is anything special derived from it.

The second canon even though it has two parts, nevertheless, contains one condemnation. The composite error is this: a). To reject the distinction between faith and natural knowledge of religious things, and b). because of this to aver divine faith need not have for its motive the authority of God revealing. It is obvious the censure is leveled at those professing both together since the *ac propterea* relates the second error to the first as cause to effect.[31] The fifteenth *adnotatio* confirms this: "In stating the error to be avoided, the second part is condemned under anathema in its connection with the first part, in so far as it is said, from this cause, because divine faith is not distinguished from natural knowledge it is not required that revealed truth be believed on account of the authority of God revealing."[32] Still more evidence is gathered from the rejection of Bishop Amat's suggestion to

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Francisco Marín-Sola, O.P. *L'evolution homogène du dogme catholique*, 2 vols. (2nd ed., Friburg, Suisse: Imperié et Libraire de l'oeuvre de Saint Paul, 1924) and especially vol 1, 154-167, 176-191 402-423 for discussion on the theological conclusion or virtually revealed truth before, and after a definition by the Church, and ecclesiastical faith.

[30] See Vacant, *op.cit.*, 20.

[31] See *Ibid.*, 31.

[32] "In enuntiatione erroris advertendum est, secundam partem sub anathemate damnari *in sua connexione* cum prima parte, quatenus dicitur, *ex hac causa*, quia fides divina non distinguitur a scientia naturali, non requiri, ut revelata veritas propter auctoritatem Dei revelantis credatur." Mansi, 50.87A_{17}-B_4.

delete the first part of the canon.[33] To which Martin responded: this was the reason for the definition and it could not be omitted.[34] And because these two parts must be held together the fideists escape heresy for they do not deny that God is the formal cause, the motive of faith.[35]

PARAGRAPH TWO: CANONS THREE AND FOUR

The second paragraph presents and teaches the reasonableness of faith.[36] The council was interested primarily in combatting the rationalists and the pietists.[37] But when next to these errors is placed the condemnation by Innocent XI, the Confession of faith subscribed to by Bautain, plus the injunction of the letter Qui Pluribus, we find the intention of the fathers is more extended.[38] Vacant correctly takes the sentence at the beginning of the third paragraph and uses it in connection with this. The two statements: "our faith is not blind and it is in harmony with reason" are, for him, principles. And they conspire to prove conclusively both the subjective and objective need of the motives of credibility. He expresses it this way:

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[33] See Mansi, 51.208A.

[34] See Ibid., 331; also See Aubert, op.cit., 162 and n.19.

[35] It must be noted, though, that Fideism is censured, ES,1622seq.; see ch. 1, pp.11-13. Bainvel states, "Le fideisme n'est pas une erreur et n'est pas condamné parce qui'il donne beaucoup à la foi; mais parce qu'il donne trop à la foi, aux dépens de la raison; parce qu'il sacrifice la raison à la foi." J. V. Bainvel, "Foi, Fideisme," Dictionnaire Apologetique de la foi catholique(Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne, 1915) 2.61.

[36] "There is no such thing as a rational establishment of the truth of faith. . . .What can be established rationally is its credibility." This is true for if otherwise the condemnation of the Vatican Council would apply. See Yves R. Simon, "Rationality of Faith," Thought, (New York: Fordam U. Press, 1956) 31.503.

[37] See Mansi, 51.313D.

[38] See ES, 1171, 1634-39, all cited in the 16th note, Mansi 50.88A-B, and included in the Oratio of Simor, Mansi, 51.47B16.

> Our council admits then, or rather it sets forth the incontestable principle that the act of faith is not a blind assent, nequaquam sit motus animae caecus, and that it must not be a variance with reason, ut fidei nostrae obsequium rationi consentaneum esset. In order for that to be so, it suffices, more it is necessary that the fact of revelation be certain. It suffices because if the fact of revelation is certain, faith can and ought to be produced in full confidence since God who reveals cannot be deceived and cannot deceive us. It is required because if the fact of revelation is doubtful, the assent given to the assertions which are claimed as revealed would be equally doubtful; there would not be then a true act of faith because there is no faith without full certitude.[39]

What is this blind faith? It is as the sixteenth note defines, faith produced spontaneously and immediately as an act of reason and which is motivated or empowered only by divine grace.[40] It is the opposite of that expressed by the words of Saint Thomas and incorporated into the revised schema under question, paragraph three, "we do not believe unless we see what is to be believed." It would seem that since this was deleted from the approved schema, it should be considered as containing a contrary doctrine to that intended. But such is not the case. For Martin said these words were not necessary to the meaning[41] which simply indicates the idea to be conveyed remains without them. If they did contain a contrary doctrine Martin might not have objected to the, but certainly he would not have said they were defensible. Furthermore Archbishop Vancsa had objected to this phrase only because in the hands of someone not acquainted with its meaning it could be used to justify the denial of some article of faith since it would seem to offer a choice.[42] The meaning of this phrase is clear. Unless that proposed for belief is rationally credible it cannot be believed, and not only in the objective order but most certainly on the subjective plane.[43]

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[39] "Notre Council admet donc, ou plutôt il invoque ce principe incontestable que l'acte de foi n'est pas un assentiment aveugle, nequaquam sit motus animae caecus, et qu'il ne doit pas être en désaccord avec la raison, ut fidei nostrae obsequium rationi consentaneum esset. Pour qu'il en soit ainsi, il suffit, mais il faut que le fait de la révélation soit certain. Cela suffit; car si le fait de la révélation est certain, la foi peut et doit se produire en toute confiance, puisque Dieu qui révèle ne peut se tromper, ne nous tromper. Cela est requis; car si le fait de la revelation est douteux, l'assentiment donné aux assertions qui se pretendent révélées, sera également douteux; ce ne sera donc point un véritable acte de foi; car il n'y a pas d'acte de foi sans une pleine certitude." Aubert objects to this. He claims the simple truth taught is that for the act of faith not to be in disharmony with reason, the word of God ought to be presented with evident signs of his revelation, that it ought to have with it external criteria at the disposition of those who would desire to verify the legitimacy of their adhesion. See op.cit., 166-7, n. 31. See Edouard Dhanis, S.J. "Le problème de l'acte de foi, "Nouvelle Revue Theologique, 68 (1946) 29-31; and Jacques de Blic, S.J. "Le problème de l'acte de foi," Melanges de science religieuse, 4 (1946) 333-34, who support Vacant's opinion.

[40] See Mansi, 50.88A.

But is it legitimate to borrow that sentence of the third paragraph and use it in such close connection with the second paragraph? Yes, it would seem so. For Martin in his first Relatio had made separate mention of every paragraph except the third.[44] Its explanation is conjoined with that of the second. If nothing more this connotes an extremely close relationship. Actually by deleting the first sentence of the third paragraph its meaning would not suffer. Yet should that sentence be discarded the meaning of the second paragraph would be rendered unclear and subject to discussion as Aubert wishes. But here there is an intimate relationship and the latter sentence designates the interpretation of the second paragraph.

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[41] See Mansi, 51.320D.

[42] See Ibid., 208A.

[43] See Dhanis, art.cit., 29-31.

[44] See Mansi, 51.313D.

Now the doctrine contained in the approved Constitution is the same as that of the first schema. In the sixteenth note in referring to the relative matter in the seventh chapter explicit mention is made that the doctrine propounded is against those who advance an internal experience, a religious sense, a testimony of the spirit, an immediate certitude of faith and thus deny the value or necessity of the motives of credibility.[45] This is reiterated by Simor in his introductory remarks to the revised schema.[46] In fact he repeats verbatim the passage from the Adnotatio. Thus it is with wonder that to Vacant's contention: "The necessity of the motives of credibility for faith is only affirmed in passing by the fathers of the Vatican: their teaching deals directly with the part the external motives of credibility play in the preparation of the act of faith."[47] that Aubert objects: "I do not think it is even affirmed in passing, because the fathers were only treating of the criteria as they are presented for the eventual disposition of the believers,..."[48] It seems evident that although an ex professo treatment of this necessity cannot be nor is alleged, there remains an indication of this necessity. It is enough then to assert that in this paragraph the council has taught that not only is faith reasonable in the objective sense but also in the subjective sense.

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[45] "...unice provocant ad internam experientiam, ad sensum religiosum, ad testimonium spiritus, ad immediatam certitudinem fidei. Valorem itaque aut necessitatem motivorum credibilitatis, . . . vel omnino negant, vel. . . ." Mansi, 50.87B_{10-15}.

[46] See Mansi, 51.47B_{11-15}.

[47] "La nécessité de motifs de crédibilité pour la foi n'a été affirmée qu'en passant par les pères du Vatican: leurs enseignements portent directement sur la part qui revient aux motifs externes de crédibilité, dans la préparation de l'acte de foi." Vacant, op.cit., 37.

[48] "Je pense qu'elle n'est même pas affirmée en passant, car les Pères ne s'occupent des critères que comme se trouvant à la disposition éventuelle des croyants, . . ." Aubert op.cit., 167, n. 31 cont'd.

What is to be learned about these divine facts, miracles and prophecies? Certainly these wonders are more than sufficient evidence of the fact of divine revelation. However, even though powerful, the evidence itself does not force assent. In short the council did not mean that a strict demonstration is afforded for the fact of revelation. But, rather, the fact is rendered believable by these signs wrought by the divine power.[49]

There is no attempt by the council to specify which miracles of the prophets, of Christ and the Apostles are factual, but no doubt some are attributable to each. The numbers are not determined, but they are many and manifest. They are not necessarily equally discernible to all men, but all men can find proof enough for themselves, something appropriate to each intelligence which will inevitably lead to the knowledge that God has spoken, that His signs make the act of belief beyond a doubt reasonable.[50]

Since the council makes so much of these external signs which are capable of rendering revelation credible; since the signs are so available not for abstract reason alone, but forceful and persuasive enough for the simple, it might seem that the council teaches that the motives of credibility can be appreciated without enlisting the aid of grace. The council neither confirms nor denies this. The arguments set forth from the conciliar decree and its antecedent discussions are not so powerful for either premise that an inescapable conclusion results. A safe judgment reads: the council gave power to grace and to reason in this regard.[51]

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[49] See Ibid., 168. See canon 3. The sole point of this canon is to condemn those who say the external signs cannot render revelation credible.

[50] See Harent, art.cit., 229; and Vacant, op.cit., where he gives a long treatment to this subject of miracles, 40-55.

After stating strongly in the paragraph that our faith is rendered credible by the facta divina, the concurrent canon proceeds to specify more exactly what error is condemned. It does not deal with the fact that God has made His speaking credible by external signs. It treats, rather, the possibility of showing the credibility of revelation, so that anyone who denied this as a possibility would be heretical. This is confirmed by Martin's reply to Bishop Estradé who had suggested so specifying the act.[52] There is no more. Together with the above, the error states that man, then, must be moved to belief only by internal persuasions. This is rather important. For the basic error is in placing undue dependency on these internal criteria because of the denial of the possibility of the external criteria.[53] Moreover that it is possible to reach this faith by internal experience alone is understood. Such was the reason behind Bishop Amat's advised change ad fidem moveri debere.[54] The debere designates the condemnation contrary to those who allege this is the only means to come to faith.[55] There is no doubt but that these two errors are causally connected and fall under the condemnation as one. Franzelin, at length, presented this as the error when he was called upon to defend his schema.[56]

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[51] See Aubert, op.cit., 170-72, thoroughly treats the subject.

[52] See Mansi, 51.213D, 331D; see also ch. 2 above, p.62

[53] See Aubert, op.cit., 173-4.

[54] See Mansi, 51.232A.

[55] Note how closely this canon now resembles and approximates that proposed by Francelin in the first schema. See ch. 2, p.43.

The fourth canon is neither doctrinally very specific as against whom nor what it is opposed. With some certainty we know that unbelievers are exempted from consideration. For Bishop Rivet had counselled the deletion of this canon on the grounds that the canon dealt with unbelievers who were outside the Church's jurisdiction. But Martin pin-pointed the fallacy of this objection: the case at hand was the Catholic, who glorying in the name, in fact was an unbeliever because of his heretical beliefs.[57] Another vague but further indication comes from Simor: pantheists and some Germans.

However, the canon is divided into two main sections. The first part is concerned with the denial of the possibility of miracles and the consequent allegation that all scriptural recitations of them are mythical. There is no need to expose the mind of the council here; the meaning of the words are clear. This even though Vacant had suggested a twofold interpretation was possible: those who denied the possibility alone were condemned; and, those who classed as myths all scriptural miracles because they denied the possibility of miracles, were condemned.[58]

This part of the canon contains one thought, complex to be sure, but one. If the sentence in question were to express two distinct though similar thoughts its structure would necessarily have to indicate this.[59] For this reason there is no need to rest our consideration on a question of fact as does Aubert. He offers that this may be likened to the second canon where the fact of the connection is expressed.[60] Since there is no indication from the discussions that this is true a firm conclusion can not be posited. But the connection stands from the words, the structure itself.

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[56] See Mansi, 50.333-4.

[57] See Mansi, 51.327-8, 330D.

[58] See Vacant, op.cit., 44-5.

And because of that structure it would seem rather naive to excuse from condemnation those who dispute the authenticity of scriptural miracles because of some historical or literary critique. Aubert affirms this.[61] That they are exempt from the condemnation in the first part of this anathema may be true. But it seems they would fall prey to the second part. If the thoughts here were so disparate something would need be done to indicate this. But, on the contrary, the use of the semicolon manifests an extremely close relationship with the preceding clause. Thus it does not seem true to affirm the second independent clause is now dealing only with miracles in general. Further the whole paragraph is oriented around miracles and prophecies recounted in the Scriptures, authored by Moses, the prophets, Christ and the Apostles. Therefore if all scriptural miracles which are multa et manifestissima are denied factuality for whatever reason itwould seem the second part of this canon would prevail. Here it is granted and stated again the council had no intention of specifying which or how many miracles contained in the Scriptures are authentic. But to say that all of these are legends seems contrary to the intention of the fathers of the council.

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[59] In the same canon the punctuation clearly manifests a changing yet very much related thought.

[60] See Aubert, op.cit., 176.

[61] See Ibid.

Moreover it cannot be claimed by implication as the meaning of this canon that only the eyewitnesses of the miracles found in the Scriptures could be convinced of the divine origin of Christianity. Can it be all that was said in the paragraph is negated by the canon? Can it be that Simor, when he confirmed the condemnation of the errors censured in 1840, had not in mind the fact that the force and clarity of these miracles had not been lost from generation to generation?[62]

PARAGRAPH THREE: CANON FIVE

The beginning of the third paragraph indicates the doctrine contained is not new, but derives from the second Council of Orange. Note eighteen also marks the counterpart in the Council of Trent.[63] From Orange the necessity of grace for the salutary act of faith is enunciated. And Trent demonstrates the necessity plus the freedom of faith. Here faith for salvation is impossible without the illuminatio et inspiratio of the Holy Spirit.

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[62] See Mansi, 51.47$_{18}$; ES, 1624. Aubert says the word "certissima" presents no problem since it must be considered philosophically. In this sense a thing may be most certain yet exceed the capacity of the majority. Op.cit. 172, n.49.

Later on he states that only the eyewitnesses could appreciate the value of the signs with sufficient certitude to be convinced of the divine origin of Christianity. Ibid., 176.

But if these miracles are "certissima" and at the same time "accommodata omnium intelligentiae" (though one may not specify which ones or how many miracles are accommodated to a given individual), they must have enough probative force (rite probari) to be sufficient to convince more than only the eyewitnesses of the divine origin of Christianity.

Too, since these signs are "certissima" and "accommodata omnium" the explanation of "certissima" is a philosophical sense does not seem correct. For it would seem that interpretation excludes the possibility of "accommodata omnium".

[63] See Mansi, 50.89C$_8$-90A$_6$; Sess. 6, chs. 6 & 8.

Those words, no matter how much one should like to try, cannot be assigned a definite place in the genesis of faith. At least it is not represented in such detail in the conciliar decree or discussions. But if one connects the illuminatio with the practico-practical judgment of credibility may this be allowed? Vacant, in fact, does note these two words in reference to the judgment of credentity (illuminatio) and the election by the will to believe (inspiratio).[64] It would seem he applies the inspiratio to the pius credulitatis affectus, the "supernatural will to believe."[65] "The illuminatio which produces the practical judgment founded on the motives of credibility, and the inspiratio which elicits the command of the will".[66] It does not seem out of order to make this connection but Vacant errs in attributing this to the council, though this was probably in the mind of the originators. For in expressing the supernaturality of faith, they knew that there had to be a transition from the natural processes to produce this supernatural act. Grace was needed and a grace which aided the mental processes prior to the ultimate command of the will to believe. Indeed the necessity for grace in this command is not controverted. But if all the acts preceding it are natural, an intrinsically supernatural effect, the act of faith, is going to have a natural cause. In the genesis of the act of faith according to that listed by Gardeil[67] the necessity of such a grace intervening does not present itself until the practico-practical judgment of credentity.[68] This grace cannot be assigned to the judgment of credibility for this judgment only confirms the possibility of an act of faith, nothing more. Should it be needed here faith would not be truly reasonable.[69] The writer does not think Vacant was overextending himself; he was not seeing something in the council that was not there; he would not be subject to Kleutgen's scathing remark: "What one has made up one's mind to be true, one easily finds again in the words of another."[70] For in the eighteenth note this position is at least presumed. "For if the pia libera voluntas inclining the intellect to the act of faith and further the supernatural illustration of the intellect and the inspiration of the will is excluded, then faith is rendered a merely rational and philosophical conviction..."[71]

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[64] See Vacant, op.cit., 73.

[65] See Van Noort, op.cit., 288.

[66] ". . .l'illumination qui produit le jugement pratique, fonde sur les motifs de crédibilité, et l'inspiration qui sollicite le commandement de la volonté." Vacant, op.cit., 73. See Aubert, op.cit., 180-1, where he objects to Vacant's statement. He thinks this phrase should not be tampered with.

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[67] See A. Gardeil, "Crédibilité", DTC, 3.2, (1923) 2205-6. The particular steps are relatively unimportant to my purposes.

[68] I do not assert there is a need for this illuminatio here, just it should not come before this point.

[69] It must be understood that an absolute need is being discussed here; not whether grace does influence this process. In fact Gardeil would posit the influence of grace much sooner, that is, in one who is coming to an act of faith. But the absolute need for grace is not demanded.

[70] "Indessen was man einmal für wahr hält, findet man leicht in den Worten anderer." J. Kleutgen, Beilagen zu den Werken über die Philosophie und Theologie der Vorzeit, Hft3, Abt. 2, "Zur Lehre vom Glauben," (Munster: 1875) cited from J. C. Murray art. cit., 40.

[71] "Si enim libera pia voluntas inclinans intellectum ad actum fidei, ac porro supernaturalis illustratio intellectus et inspiratio voluntatis excluditur, sique fides revocatur ad mere rationalem et philosophicam convictionem de veritate ex argumentis demonstrationis; . . ." Mansi 50.90B$_{16}$-C$_4$.

The pia voluntas is not questioned; this denotes a supernaturally powered will. The ac porro evidently bespeaks a supernaturality arrived at earlier in the genesis of faith. And if we are to have an apologetic the supernaturality cannot be placed at the judgment of credibility or before for there would be no terminus ad quem for our apologetic. In any case there is full agreement that actual grace is required for this act of faith.[72]

Now the council of Trent had defined that the loss of charity did not conclude necessarily to the loss of faith.[73] And it can be deduced from this same council that a salutary act of faith is a decided possibility even before justification.[74] At the Vatican, faith's endurance is presumed. Then a new statement of doctrine: faith itself in itself (fides ipsa in se) not restricted, comprising living and dead faith, is a gift of God, is supernatural, is salutary. Its salutary character, however, does not mean formed and unformed faith merit in the same way (Salutary simply means pertaining to salvation). For just as this distinction is made in faith so is there a distinction between grace merited de condigno and de congruo. In no wise can a dead faith claim an increase in habitual grace--to increase supposes a possession. But acts of dead faith do offer a promise of actual graces to avoid sin and finally to regain the habit of grace which was lost.[75] This statement was the primary concern of the Vatican Council since Hermes condemned the idea that such a faith could be meritorious or salutary.

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[72] The practico-practical judgment of credibility must be powered by grace. For here there is an actual motion toward and call to make an act of divine faith. And a motion toward the supernatural requires a supernatural power. Reason can merely show the possibility of such a motion. But at this point the limit of natural reason alone is reached. Grace must influence subsequent acts. See Alfaro, op.cit., 194-95.

[73] See ES, 801.

[74] See Vacant, op.cit., 72-3.

Consequent on this identity and its corollaries flows the freedom of faith. For man freely offers obedience to God by consenting to and cooperating with His grace which is resistable. In stating this did the council intend only, here and in the canon,[76] to reaffirm man's basic freedom to believe or not believe--liberty of exercise?[77] As Bourgeois remarks this is hardly questioned.[78] Then must we conclude with Alfaro that we alone draw the conclusion of man's freedom to believe or to disbelieve, that it was not intended by the council?[79] This much is explicit in Martin's relatio: Man even after a most thorough and detailed study of the proofs of religion remains free. The arguments do not coerce belief.[80] But from the discussions the freedom of specification is also included. Aubert expresses it:

> In condemning the Hermesion theory. . .the council defined the freedom of faith even for those who could perfectly

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[75] See Vacant, op.cit., 72-3.

[76] The grave difficulties met with over this canon can be seen in ch. 3, p. 91ff.

[77] See Garrigou-Lagrange, op.cit., 403; also Joachim M. Bauer, The Modern Notion of Faith, SP (diss. Washington 1930) for the part the will plays in belief.

[78] See Eduardo Leon Bourgeois, Sobrenaturalidad y libertad de la fe (Santiago: 1942) 137.

[79] Alfaro op.cit., 121-123.

[80] See Mansi, 51.333C-D.

> appreciate the proofs of it. It can be immediately concluded that the freedom which it (the council) intended to affirm was not only the liberty of exercise. . .but the liberty of specification, . . .[81]

Thus, specifically against the Hermesian errors, the fifth canon defines the freedom of faith, in exercise and in specification; and the necessity of divine grace even for a fides informis. Here there is no denial of the possibility of natural faith for the council had in mind only that faith which is salutary--sicut oportet ad salutem.

The conciliar decrees and discussions permit nothing more. How to harmonize the teaching in this paragraph and canon remains a problem for theologians. But most certainly in the preferred theories of the day no one has any more support than the other from the Vatican Council. All safeguard the definitions. Each has a particular area of haziness; the battle of ideas still wages.

PARAGRAPH FOUR

This paragraph was completely new.[82] It was not mentioned either in the first schema nor in that revised by Martin. The Deputation had hastily formulated this at their ninth meeting and then postponed discussion on it.[83] The lack of this due consideration provoked the great discussions noted before.

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[81] "En condamnant la théorie hermésienne. . .le Concile définit donc la liberté de la foi, même pour ceux qui peuvent parfaitement en apprécier les preuves. On peut en conclure immédiatement qua la liberté qu'il entend affirmer n'est pas seulement la liberté d'exercise, . . . mais la liberté de spécification, . . ." Op.cit., 184.

[82] See Marc Caudron, Magistère ordinaire et infallibilité pontificale d'après la Constitution Dei Filius, Sylloge excerptorum e dissertationibus, Universitas Catholica Lovaniensis, vol. 35, fasc. 2, 1961, for an extensive study of the meaning of this paragraph especially of the words ordinarium magisterium.

In this paragraph only is there a divergence from the treatment of divine faith. For here a new element is added and that of Catholic faith. It is not a new idea in the Church. For actually it had a long history and was understood by the fathers of the council to mean the faith proposed by the Church.[84] Franzelin had written in 1870 that the only condition required for this faith was the proposal of a revealed truth by the Church.[85] Nor did the fathers understand this to mean that no other truths were to be believed on faith except those proposed by the Church. Far from it. Everyone is bound to believe on divine faith the truths revealed by God. Now the manner in which one comes to know the truths to be believed specifies how one is to believe. As Van Noort says, "Merely divine faith and divine-Catholic faith differ from one another purely accidently, since the fashion in which revealed truths become known to us does not change the nature of faith in itself."[86]

At first glance the paragraph seems to be very far reaching. But since it is fashioned to combat one error its extension is limited. The error: divine faith is due only to decrees of the solemn magisterium. First the words of the paragraph show that not *each* and *every* officially proposed truth demands an act of faith. This does not mean, however, that every Catholic need not believe the _whole_ of revealed truth as proposed by the Church. In fact such is mandatory. The point is: each truth taken singly may not reach _each_ and _every_ Catholic. Consequently they are not obliged to make an act of faith specifically in that truth of which they are ignorant. In the event, though, that one does come to the knowledge of such a proposal it would seem in harmony with the intention of the fathers that an act of faith be elicited at that time. Of course, if one should arrive at this knowledge through one's own rational endeavors, there is no need to make an act of faith in this truth. Straub does not accept this interpretation and actually uses the opposite idea to exclude the Thomistic statement which says that a thing cannot be known and believed at the same time.[87]

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[83] See Mansi, 53.192C,D.

[84] Bishop Amat: "fides catholica aut ab Ecclesia proposita." Mansi 51.231D$_{13}$; Vancsa: "sit fide catholica credendum quod ab ecclesia proponitur credendum." *Ibid*., 205C$_{6-7}$.

[85] See John Baptist Franzelin, S.J. *Tractatus de divina traditione et scriptura*(Rome: Typis S.C.DePropag. Fide, 1870) 592.

[86] See *op.cit*., 190.

The degree of understanding of the matter proposed by the Church is not mentioned nor alluded to in this paragraph. But that the Church proposes matter for belief on divine faith is directly mentioned. For Martin in his explanation of the doctrine points out that it is not a matter of human faith in the proposed teachings of the Church but one of divine faith.[88] And so it was understood by the fathers. This is evidenced by the proposed canon of Bishop Meurin: "If anyone says that whatever is not defined as a dogma of faith by a solemn judgment by the Church, can only be believed on human faith, a.s."[89]

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[87] See St. Thomas, _Summa theologica_, 2,2, q.1, art.4, ad.2; see also A. Straub, _De analysi fidei_ (Innsbruck: Felicaini Rauch, 1922) 353-4.

[88] See Mansi, 51.314A$_{12-16}$; in 322D$_{4-5}$ especially is it found that **the whole** and entire material object of divine faith is at stake and human faith does not suffice for such an object.

[89] "Si quis dixerit, quidquid ab ecclesia solemni iudicio tanquam fidei dogma definitum non sit, credi non posse nisi fide humana, anathema sit." _Ibid._, 235A$_{9-11}$. See also Aubert, _op.cit._, 188-89.

By the very fact that the definition of divine and Catholic faith or simply Catholic faith has been agreed upon since the Vatican Council it seems legitimate to posit that this paragraph forms the definition. With minor changes it can read: Divine and Catholic faith is that by which we believe all the things contained in the written word of God or tradition and proposed for our belief by the Church either by a solemn judgment or by the ordinary and universal magisterium as divinely revealed. Now whether it was the intention of the council to so define Catholic faith is not too important.[90] But the fact is that Catholic faith embraced solemnly defined truths and this was admitted.[91] And to further distinguish the object of faith the fathers included those truths taught by the ordinary and universal magisterium. So whereas before the understanding of the term "Catholic faith" was somewhat unclear it had now been clarified so as to extend the previous definition. The least that can be said, then, is that although Catholic faith may have greater extension (though this does not seem possible) surely the council by its use of this terminology has actually recognized this definition though it has not designated this as taxative or complete.

This Catholic faith, whom does it oblige. Is it universal as Vacant says and demanded of all Christians?[92] Or is it only required of the Catholic as Aubert contends?[93] The fifth paragraph and the discussions about it give the answer.

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[90] Aubert denies the council intended a definition; Ibid., 191.

[91] See Mansi, 51; 207B, 304D; 402, amend. 64.

[92] La foi catholique est donc celle qui s'impose à tous les chrétiens. Son nom de catholique cu d'universelle l'indique et a toujours été compris ainsi." op.cit., 84.

[93] See Aubert, op.cit., 191.

PARAGRAPH FIVE

Recalling the confusion which arose because of the improper transition from the preceding paragraph to this[94] and Martin's replies to the various objections on this score will help to clarify the above question. Martin explained in reply that an act of Catholic faith is not demanded of all men: "ne videretur omnibus ad salutem necessarium esse actum fidei catholicae; nam hoc falsum esset."[95] Because of that statement Vacant's position is untenable. Now the virtue of faith is so necessary that everyone is bound to come to it. If Catholic faith were demanded of all Christians as Vacant suggested there would have been no reason for the confusion relating to the nexus of these two paragraphs. Moreover to be bound by Catholic faith one must be aware of the proposal of the truth by the Church. But if one is certain without this proposal that the truth is revealed then that one is bound to give assent on divine faith.

The necessity of the virtue of divine faith is the teaching here. It is a means without which man cannot be saved--necessity of means. Prudently the council does not mention which truths must be so believed nor what truths require belief by precept. Even so there is an obligation to embrace the true faith and to persevere in it. And that this be feasible, God has marked His institution with irrevocable signs which suffice to make it known. The progression in this paragraph from virtue, to act, to helps to attain this faith is quite pronounced. Now these helps are fundamental to our apologetic.

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[94] See ch. 3, p.96-97.

[95] See Mansi, 51.324C$_{2-4}$.

It has been characteristic of Apologetics to muster its strength from the past of the Church hardly glancing at the present organism so beautifully formed by God to catch the eye of any person looking for the Way, the Truth and the Life. The external guarantees--miracles, prophecies, the notes--are at hand but the fact that she is perpetually enlightened by the divine character is sufficient, indeed more than sufficient, to indicate her unique position as the custos and magistra of revelation.[96]

And only to this Church or in her does one find the many and wonderful signs divinely deposited for the evident credibility of Christianity. The tam mira et tam multa together with their priority in the paragraph to Ecclesia per se ipsa are the Vacant proof-positive that it is the classic or historic Apologetic which is favored by the council.[97] The fact is true but is the conclusion legitimate? It does not seem so. For after mentioning the many and wonderful things deposited in the Church for credibility, the next sentence begins: Quin etiam ecclesia per se ipsa. In classical usage the quin etiam has a peculiar force. It is understood as adding a stronger assertion of proof than that which precedes it. Thus the Church herself provides a stronger motive of credibility than anything she contains.[98]

When Aubert sets forth his disagreement with Vacant,[99] he states, rather, the Quo fit at the beginning of the sixth paragraph indicates faith is supported not by the classic apologetic but by the contemporary Church. This is a rational conclusion for him and no attempt is made to assign it place as a definition. He had objected that Vacant gathered too much from too few words.[100] One wonders how valid then is his statement: "the Quo fit at the beginning indicates clearly that the faith is normally supported, in actual reality (italics mine) on the sign of the contemporary Church and not on the Classic apologetic...."[101] The meaning seems to be rather unencumbered: Because the Church is gifted with so many wondrous signs and is so replete with evident testimony of her divine legation, she beckons to those who do not believe and strengthens those who do. There is nothing here to occasion the words normally or in actual reality.

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[96] Aubert points out this doctrine has been neglected by the theologians of recent times. Op.cit., 195.

[97] See Vacant, op.cit., 155-63.

[98] See Aegidius Forcellini, Totius Latinitatis Lexicon(Prati, Aldina Edente, 1871) 5.47, "Quin", n.12.

[99] See Aubert, op.cit., 201.

Thus it would seem that the validity of the classic apologetic still obtains. It is not to be minimized. And presenting the Church as such a treasure of credibility merely brings to the fore something which had been overlooked. Further these two facts coalesce to render the faith always credible. To exclude either one of these approaches, therefore, does not seem right. But because of the force given to the Church as represented above, it is reasonable to admit that the Vatican Council recognized the superior worth of the Church in an apologetic.[102]

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[100] See Ibid., 202, n.147.

[101] "Le Quo fit du début indique clairement que la foi s'appuie normalement, dans la réalité actuelle, sur le signe de l'Église contemporaine, et non sur l'apologétique classique. . . ." Ibid., 201.

[102] See Aubert, op.cit., 201-02. It is superior in that the rational conclusive proof (not in the sense of demonstration, rather a cogent argument) derives from miracles and prophecies, external facts. But

Nevertheless it is still the mind of the council to say that the miracles and prophecies spoken of in paragraph two remain the most outstanding outward signs of God's revelation. Paragraph five does not contradict this. It portrays the Church as alone possessing these marvels. And more because she is so real and vibrant she is the more easily recognizable as a perpetual motive of credibility than these other wonders which are not so present. Moreover it is not the intent of this paragraph to offer the Church as alone established to furnish subjective reasonableness while the second deals with the objective reasonableness occasioned by miracles and prophecies. For if these latter are accomodated

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because man is so often moved by the heart rather than the head, by his deep religious aspirations, by seeing something as good rather than as true, the Church in her goodness is truly a superior force and motive of credibility. See P. DeLetter, S.J., "Faith and Apologetics," *Irish Ecclesiastical Record*, 5s. 82 (1954) 310-21. Also D.J.B. Hawkins, Rev. D. D., "The Plain Man's Motives of Credibility," *The Clergy Review*, n.s. 28 (1947) 289-99. See also Joseph C. Fenton. *We Stand with Christ* Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1942) 85. It is easy to see that Archbishop Dechamps influenced this paragraph on the Church as a motive of credibility. A few samples from his writings will illustrate this fact. "L'Église. . .n'est pas seulement un motif de crédibilité proprement dit, mais. . .il est pour nous le principal, celui qui se distingue de tous les autres, en ce qu'il est *présent, public, notoire*, . . .et en ce qu'il est *vivant, parlant, se manifestant et s'expliquant* lui-même." And "ce motif, suffisant pour donner un fondement rationnel à la foi des simples, est nécessaire aussi à la foi des savants, la raison n'arrivant à la foi divine, selon l'ordre général établi par la Providence, . . .que par sa soumission à une autorité vivante qui prouve elle-même sa mission." ("Du fait de l'Église," *Oeuvres complets*, Maline, 1879-1880, 15.340-41; from Aubert, *op.cit*., 144) "Les miracles et les prophéties, ne sont pas les seuls faits démonstratifs de la révélation, l'Église se trouvant être elle-même un puissant motif de crédibilité par ses caractères qui sont des faits à leur tour, des faits publics et splendides, de vrais miracles *permanents*, dit Boussuet, et qui *prouvent la vérité de tous les autres*." ("Entretiens sur la démonstration catholique de la religion chrétienne," *Ouvres complets*, Préface, 1.15; from Aubert *op.cit*., 195) "La Providence a établi l'Église elle-même son temoin sur la terre, temoin vivant et parlant, qui prouve lui-même sa mission divine par ses caractères substitants." ("Entretiens", 37; from Aubert, 195) See Aubert, *op.cit*., 142-44, 149-50, 195-97, for further discussion of Dechamps' influence.

to every intelligence they must be more than just objectively capable of rendering revelation credible. It is of the very nature of these facts to attest to and convince any mind of the credibility of the statement: God has truly spoken.[103]

The fourth paragraph needed no canon because it sufficiently propounded the doctrine; this fifth paragraph does not have a correlative canon because it is so intimately connected with the doctrine of the sixth paragraph.

SIXTH PARAGRAPH: CANON SIX

The Church as an external grace has been designated to help one come to the faith. In addition internal helps are lavished upon those outside the fold to move them toward the truth. And by the same help of grace God enables the faithful to persevere in their faith for He does not abandon unless he is first abandoned. In this way the paragraph introduces the error combatted. Hermes enunciated it:

> In all my studies I have diligently preserved my intention of doubting everything that I could, and then deciding for one or the other side only when I could offer absolute proof of reason for that opinion. . . .Perhaps it would be more desirable to be free from these doubts rather than be satisfied by them. But this is not valid for the future doctors of religion. They must know what they do by seeking knowledge through great study; they ought to pursue all the labyrinthine ways of doubts, that thence they themselves by doubting can offer themselves as companions through every circuitous route.[104]

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[103] See Aubert, op.cit., 201, n.147.

[104] "Omnibus hisce meis studiis propositum meum sancte servavi ubique dubitandi quamdiu possem; et tum demum definitive pro alterutra parte decernendi, quando absolutam necessitatem rationis pro una sententia exhibere possem. . . .Fuerit optabilius, si placet, huiusmodi dubiis carere quam iis satisfacere posse; pro futuris doctoribus religionis hoc non valet. Ii debent scire, se nescire, ut scientiam magno studio

Before treating this error and its consequences the phrase non deserens nisi deseratur demands some attention. Saint Augustine used it in hid discussion on grace.[105] In his context it meant that man when he fell was assured recovery through the mediation of Christ. That is, He justifies them. And further that they might continue always in this holy state he leads them to the perfect life, non deserit, si non deseratur. Thus Augustine is definitely referring to that grace which perdures--sanctifying grace.[106] Then Trent uses this phrase when speaking of the possibility and necessity of observing the commandments: "For God does not forsake those who have once been justified by His grace, unless He be first forsaken by them."[107] Again man remains in the state of grace as long as he does not desert God. Thus from its sources one might expect this same sense to obtain in this text. But it does not.[108] Rather it

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quaerant; debent labyrinthum dubiorum per omnes circuitus peragrare, ut deinde ipsi dubitantibus per omnes anfractus comites se dare possint." Intr. Phil. ad theol. praef., from Mansi, 50.90. n.1. From this passage the stimulating character attributed to doubt is evidenced. And obviously certitude is not legitimate until the torturous ways of doubt have been travelled. See Pierre Charles, S. J. "Le concile du Vatican et l'acte de foi," Nouvelle revue théologique, 52 (1925) 515.

[105] De Natura et gratia 26 (29) (ML 44.261)

[106] Aubert does not think so for he remarks that it is a grace also applied to sinners. But it does not seem possible to interpret the passage in this way. It reads: "Ipse autem Deus, cum per mediatorem Dei et hominum, hominem Jesum Christum (1 Tim. 2:5) spiritualiter sanat aequm vel vivificat mortuum, id est justificat impium, et cum ad perfectam sanitatem, hoc est, ad perfectam vitam justitiamque perduxent, non deserit, si non deseratur, ut pie semper justeque vivatur." The "ut pie semper vivatur" would surely indicate he is talking about the justified man with reference to the "non deserit, . . ." Ibid., see Aubert, op.cit., 202, n.148.

[107] ES, 804; Trent, sess. 6, ch. 11.

[108] Vacant, op.cit., 172-3, would apply it so and not relate it to faith directly.

is obvious from the text and notes that those graces directly related to faith are intended here. The adnotatio explains it: "Therefore just as by following grace and cooperating with it men are drawn to faith by the father of lights so by neglecting grace and resisting it they fall from faith, . . ."[109]

And because this assured grace confirms the faithful there is a great difference between them and the non-Catholic. The non-Catholic under the impulse of grace is urged (and justified in doing so) to question and to change his faith whereas the Catholic never has any reason to change or to doubt his faith. And this under the preserving impulse of grace. This latter part of the paragraph provides the condemnation in the sixth canon.

That condemnation like others before it is complex in structure but singular in purpose. The anathema is leveled at those who consider the Catholic and non-Catholic to be equal in relation to their faith so that the Catholic may call his faith into doubt, suspend it and even change it.

The evolution of this sixth canon is rather interesting and gives a particular meaning or sense to the condemnation. Franzelin had offered a canon very much like the one approved.[110] But when Kleutgen presented the reformed schema to the Deputation the first part was deleted so that there was no mention of the similar conditions prevailing between Catholic and non-Catholic.[111] Then at the seventh session of the Deputation Archbishop Simor advised a return to the original form presented.[112] Although the reason for it is not recorded he must have concluded the deleted portion was necessary to the sense of the canon. The Deputation was in full accord with it in any case. A final attempt was made by Archbishop Melchers to truncate this canon.[113] But Martin intervened and pointed out that the necessity of the first part derived from the fact that it is not wrong for the non-Catholic to doubt whereas the Catholic cannot be granted this same liberty.[114] And thus it is erroneous to claim their conditions as the same.

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[109] "Sicut ergo sequendo gratiam eique cooperando homines trahuntur a patre luminum ad fidem, ita gratiam negligendo eique resistendo a fide deficiunt, . . ." Mansi, 50.94B_{6-10}.

[110] See Ibid., 66; ch. 2, p.42-43.

Furthermore the error as listed in the twentieth note links the two parts together as cause and effect. For the error is condemned insofar as it says the condition of the faithful and those who have not yet come to the faith is equal in regard to the firmness and constancy of assent and the independence of examination and therefore insofar as it says the faithful Catholic can lawfully questin or suspend his faith.[115] And the canon itself substantiates this by the use of ita ut which has place only in a result clause.[116]

So far the disparity existing between the faithful and non-Catholic has been oft repeated. Franzelin mentioned it was an "immenso inter-

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[111] See Mansi, 53.169C; ch. 3, p.85

[112] See Ibid., $189B_3$.

[113] See Mansi, 51.221C.

[114] See Ibid., 334D.

[115] See Mansi, $50.95A_{12-18}$.

[116] See Aubert, op.cit., 211-13, for a detailed discussion.

vallo."[117] He then explained that it derived principally from the "necessity and divine precept of faith; from the credibility of the whole revealed truth, as revelation is proposed and preached by the Catholic Church, and the immutable certitude even for the unlearned under scientific and philosophical scrutiny; from the light of faith and the supernatural firmness of faith."[118] It stands to reason that "without faith it is impossible to please God," and if it is gravely sinful to once be enlightened by the true faith and then fall away[119] that God would insure man against this. He did just that by implanting in the structure of His Church those things required to make certain the fact of revelation and its credibility. So cogent are these that not even the most detailed search will cause one to waver in belief. Moreover the firmness of the faith which is supernatural arises from grace. And this grace will strengthen and confirm the faithful for they have truth.[120]

This leads directly to the major question about this paragraph. It concerns the perseverence in the faith and the culpability of one defecting or doubting. Granderath asks the question in this way, "Is it defined by the council that those who have received the faith under the magisterium of the Church cannot question or change their faith without formal sin."[121] Vacant asks the question, "Did the council intend to say that it is impossible that a Catholic place his religion in doubt in good faith and without sin, or rather did it wish to say only that he cannot have reasons for it, legitimate in themselves, for doubting the Catholic faith."[122] For both it was not a question of conciliar decree. It was, rather, a matter of intention: what teaching could be taken from this conciliar decree. These theologians contend the council only taught there was no legitimate reason, no objective reason, for a Catholic to doubt his faith--hence the objective position. Kleutgen says, "This question depends especially on the assistance of God and the light of grace. Since it is God who gives perserverence in the faith and since he has made this perseverence the condition of eternal salvation, he does not refuse his helps from those who ask it and does not deprive from this grace of faith those who have not by their resistance made themselves unworthy." And a little further on he says, "No one loses the faith without a fault against the faith."[123] Scheeben is characteristically severe, "It is always a crime to deny the Catholic faith when one has formally accepted and possessed it as such. . . There is always an imperative duty as well as rational possibility on both the subjective and objective side to remain firmly attached to it."[124] Kleutgen and Scheeben then hold the subjective position. And with them Harent is in full agreement.[125] Still Harent observes with perspicacity that there is no question of definition here. Such divergent views held among theologians confirms this.[126]

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[117] Mansi, 50.66A_{17}.

[118] *Ibid.*, 92A_{7-13}.

[119] See *Ibid.*, 92B_{16}.

[120] See *Ibid.*, 92-5, where the reasoning is given at long length.

[121] "Sitne a concilio definitu, eos qui fidem sub Ecclesiae magisterio susceperunt, sine peccato formali eamdem fidem mutare vel in dubium vocare non posse?" *Constitutiones dogmaticae sacrosancti oecumenici conilii Vaticani* (Friburgi Brisgoviae; Herder, 1892) 61.

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[122] Le Concile a-t-il entendu dire qu'il est impossible qu'un catholique mette sa religion en doute de bonne foi et sans pécher, ou bien a-t-il entendu dire seulement qu'll ne peut y avoir de raisons en soi légitimes de douter de la foi catholique?" Op.cit., 165.

[123] "Wie so eben erklärt wurde, hängt dieselbe vorzugsweise von dem Beistand Gottes und dem Lichte der Gnade ab. Weil nun Gott Standhaftigkeit im Glauben fordert, und sie zur Bedingung des ewigen Heiles gemacht hat; so ist es gewiss, dass er seine Hülfe dem, der sie sucht, nicht versagt, und die Gnade des Glaubens keinem nimmit, der sich nicht durch Widerstand derselben unẅurdig macht. . ." Die Theologie der Vorzeit. (Munster: Letzter Band., 1860) cited from Textus et documenta: De obligatione catholicorum perseverandi in fide, collected by Henricus Lennerz, S.J.3(Rome: Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, 1932) 63.

Always the middle ground is open for a tack. And this is done by Aubert.[127] He is neither subjectivist nor objectivist. For him the council took cognizance of both. The council though not defining anything in regard to the culpability in any individual case did declare than an apostasy could never have a really valid reason. And it is not to be averred that the conversion of a Catholic is justifiable as is the non-Catholic's. However, he says, the council did not exclude the possibility of one having apparently cogent reasons for apostasy. For him, it can be deduced that in the majority of cases some kind of culpability redounds to the person who defects after a scientific examination of Catholicism.[128] This might be called a mitigated subjectivist position for it does admit culpability in the majority of cases but not always.

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[124] "C'est toujours un crime de rétracter la foi catholique, quand on l'a formellement acceptée comme telle et possedée. . .Il y a toujours, soit du côté de l'object, soit du côté du sujet, devoir impérieux en même temps que possibilitié rationnelle d'y rester immuablement attaché." *La dogmatique*, French trans. (Paris, 1877) t. 1, #46 p.547-8; taken from Harent, *art.cit.*, 299. The German reads more forcefully: "Dagegen ist unbedingt moralisch unmöglich und daher immer unberechtight und frevelhaft die Retraktation des katholischen Glaubens, nachdem man denselben formell als solchen angenommen und besessen hat. . .Folglich ist der katholische Glaube als solcher zwar nicht physisch unzerstörbar, wohl aber in der Weise schlechtin unumstösslich und unwiderruflich, dass er nur durch ein unvernünftiges und unsittliches Verhalten zurückgenommen werden kann, und das bei ihm nicht bloss objektiv sondern auch subjektive stets, wie die gebieterische Pflicht, so zugleich die vernünftige Möglichkeit besteht, demselben unwande bar treu zu bleiben." *Handbuch der katholischen Dogmatik* (Friburg: Herder Book Co. 1873) 1.350,357. See Anselm Stolz, O.S.B. who reasons that Scheeben actually agrees with his position. "Was definiert das vatikanische Konzil uber den Glaubenszweifel?" *Theologische Quartalschrift*, III (1930) 555-6.

[125] See *art. cit.*, 298.

[126] See Harent, *art.cit.*, 291.

[127] Although Stolz, *art.cit.*, 524, says to find middle ground is impossible.

Another and the final view is that of Anselm Stolz. Both the objectivist and subjectivist opinions were, for him foreign to the thought of the council. Since, as he said, the error was specified to a great degree, namely, concerning only the intellectual who was counselled to doubt his faith, the teaching of the paragraph has only him in view. The simple (*rudes*) are not at all included in this declaration and their apostasy could easily be formally or subjectively inculpable. But the council exempts them from intention. Thus these intellectuals or as Hermes had put it, the future doctors, are not excused from guilt if they abandon their religion after a scientific inquiry into its credibility.[129]

No attempt will be made to counter the subjective or objective views. Aubert it seems forces a conclusion contrary to the facts and this will be pointed out as the explanation allied with Stolz's develops.

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[128] See Aubert, *op.cit.*, 219.

[129] See Stolz, *art.cit.*, 519-60. Note on pages 559-60 that he does admit a well educated man, though not so educated in his faith, could fall into invincible error regarding Catholic doctrine. For a refutation of both the subjectivist and objectivist schools see pages 528, 543-44. See also Romano Guardini, *The Life of Faith*, trans. John Chapin(Westminster, Md: The Newman Press, 1961) 19-20, where he describes the loss of faith of one who has hardly been educated in the faith.

It seems Stolz more nearly approximates the meaning intended by the council.

To begin, it is wise to ascertain who is not included in this teaching. And immediately the simple must be removed from any kind of condemnation. For in the twentieth note it is stated that the rudes, the simple, are completely excluded from consideration. Some theologians, as Franzelin remarked, felt these could under certain circumstances fall into error and this invincibly; without formal sin. "But these. . .are very foreign to the heresy proposed to be examined by the council."[130]

This is not all. A greater portion, even the majority, can be excluded from consideration. Mention must be made that the council was not convened to combat an error which was disrupting the ordinary Catholic populace. It was a technical problem which far exceeded the capabilities of the average Catholic let alone piqued his curiosity. It was, in short, an intellectual error (though with far reaching effects) of the schools which the council had in mind.

Yet there seems to be an anomaly in the twentieth note. For most assuredly there is evidence that the majority of Catholics would not fall under the burden of this teaching. And admittedly all Catholics are included in the doctrine of the paragraph, but all Catholics who have a certain character or quality. For they must be able to conduct a scientific examination (scientificam examen) of their credibility and let their faith depend absolutely on it just as (ita. . . quemadmodum) Hermes advised for theological students and all who could conduct such a scientific examination (*qui scientifico examini sunt idonei*).[131]

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[130] ". . .sed ab haeresi, quae sacro concilio examinanda proponitur, sunt alienissima." Mansi, 50.95D_{13}.

Archbishop Simor explained the error in this paragraph not only allowed the Catholic to search (*inquirere*) but demanded that he make a study of his motives of credibility. And the sanon condemned among others the Hermesian school.[132] Martin, too, in his preliminary remarks, isolates the segment of Catholics included in this condemnation--not expressly, however, but he used that very indicative word (scientificam).[133]

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[131] "Expositioni doctrinae catholicae respondet damnatio erroris oppositi. Haereseos autem damnatur error, quatenus quoad firmitatem et constantiam assensus et quoad independentiam examinis par esse dicitur conditio fidelium et eorum qui ad fidem unice veram nondum pervenerunt; et quatenus propterea dicitur, *universim* fideles catholicos licite posse in dubium vocare aut suspendere suam fidem, quam ante *scientificum examen* sub magisterio ecclesiae susceperunt, ita ut ab hoc subsequente examine pendere debeat, utrum fides catholica eis retinenda an reiicienda sit; *quemadmodum* G. Hermes hortatur candidatos theologiae et consequenter omnes saltem eos, qui *scientifico examini sunt idonei*, ut dum in inquisitione versantur, ergo quamvis religionem 'exempli gratia catholicam aut christianam' omnino indifferenter se habeant, sibique persuadeant, sancte se agere 'sequendo rationem quocunque demum ea deduxerit'," Mansi, $50.95A_{11}$-B_{10}. The italics are mine. "*Universim*" is used by Aubert first to mean all inclusive, *op.cit.*, 212. Later he gives it the meaning of the majority, 217. The "*scientificum examen*" reappears often. Is there a contradiction between the "*universim*" and "*scientificum examen*?" No, for it is a universal right for those who have the necessary equipment. The "quemadmodum" attests to that, for it is just as Hermes had said. Moreover it indicates the error of A. Schmid has the same conclusion as Hermes'.

[132] "Deinde constituitur et docetur necessitas fidei, et indicatur deinde ubi fides vera inveniatur contra illos, qui dicunt catholicos sicut et protestantes, suspenso assensu, in motiva credibilitatis fidei suae *inquirere posse* et *debere*, ideoque catholicorum conditionem eamdem esse ac protestantium quoad certitudinem et constantiam fide." Mansi, $51.47C_{14-20}$. "Canon quintus contra scholam Hermesianam: quemadmodum ei tam canon sextus contra illam et contra alios errores, sicuti reverendissimi episcopi Germaniae dixerunt, late in Germania propagatos." *Ibid.* $47D_{8-11}$. This is against the Hermesians (a school of thought) and against the idea that a Catholic has the moral obligation, must, *debere*, search into (not just cursorily, for *inquirere* means to sift and sort) his motives of credibility.

[133] "Huic magnae revelationis manifestationi accedit iuxta paragraphum sextam auxilium internae Dei gratiae, qua non credentes ad credendum excitat, et credentes in fide confirmat. Qua quidem doctrina

This word connotes at least some advanced schooling and the intelligence to conduct an orderly research.

Although nowhere in these passages do we find the definite statement: Only intellectuals are under consideration here, enough has been cited to attest to the thesis that the council had in mind a particular group of people, not the simple, nor even the ordinary Catholic but, rather, only the Catholic intellectual.[134]

Now this Catholic intellectual, is he always gravely culpable for his defection? No doubt this is a very moot question. The council did not come out positively and define concerning the culpability of the defector. But because of this silence a demonstrative argument in favor of one opinion or the other cannot be formulated.[135] It is not demonstrative yet it does have value, but only when proofs to the contrary do not obtain.

Behind the opinions on this point is the one hundred and sixth amendment where Dupanloup suggests the substitution of vera et iusta causa in place of licite in the canon. The reasons he asserted are two: a) to conform to the text of the paragraph and b) to show that there

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ille late diffusus error capitalis excluditur, qui fidelibus ius vindicat, susceptam fidem in dubium vocare et assensum suum suspendere, donec de veritate fidei scientificam sibi comparaverint persuasionem." Ibid. 314B9-17. There is no doubt about the capabilities required and indicated by this scientificam.

[134] See Stolz, art.cit., 556 and n.2; also Aubert, op.cit., 209-11.

[135] Aubert, op.cit., 216, asks, if the council wished to formally teach that the loss of faith is always gravely culpable, more or less in the case of the intellectual, is it not evident that it would have said it more explicitly and that for their part the redactors would have drawn attention to an affirmation of such importance?

are no cases where an objectively just cause for doubting is valid.[136] The deputation struck the word *vera* contained as it is in the word *iusta*. This, as Martin remarked, satisfied the intention of Dupanloup.[137] It has been suggested that because of this change and comment by Martin the possibility of a non-culpable defection is established.[138] The questions naturally arise: what was meant by the term *licite*?, what was meant by the *iustam causam*? From the fact that the paragraph used *iustam causam* and the canon *licite* it would seem they had qual force and meaning. For surely a new idea was not going to be expressed in the canon that was not so indicated in the paragraph.[139] The change from *licite* to *iustam causam* in the canon parallels the advised change in the fifth paragraph.[140] There the suggestion was dismissed not because a new meaning would ensue but rather to conform to the words of the council whence it derived.

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[136] The second reason: "quin semper et in omnibus casus veram erit, iustam obiective causam dubitandi non haberi posse." Mansi, 51.231A.

[137] See Ibid., 334C_4-D_2.

[138] See Dhanis, *art.cit.*, 29; also Aubert *op.cit.*, 216-17, n.184. In the 1945 edition of Aubert, Martin is made simply to confirm, "entérina", Dupanloup's opinion; in the 1950 edition, Martin "willingly rallies to his proposition," "se rallia volontiers à sa proposition." Martin actually says: "Quod ad hanc emendationem pertinet, censuit Deputatio huic satisfaciendum esse cum hac parva modificatione, ut vox veram, quam proponit illustrissimus auctor, omittatur, cum sensus huius vocis in voce *iustam* iam contineatur. Placeat igitur vobis, reverendissimi patres, ut pro *veram et iustam* ponatur simpliciter *iustam causam habere*. Ei iam satisfactum est intentioni reverendissimi patris." Mansi, 51.334C_{12}-D_2. Note that although Bishop Dupanloup had advised removing the *scientificam* nothing is said here about it. Are we to fabricate some argument from this silence? Is not the most that can be said: the Deputation decided this was necessary for the sense of the canon?

[139] See Stolz, *art.cit.*, 523.

[140] See above, ch. 3, p.99.

Again consentiendo replaced assentiendo so that there would be conformity to the statement of the council from whence it came.[141] Thus there is no need to infer that a different meaning was assigned to each word.[142] It is rather in keeping with the general procedure followed in arriving at a suitable document. It cannot be averred that the word licite suggests a subjective and objective guilt whereas numquam iustam causam only connotes an objective invalidity. True Dupanloup does offer this word objective in his second reason. But nothing is said about it by Martin. Simply he stated the word veram is not needed and to delete it does not counter the intention of Dupanloup.[143] Is there some special significance to licite that would prompt one to draw such a conclusion? Any prohibition which is ex toto genere suo grave means that the act is never licit. Yet no one dares intimate subjective guilt necessarily follows. As in all sins, ignorance excuses, insufficiency of will-consent excuses. But these are precisely the points on which the simple and non-learned are excused. They do not apply to the scholar or one who has the capability for a scientific search.[144]

Firstly the position is stated openly by Martin when he replied that the faithful who have received the faith must not doubt or question the faith (quod fideles fidem susceptam non in dubium vocare debeant).[145] And again he stated even more strongly that "Catholics and faithful must never call their faith into doubt."[146] Here the numquam leaves room for no exceptions. The passage cannot be understood as Aubert shows by his translation, "that Catholics are never obliged to question their faith."[147] For the passage posits a moral obligation which prohibits an action whereas his rendition discounts any moral obligation altogether. The passage says it must not be done; Aubert says, in fact, one doesn't have to do it, but one may. And this is quite contrary to the meaning he gives to nunquam in relation to the fourth canon. There he commends the prudential character of the canon in that it condemns those who say that a miracle is never discernible with certitude. Thus sometimes or even often they are not. The never would, of course, exclude exceptions. Yet he does not allow this in the present circumstance. This is illogical.[148] The council is not simply suggesting that a person does not have the obligation to doubt the faith. It is much stronger. It says that under no circumstances, without any exceptions, may this be done. The council does not state it is physically impossible. It affirms it is morally wrong to do so. And this leads to the second point of discussion in this regard.

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[141] See above, ch. 3, p.93.

[142] See Aubert, op.cit., 216, n.184.

[143] See Dhanis, art.cit., 29, where he finds great weight to Aubert's argument from this fact.

[144] Aubert believes the scholar can, out of weakness or ignorance, be excused: "Bref, le concile réfuse de concécer à la raison le droit de doute qu'elle révendique indûment, mais il n'est nullement dit pour cela qu'il entend réfuser en même temps à la faiblesse et à l'erreur (qui se rencontrent même chez les intellectuels) toute possibilité d'excuse." Op.cit., 217-18.

It is established: under no pretext is there any just reason for questioning the faith, i.e., it is a moral aberration to do so. But now is this a formally grave violation? In relation to the material gravity of the sin there is no doubt as to its serious character. The three pertinent passages which show formal guilt are given in full. They are from the notes explaining the doctrine of this section. There is a logical progression from the one to the other which will unfold naturally.

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[145] Mansi, 51.315A$_5$.

[146] "catholici et fideles numquam debeant fidem suam vocare in dubium." Ibid., 328C.

[147] "Lesquels ne sont jamais obligés de revoque en doute leur foi." Op.cit., 217.

[148] See Aubert, op.cit., 176. His choice of "ne sont jamais obligés" to translate "nunquam debeant" is unfortunate. It seems that because of this he is able to conclude that there are cases, though exceptional, where a Catholic scholar can non-culpably suspend his faith and/or defect from it.

> In principles of this kind in the final analysis explicitly or at least equivalently the divine precept of faith is denied shereby just as a careful inquiry and adoption of the faith is required in relation to a sufficiently set forth proposal both as a necessary consequence of the very fact of divine revelation as well as by the clear promulgation of divine law for those who have not yet come to the faith, so for the faithful constancy in the faith (is prescribed) and by this very fact just as the denial is forbidden under pain of eternal damnation so the deliberate doubt in regard to any revealed truth once sufficiently proposed.[149]
>
> Thus is declared of the true faith: both the necessity of means from the doctrine of the Apostle, Hebrews 11:6; and the precept of Jesus Christ to believe the entire doctrine for which purpose he sent his legates to preach to all creatures; and the words of Paul briefly cited (show) the consequent gravity of their sin who once were enlightened by the true faith and have fallen away.[150]

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[149] "In huiusmodi autem principiis postremo explicite vel saltem aequipollenter negatur divinum praeceptum fidei, quo tum per necessariam consequentiam ex ipso facto divinae revelationis tum diserta promulgatione divinae legis praescribitur tam iis, qui ad veram fidem nondum pervenerunt, prudens ac sedula inquisitio et ad sufficientem propositionem susceptio fidei, quam fidelibus constatis in fide, hocque ipso vetatur sub reatu damnationis aeternae sicut negatio ita dubium deliberatum circa veritatem quamcumque revelatam sufficienter propositam." Mansi, 50.90C$_{12}$-91A$_{9}$. Italics mine.

[150] "Declaratur itaque verae fidei tum necessitas medii ex doctrina apostoli Hebr. XI,6, tum praeceptum Iesu Christi credendi totam doctrinam, ad quam praedicandam omni creaturae misit suos legatos, tum inde consequens gravitas peccati eorum, qui semel per veram fidem illuminati et prolapsi sunt, ubi verba Pauli solummodo summatim citantur." Ibid., 92B$_{12}$-C$_{1}$.

> On the other hand, however, the God of truth through His grace confirms the faithful in the truth of the faith once known, and in the timely help of the believers the Lord is strength who will not abandon unless abandoned. Therefore just as by following grace and cooperating with it men are drawn to faith by the father of lights, so by neglecting grace and resisting it they fall from the faith as the Apostle says: some rejecting good conscience...have made shipwreck of the faith.[151]

In the first passage the gravity of the sin is set forth. For the person by the very fact that he doubts is subject to eternal damnation. The second passage presents the Scriptural testimony to this statement[152] and the third demonstrates that only because one deserts is he deserted. Remembering again that the capable intellect is our subject, it must be stated the council convicts him of formal sin who deliberately doubts just as he is guilty who denies. It is important to notice that grace is at hand in this decision.[153] The notes mention as does the paragraph non deserens nisi deseratur. And this is not merely an adage, common saying, proverb as Aubert would make it thus weakening its force.[154] It means just what is said in the third citation--a neglect and resistance of grace ends in defection from the faith. That in certain cases and circumstances the divine light is not sufficient is the basic reason why the non-capable are invincible in their act. But the doubt must be deliberate (again showing the mental caliber of the person involved.) And since this grace mentioned above operates on the level of deliberate activity it must be concluded: if a person deliberately doubts, that one is deliberately rejecting the graces proffered. For to perform a deliberate act means a knowledgeable will-act for which one is responsible.

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[151] "Ex adverso autem Deus veritatis per suam gratiam fideles in semel agnita fidei veritate confirmat, atque ita in auxilio opportuno credentium fortitudo Dominus est, qui non deserit, nisi deseratur. Sicut ergo sequendo gratiam eique cooperando homines trahuntur a patre luminium ad fidem, ita gratiam negeligendo eiqui resistendo a fide deficiunt, ut ait apostolus: bonam conscientiam. . .quidam repellentes circa fidem naufragaverunt." Ibid. $94B_{2-10}$.

[152] Aubert maintains that since only a divine precept is set forth there is no question of formal sin. ". . .il s'ait simplement d'un péché matériel puisque le seul argument invoque est l'éxistence d'un précepte divin." Op.cit., 217, n.186.

[153] Romano Guardini in his The Faith and Modern Man, trans. Charlotte Forsyth(New York: Pantheon Books, 1952) (which treats faith's intimate relationship to man's life) has this to say of one who becomes so enmeshed in the questions (representing the world which faith must "overcome") that faith seems to disintegrate: "one day his eyes were opened; the spell had lost its hold, and he was free once more. The questions themselves, in so far as they represented genuine problems remained, but they had lost their destructive power." p.87. This seems to express quite well the supernatural help of grace.

The least, material sin, is predicated of all those who defect from the faith. But the theme of this whole chapter would indicate that the evidence of credibility plus the divine help is such to insure that a Catholic never will have to fear that by his study he will disprove his motives of credibility and thence his faith.

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[154] See Ibid., 215.

CONCLUSION

Although Pius IX formally suspended the Vatican Council on October 20, 1870, it was July 19, 1870 that signalled the end of the proceedings of this august assembly. No longer was there "quiet, peace and time to complete so great a work".[1] But between December 28, 1869, the beginning of the discussions, and April 24, 1870, the final approval of the Constitution Dei Filius, much work had been done. The climax of that Constitution was the third chapter De Fide.

It cannot be claimed that the dogmatic truths contained therein were formulated now for the first time. For the errors prompting this definition had been condemned previously as the need arose. What was effected here partook, it is true, of the old doctrine but imparted a vitality of its own.

Faith had meaning at Trent and it did not change. But the Vatican boldly underscored the radical separateness between it and scientific knowledge. Again and again "the authority of God revealing" charges the definition of faith.

As an assent faith shares mental activity, but it is an assent dependent on the command of the will. And yet reason does not rebel since the evidences portrayed in revelation itself and the dynamic wonders and beauty of the Church guarantee the reasonableness of faith. Together with man's innate ability to perceive these marvels the needed graces entice man to recognize that God has spoken.

And though a necessary part of salutary life, man retains the freedom, even after credibility has been ascertained, to refuse further thought or assent, nay more, even to disbelieve.

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[1] Mansi 49.55D; see chapter 2, p.32.

Yet God reassures the one who has received this supernatural gift. Grace will not be lacking. For him Goodness promises sufficient illumination of intellect and incentives to will to hold boldly and tenaciously to the committed Way.

This is the doctrine of the Church--in a brief chapter, a lucid proclamation.

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